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linux-tkg/linux-tkg-patches/5.13/0012-linux-hardened.patch

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diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 995deccc28bc..d065ac0b2ea3 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -522,17 +522,6 @@
nosocket -- Disable socket memory accounting.
nokmem -- Disable kernel memory accounting.
- checkreqprot [SELINUX] Set initial checkreqprot flag value.
- Format: { "0" | "1" }
- See security/selinux/Kconfig help text.
- 0 -- check protection applied by kernel (includes
- any implied execute protection).
- 1 -- check protection requested by application.
- Default value is set via a kernel config option.
- Value can be changed at runtime via
- /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot.
- Setting checkreqprot to 1 is deprecated.
-
cio_ignore= [S390]
See Documentation/s390/common_io.rst for details.
clk_ignore_unused
@@ -3735,6 +3724,11 @@
the specified number of seconds. This is to be used if
your oopses keep scrolling off the screen.
+ extra_latent_entropy
+ Enable a very simple form of latent entropy extraction
+ from the first 4GB of memory as the bootmem allocator
+ passes the memory pages to the buddy allocator.
+
pcbit= [HW,ISDN]
pcd. [PARIDE]
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
index 68b21395a743..6a4961e27273 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
@@ -861,6 +861,8 @@ with respect to CAP_PERFMON use cases.
>=1 Disallow CPU event access by users without ``CAP_PERFMON``.
>=2 Disallow kernel profiling by users without ``CAP_PERFMON``.
+
+>=3 Disallow use of any event by users without ``CAP_PERFMON``.
=== ==================================================================
@@ -1384,6 +1386,26 @@ If a value outside of this range is written to ``threads-max`` an
``EINVAL`` error occurs.
+tiocsti_restrict
+================
+
+This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented from using the
+``TIOCSTI`` ioctl to inject commands into other processes which share a tty
+session.
+
+= ============================================================================
+0 No restriction, except the default one of only being able to inject commands
+ into one's own tty.
+1 Users must have ``CAP_SYS_ADMIN`` to use the ``TIOCSTI`` ioctl.
+= ============================================================================
+
+When user namespaces are in use, the check for ``CAP_SYS_ADMIN`` is done
+against the user namespace that originally opened the tty.
+
+The kernel config option ``CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT`` sets the default
+value of ``tiocsti_restrict``.
+
+
traceoff_on_warning
===================
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst
index 9a57e972dae4..35f70abc1207 100644
--- a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst
+++ b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst
@@ -685,6 +685,24 @@ tcp_comp_sack_nr - INTEGER
Default : 44
+tcp_simult_connect - BOOLEAN
+ Enable TCP simultaneous connect that adds a weakness in Linux's strict
+ implementation of TCP that allows two clients to connect to each other
+ without either entering a listening state. The weakness allows an attacker
+ to easily prevent a client from connecting to a known server provided the
+ source port for the connection is guessed correctly.
+
+ As the weakness could be used to prevent an antivirus or IPS from fetching
+ updates, or prevent an SSL gateway from fetching a CRL, it should be
+ eliminated by disabling this option. Though Linux is one of few operating
+ systems supporting simultaneous connect, it has no legitimate use in
+ practice and is rarely supported by firewalls.
+
+ Disabling this may break TCP STUNT which is used by some applications for
+ NAT traversal.
