From 73e9a2eb3c25a844ee2198d6d4e15c6da8d57555 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tk-Glitch Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2022 00:07:43 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] linux 6.1.y: Update our unprivileged CLONE_NEWUSER patch to current --- ...sallow-unprivileged-CLONE_NEWUSER-by.patch | 233 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 114 insertions(+), 119 deletions(-) diff --git a/linux-tkg-patches/6.1/0001-add-sysctl-to-disallow-unprivileged-CLONE_NEWUSER-by.patch b/linux-tkg-patches/6.1/0001-add-sysctl-to-disallow-unprivileged-CLONE_NEWUSER-by.patch index 58ef23c..000c6b6 100644 --- a/linux-tkg-patches/6.1/0001-add-sysctl-to-disallow-unprivileged-CLONE_NEWUSER-by.patch +++ b/linux-tkg-patches/6.1/0001-add-sysctl-to-disallow-unprivileged-CLONE_NEWUSER-by.patch @@ -1,124 +1,48 @@ -From 5ec2dd3a095442ec1a21d86042a4994f2ba24e63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -Message-Id: <5ec2dd3a095442ec1a21d86042a4994f2ba24e63.1512651251.git.jan.steffens@gmail.com> -From: Serge Hallyn -Date: Fri, 31 May 2013 19:12:12 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] add sysctl to disallow unprivileged CLONE_NEWUSER by default - -Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn -[bwh: Remove unneeded binary sysctl bits] -Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay ---- - kernel/fork.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ - kernel/sysctl.c | 12 ++++++++++++ - kernel/user_namespace.c | 3 +++ - 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c -index 07cc743698d3668e..4011d68a8ff9305c 100644 ---- a/kernel/fork.c -+++ b/kernel/fork.c -@@ -102,6 +102,11 @@ - - #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS - #include -+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS -+extern int unprivileged_userns_clone; -+#else -+#define unprivileged_userns_clone 0 -+#endif - - /* - * Minimum number of threads to boot the kernel -@@ -1555,6 +1560,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( - if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) - return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - -+ if ((clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) -+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) -+ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); -+ - /* - * Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads - * can only be started up within the thread group. -@@ -2348,6 +2357,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(unshare, unsigned long, unshare_flags) - if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS) - unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS; - -+ if ((unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) { -+ err = -EPERM; -+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) -+ goto bad_unshare_out; -+ } -+ - err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags); - if (err) - goto bad_unshare_out; -diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c -index b86520ed3fb60fbf..f7dab3760839f1a1 100644 ---- a/kernel/sysctl.c -+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c -@@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ extern int core_uses_pid; - - #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) - -+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS -+extern int unprivileged_userns_clone; -+#endif - /* Constants used for minimum and maximum */ - - #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS -@@ -513,6 +516,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, - }, - #endif -+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS -+ { -+ .procname = "unprivileged_userns_clone", -+ .data = &unprivileged_userns_clone, -+ .maxlen = sizeof(int), -+ .mode = 0644, -+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, -+ }, -+#endif - #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL - { - .procname = "tainted", -diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c -index c490f1e4313b998a..dd03bd39d7bf194d 100644 ---- a/kernel/user_namespace.c -+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c -@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ - #include - #include - -+/* sysctl */ -+int unprivileged_userns_clone; -+ - static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly; - static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex); - --- -2.15.1 - -From b5202296055dd333db4425120d3f93ef4e6a0573 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From d50977b164e708bf523a35ef53315355528c3ca6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jan Alexander Steffens (heftig)" -Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2017 13:50:48 +0100 -Subject: ZEN: Add CONFIG for unprivileged_userns_clone +Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2019 04:53:20 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] ZEN: Add sysctl and CONFIG to disallow unprivileged + CLONE_NEWUSER -This way our default behavior continues to match the vanilla kernel. +Our default behavior continues to match the vanilla kernel. --- - init/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++ - kernel/user_namespace.c | 4 ++++ - 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+) + include/linux/user_namespace.h | 4 ++++ + init/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++ + kernel/fork.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ + kernel/sysctl.c | 12 ++++++++++++ + kernel/user_namespace.c | 7 +++++++ + 5 files changed, 53 insertions(+) +diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h +index 45f09bec02c485..87b20e2ee27445 100644 +--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h ++++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h +@@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ static inline void set_userns_rlimit_max(struct user_namespace *ns, + + #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS + ++extern int unprivileged_userns_clone; ++ + static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns) + { + if (ns) +@@ -181,6 +183,8 @@ extern bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns); + struct ns_common *ns_get_owner(struct ns_common *ns); + #else + ++#define unprivileged_userns_clone 0 ++ + static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns) + { + return &init_user_ns; diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig -index 4592bf7997c0..f3df02990aff 100644 +index 94125d3b6893c7..9f7139b536f638 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig -@@ -1004,6 +1004,22 @@ config USER_NS - +@@ -1247,6 +1247,22 @@ config USER_NS + If unsure, say N. - + +config USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED + bool "Allow unprivileged users to create namespaces" + default y @@ -138,19 +62,90 @@ index 4592bf7997c0..f3df02990aff 100644 config PID_NS bool "PID Namespaces" default y +diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c +index 08969f5aa38d59..ff601cb7a1fae0 100644 +--- a/kernel/fork.c ++++ b/kernel/fork.c +@@ -98,6 +98,10 @@ + #include + #include + ++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS ++#include ++#endif ++ + #include + #include + #include +@@ -2008,6 +2012,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( + if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + ++ if ((clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) ++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) ++ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); ++ + /* + * Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads + * can only be started up within the thread group. +@@ -3166,6 +3174,12 @@ int ksys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags) + if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS) + unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS; + ++ if ((unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) { ++ err = -EPERM; ++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) ++ goto bad_unshare_out; ++ } ++ + err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags); + if (err) + goto bad_unshare_out; +diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c +index c6d9dec11b749d..9a4514ad481b21 100644 +--- a/kernel/sysctl.c ++++ b/kernel/sysctl.c +@@ -81,6 +81,9 @@ + #ifdef CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES + #include + #endif ++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS ++#include ++#endif + + /* shared constants to be used in various sysctls */ + const int sysctl_vals[] = { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 100, 200, 1000, 3000, INT_MAX, 65535, -1 }; +@@ -1659,6 +1662,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, + }, ++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS ++ { ++ .procname = "unprivileged_userns_clone", ++ .data = &unprivileged_userns_clone, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0644, ++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, ++ }, ++#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL + { + .procname = "tainted", diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c -index 6b9dbc257e34..107b17f0d528 100644 +index 54211dbd516c57..16ca0c1516298d 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c -@@ -27,7 +27,11 @@ +@@ -22,6 +22,13 @@ + #include #include - - /* sysctl */ + ++/* sysctl */ +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED +int unprivileged_userns_clone = 1; +#else - int unprivileged_userns_clone; ++int unprivileged_userns_clone; +#endif - ++ static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly; static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex); +