+
+ Default: Value of CONFIG_TCP_SIMULT_CONNECT_DEFAULT_ON
+
tcp_slow_start_after_idle - BOOLEAN
If set, provide RFC2861 behavior and time out the congestion
window after an idle period. An idle period is defined at
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index c45b770d3579..f9cc813e4838 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -920,7 +920,7 @@ config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address" if EXPERT
range ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT
- default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN
+ default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
help
This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to
@@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address for compatible applications" if EXPERT
range ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT
- default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN
+ default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
help
This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to
@@ -1131,6 +1131,7 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
config RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT
bool "Randomize kernel stack offset on syscall entry"
depends on HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
+ default y
help
The kernel stack offset can be randomized (after pt_regs) by
roughly 5 bits of entropy, frustrating memory corruption
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index 9f1d8566bbf9..3350691c225f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -1213,6 +1213,7 @@ config RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED
config ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN
bool "Emulate Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching"
+ default y
help
Enabling this option prevents the kernel from accessing
user-space memory directly by pointing TTBR0_EL1 to a reserved
@@ -1788,6 +1789,7 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE
bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image"
select ARM64_MODULE_PLTS if MODULES
select RELOCATABLE
+ default y
help
Randomizes the virtual address at which the kernel image is
loaded, as a security feature that deters exploit attempts
diff --git a/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig b/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig
index 9907a431db0d..a981d7b0635c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y
CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y
CONFIG_AUDIT=y
CONFIG_NO_HZ_IDLE=y
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
index 8d1c8dcb87fd..32c1609a1158 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
@@ -124,14 +124,10 @@
/*
* This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On
- * 64-bit, this is above 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
+ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
* space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers.
*/
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_FORCE_52BIT
-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (2 * TASK_SIZE_64 / 3)
-#else
-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (2 * DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW_64 / 3)
-#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_FORCE_52BIT */
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE 0x100000000UL
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
@@ -189,10 +185,10 @@ extern int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
/* 1GB of VA */
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
#define STACK_RND_MASK (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? \
- 0x7ff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \
- 0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
+ ((1UL << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \
+ ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
#else
-#define STACK_RND_MASK (0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
+#define STACK_RND_MASK (((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
#endif
#ifdef __AARCH64EB__
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 0045e1b44190..35adb5018505 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1191,8 +1191,7 @@ config VM86
default X86_LEGACY_VM86
config X86_16BIT
- bool "Enable support for 16-bit segments" if EXPERT
- default y
+ bool "Enable support for 16-bit segments"
depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
help
This option is required by programs like Wine to run 16-bit
@@ -2313,7 +2312,7 @@ config COMPAT_VDSO
choice
prompt "vsyscall table for legacy applications"
depends on X86_64
- default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_XONLY
+ default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE
help
Legacy user code that does not know how to find the vDSO expects
to be able to issue three syscalls by calling fixed addresses in
@@ -2409,8 +2408,7 @@ config CMDLINE_OVERRIDE
be set to 'N' under normal conditions.
config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
- bool "Enable the LDT (local descriptor table)" if EXPERT
- default y
+ bool "Enable the LDT (local descriptor table)"
help
Linux can allow user programs to install a per-process x86
Local Descriptor Table (LDT) using the modify_ldt(2) system
diff --git a/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig b/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig
index b60bd2d86034..e1102b8e7653 100644
--- a/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
# CONFIG_LOCALVERSION_AUTO is not set
-CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y
CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y
CONFIG_AUDIT=y
CONFIG_NO_HZ=y
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
index 235a5794296a..ab493326f2ed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
@@ -298,55 +298,9 @@ static int map_vdso(const struct vdso_image *image, unsigned long addr)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-/*
- * Put the vdso above the (randomized) stack with another randomized
- * offset. This way there is no hole in the middle of address space.
- * To save memory make sure it is still in the same PTE as the stack
- * top. This doesn't give that many random bits.
- *
- * Note that this algorithm is imperfect: the distribution of the vdso
- * start address within a PMD is biased toward the end.
- *
- * Only used for the 64-bit and x32 vdsos.
- */
-static unsigned long vdso_addr(unsigned long start, unsigned len)
-{
- unsigned long addr, end;
- unsigned offset;
-
- /*
- * Round up the start address. It can start out unaligned as a result
- * of stack start randomization.
- */
- start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
-
- /* Round the lowest possible end address up to a PMD boundary. */
- end = (start + len + PMD_SIZE - 1) & PMD_MASK;
- if (end >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
- end = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
- end -= len;
-
- if (end > start) {
- offset = get_random_int() % (((end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 1);
- addr = start + (offset << PAGE_SHIFT);
- } else {
- addr = start;
- }
-
- /*
- * Forcibly align the final address in case we have a hardware
- * issue that requires alignment for performance reasons.
- */
- addr = align_vdso_addr(addr);
-
- return addr;
-}
-
static int map_vdso_randomized(const struct vdso_image *image)
{
- unsigned long addr = vdso_addr(current->mm->start_stack, image->size-image->sym_vvar_start);
-
- return map_vdso(image, addr);
+ return map_vdso(image, 0);
}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
index 7d7500806af8..ff388233c755 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
@@ -247,11 +247,11 @@ extern int force_personality32;
/*
* This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On
- * 64-bit, this is above 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
+ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
* space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers.
*/
#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (mmap_is_ia32() ? 0x000400000UL : \
- (DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW / 3 * 2))
+ 0x100000000UL)
/* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
instruction set this CPU supports. This could be done in user space,
@@ -331,8 +331,8 @@ extern bool mmap_address_hint_valid(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
-#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) (0x7ff)
-#define STACK_RND_MASK (0x7ff)
+#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1)
+#define STACK_RND_MASK ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1)
#define ARCH_DLINFO ARCH_DLINFO_IA32
@@ -341,7 +341,11 @@ extern bool mmap_address_hint_valid(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len);
#else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
/* 1GB for 64bit, 8MB for 32bit */
-#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((is32bit) ? 0x7ff : 0x3fffff)
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((is32bit) ? (1UL << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1 : (1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1)
+#else
+#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1)
+#endif
#define STACK_RND_MASK __STACK_RND_MASK(mmap_is_ia32())
#define ARCH_DLINFO \
@@ -403,5 +407,4 @@ struct va_alignment {
} ____cacheline_aligned;
extern struct va_alignment va_align;
-extern unsigned long align_vdso_addr(unsigned long);
#endif /* _ASM_X86_ELF_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index a1b756c49a93..31862a27229d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -398,6 +398,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(native_write_cr4);
void cr4_update_irqsoff(unsigned long set, unsigned long clear)
{
unsigned long newval, cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
+ BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4());
lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 5e1f38179f49..16f425a93c41 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@
#include <asm/io_bitmap.h>
#include <asm/proto.h>
#include <asm/frame.h>
+#include <asm/elf.h>
+#include <linux/sizes.h>
#include "process.h"
@@ -608,6 +610,7 @@ void speculation_ctrl_update_current(void)
static inline void cr4_toggle_bits_irqsoff(unsigned long mask)
{
unsigned long newval, cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
+ BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4());
newval = cr4 ^ mask;
if (newval != cr4) {
@@ -917,7 +920,10 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
- return randomize_page(mm->brk, 0x02000000);
+ if (mmap_is_ia32())
+ return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_32M + PAGE_SIZE;
+ else
+ return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_1G + PAGE_SIZE;
}
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
index 660b78827638..abf366019da6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
@@ -52,13 +52,6 @@ static unsigned long get_align_bits(void)
return va_align.bits & get_align_mask();
}
-unsigned long align_vdso_addr(unsigned long addr)
-{
- unsigned long align_mask = get_align_mask();
- addr = (addr + align_mask) & ~align_mask;
- return addr | get_align_bits();
-}
-
static int __init control_va_addr_alignment(char *str)
{
/* guard against enabling this on other CPU families */
@@ -116,10 +109,7 @@ static void find_start_end(unsigned long addr, unsigned long flags,
}
*begin = get_mmap_base(1);
- if (in_32bit_syscall())
- *end = task_size_32bit();
- else
- *end = task_size_64bit(addr > DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW);
+ *end = get_mmap_base(0);
}
unsigned long
@@ -196,7 +186,7 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, const unsigned long addr0,
info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN;
info.length = len;
- info.low_limit = PAGE_SIZE;
+ info.low_limit = get_mmap_base(1);
info.high_limit = get_mmap_base(0);
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
index 21ffb03f6c72..c61841fc7a9d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
@@ -533,9 +533,9 @@ static void __init pagetable_init(void)
#define DEFAULT_PTE_MASK ~(_PAGE_NX | _PAGE_GLOBAL)
/* Bits supported by the hardware: */
-pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __read_mostly = DEFAULT_PTE_MASK;
+pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __ro_after_init = DEFAULT_PTE_MASK;
/* Bits allowed in normal kernel mappings: */
-pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask __read_mostly = DEFAULT_PTE_MASK;
+pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask __ro_after_init = DEFAULT_PTE_MASK;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask);
/* Used in PAGE_KERNEL_* macros which are reasonably used out-of-tree: */
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__default_kernel_pte_mask);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
index e527d829e1ed..883876d21613 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
@@ -97,9 +97,9 @@ DEFINE_ENTRY(pte, pte, init)
*/
/* Bits supported by the hardware: */
-pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~0;
+pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __ro_after_init = ~0;
/* Bits allowed in normal kernel mappings: */
-pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~0;
+pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask __ro_after_init = ~0;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask);
/* Used in PAGE_KERNEL_* macros which are reasonably used out-of-tree: */
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__default_kernel_pte_mask);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index cfe6b1e85fa6..f580661f08a1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -1110,6 +1110,7 @@ STATIC_NOPV void native_flush_tlb_global(void)
raw_local_irq_save(flags);
cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
+ BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4());
/* toggle PGE */
native_write_cr4(cr4 ^ X86_CR4_PGE);
/* write old PGE again and flush TLBs */
diff --git a/block/blk-mq.c b/block/blk-mq.c
index c732aa581124..cff0f113d3c3 100644
--- a/block/blk-mq.c
+++ b/block/blk-mq.c
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ static void blk_complete_reqs(struct llist_head *list)
rq->q->mq_ops->complete(rq);
}
-static __latent_entropy void blk_done_softirq(struct softirq_action *h)
+static __latent_entropy void blk_done_softirq(void)
{
blk_complete_reqs(this_cpu_ptr(&blk_cpu_done));
}
diff --git a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
index 61c762961ca8..02a83039c25b 100644
--- a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
+++ b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
@@ -4540,7 +4540,7 @@ void ata_qc_free(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
struct ata_port *ap;
unsigned int tag;
- WARN_ON_ONCE(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */
+ BUG_ON(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */
ap = qc->ap;
qc->flags = 0;
@@ -4557,7 +4557,7 @@ void __ata_qc_complete(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
struct ata_port *ap;
struct ata_link *link;
- WARN_ON_ONCE(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */
+ BUG_ON(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */
WARN_ON_ONCE(!(qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_ACTIVE));
ap = qc->ap;
link = qc->dev->link;
diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig
index b151e0fcdeb5..d837761a3c38 100644
--- a/drivers/char/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig
@@ -327,7 +327,6 @@ config NSC_GPIO
config DEVMEM
bool "/dev/mem virtual device support"
- default y
help
Say Y here if you want to support the /dev/mem device.
The /dev/mem device is used to access areas of physical
@@ -381,7 +380,6 @@ config MAX_RAW_DEVS
config DEVPORT
bool "/dev/port character device"
depends on ISA || PCI
- default y
help
Say Y here if you want to support the /dev/port device. The /dev/port
device is similar to /dev/mem, but for I/O ports.
diff --git a/drivers/tty/Kconfig b/drivers/tty/Kconfig
index f6a7fd6d3bb6..d47e80279511 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/tty/Kconfig
@@ -122,7 +122,6 @@ config UNIX98_PTYS
config LEGACY_PTYS
bool "Legacy (BSD) PTY support"
- default y
help
A pseudo terminal (PTY) is a software device consisting of two
halves: a master and a slave. The slave device behaves identical to
diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
index 5b5e99604989..fb07b38d290c 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static void free_tty_struct(struct tty_struct *tty)
put_device(tty->dev);
kfree(tty->write_buf);
tty->magic = 0xDEADDEAD;
+ put_user_ns(tty->owner_user_ns);
kfree(tty);
}
@@ -2298,11 +2299,19 @@ static int tty_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
* FIXME: may race normal receive processing
*/
+int tiocsti_restrict = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT);
+
static int tiocsti(struct tty_struct *tty, char __user *p)
{
char ch, mbz = 0;
struct tty_ldisc *ld;
+ if (tiocsti_restrict &&
+ !ns_capable(tty->owner_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ dev_warn_ratelimited(tty->dev,
+ "Denied TIOCSTI ioctl for non-privileged process\n");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
if ((current->signal->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (get_user(ch, p))
@@ -3151,6 +3160,7 @@ struct tty_struct *alloc_tty_struct(struct tty_driver *driver, int idx)
tty->index = idx;
tty_line_name(driver, idx, tty->name);
tty->dev = tty_get_device(tty);
+ tty->owner_user_ns = get_user_ns(current_user_ns());
return tty;
}
diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/Makefile b/drivers/usb/core/Makefile
index 18e874b0441e..fc7a3a9aa72a 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/core/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/Makefile
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ usbcore-y += phy.o port.o
usbcore-$(CONFIG_OF) += of.o
usbcore-$(CONFIG_USB_PCI) += hcd-pci.o
usbcore-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += usb-acpi.o
+usbcore-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
obj-$(CONFIG_USB) += usbcore.o
diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
index 4e123336e410..e5377d6279b3 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
@@ -5218,6 +5218,12 @@ static void hub_port_connect(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1, u16 portstatus,
goto done;
return;
}
+
+ if (deny_new_usb) {
+ dev_err(&port_dev->dev, "denied insert of USB device on port %d\n", port1);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
if (hub_is_superspeed(hub->hdev))
unit_load = 150;
else
diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/sysctl.c b/drivers/usb/core/sysctl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..16f68ff8205c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/sysctl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/usb.h>
+
+static struct ctl_table usb_table[] = {
+ {
+ .procname = "deny_new_usb",
+ .data = &deny_new_usb,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
+ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
+ .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
+ },
+ { }
+};
+
+static struct ctl_table usb_root_table[] = {
+ { .procname = "kernel",
+ .mode = 0555,
+ .child = usb_table },
+ { }
+};
+
+static struct ctl_table_header *usb_table_header;
+
+int __init usb_init_sysctl(void)
+{
+ usb_table_header = register_sysctl_table(usb_root_table);
+ if (!usb_table_header) {
+ pr_warn("usb: sysctl registration failed\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void usb_exit_sysctl(void)
+{
+ unregister_sysctl_table(usb_table_header);
+}
diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/usb.c b/drivers/usb/core/usb.c
index 62368c4ed37a..502da1fcc79b 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/core/usb.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/usb.c
@@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(autosuspend, "default autosuspend delay");
#define usb_autosuspend_delay 0
#endif
+int deny_new_usb __read_mostly = 0;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(deny_new_usb);
+
static bool match_endpoint(struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epd,
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor **bulk_in,
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor **bulk_out,
@@ -1054,6 +1057,9 @@ static int __init usb_init(void)
usb_debugfs_init();
usb_acpi_register();
+ retval = usb_init_sysctl();
+ if (retval)
+ goto sysctl_init_failed;
retval = bus_register(&usb_bus_type);
if (retval)
goto bus_register_failed;
@@ -1088,6 +1094,8 @@ static int __init usb_init(void)
bus_notifier_failed:
bus_unregister(&usb_bus_type);
bus_register_failed:
+ usb_exit_sysctl();
+sysctl_init_failed:
usb_acpi_unregister();
usb_debugfs_cleanup();
out:
@@ -1111,6 +1119,7 @@ static void __exit usb_exit(void)
usb_hub_cleanup();
bus_unregister_notifier(&usb_bus_type, &usb_bus_nb);
bus_unregister(&usb_bus_type);
+ usb_exit_sysctl();
usb_acpi_unregister();
usb_debugfs_cleanup();
idr_destroy(&usb_bus_idr);
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index d7c4187ca023..40d46a6e11ab 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/io_uring.h>
#include <linux/syscall_user_dispatch.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
@@ -281,6 +282,8 @@ static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
mm->stack_vm = mm->total_vm = 1;
mmap_write_unlock(mm);
bprm->p = vma->vm_end - sizeof(void *);
+ if (!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) && randomize_va_space)
+ bprm->p ^= get_random_int() & ~PAGE_MASK;
return 0;
err:
mmap_write_unlock(mm);
diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
index c93500d84264..0a92f1a4f1b4 100644
--- a/fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/inode.c
@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@ int proc_nr_inodes(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
}
#endif
+/* sysctl */
+int device_sidechannel_restrict __read_mostly = 1;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(device_sidechannel_restrict);
+
static int no_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return -ENXIO;
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 79b0ff9b151e..eec06daa6da2 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -992,10 +992,10 @@ static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd)
path_put(&last->link);
}
-int sysctl_protected_symlinks __read_mostly = 0;
-int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 0;
-int sysctl_protected_fifos __read_mostly;
-int sysctl_protected_regular __read_mostly;
+int sysctl_protected_symlinks __read_mostly = 1;
+int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 1;
+int sysctl_protected_fifos __read_mostly = 2;
+int sysctl_protected_regular __read_mostly = 2;
/**
* may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations
diff --git a/fs/nfs/Kconfig b/fs/nfs/Kconfig
index 14a72224b657..080a8027c6b1 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/nfs/Kconfig
@@ -195,7 +195,6 @@ config NFS_DEBUG
bool
depends on NFS_FS && SUNRPC_DEBUG
select CRC32
- default y
config NFS_DISABLE_UDP_SUPPORT
bool "NFS: Disable NFS UDP protocol support"
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/Kconfig b/fs/overlayfs/Kconfig
index dd188c7996b3..f1f14808bc8f 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/Kconfig
@@ -124,3 +124,19 @@ config OVERLAY_FS_METACOPY
that doesn't support this feature will have unexpected results.
If unsure, say N.
+
+config OVERLAY_FS_UNPRIVILEGED
+ bool "Overlayfs: turn on unprivileged user namespace mounts"
+ default n
+ depends on OVERLAY_FS
+ help
+ When disabled, unprivileged users will not be able to create
+ new overlayfs mounts. This cuts the attack surface if no
+ unprivileged user namespace mounts are required like for
+ running rootless containers.
+
+ Overlayfs has been part of several recent local privilege
+ escalation exploits, so if you are security-conscious
+ you want to disable this.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
index b01d4147520d..7dfbab718030 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
@@ -2163,7 +2163,9 @@ static struct dentry *ovl_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
static struct file_system_type ovl_fs_type = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.name = "overlay",
+#ifdef CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_UNPRIVILEGED
.fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
+#endif
.mount = ovl_mount,
.kill_sb = kill_anon_super,
};
diff --git a/fs/proc/Kconfig b/fs/proc/Kconfig
index c930001056f9..6a0a51b3f593 100644
--- a/fs/proc/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/proc/Kconfig
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ config PROC_KCORE
config PROC_VMCORE
bool "/proc/vmcore support"
depends on PROC_FS && CRASH_DUMP
- default y
help
Exports the dump image of crashed kernel in ELF format.
diff --git a/fs/stat.c b/fs/stat.c
index 1fa38bdec1a6..cac8d4d0cfd9 100644
--- a/fs/stat.c
+++ b/fs/stat.c
@@ -51,8 +51,13 @@ void generic_fillattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
stat->gid = i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode);
stat->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
stat->size = i_size_read(inode);
- stat->atime = inode->i_atime;
- stat->mtime = inode->i_mtime;
+ if (is_sidechannel_device(inode) && !capable_noaudit(CAP_MKNOD)) {
+ stat->atime = inode->i_ctime;
+ stat->mtime = inode->i_ctime;
+ } else {
+ stat->atime = inode->i_atime;
+ stat->mtime = inode->i_mtime;
+ }
stat->ctime = inode->i_ctime;
stat->blksize = i_blocksize(inode);
stat->blocks = inode->i_blocks;
@@ -101,9 +106,14 @@ int vfs_getattr_nosec(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
STATX_ATTR_DAX);
mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(path->mnt);
- if (inode->i_op->getattr)
- return inode->i_op->getattr(mnt_userns, path, stat,
- request_mask, query_flags);
+ if (inode->i_op->getattr) {
+ int retval = inode->i_op->getattr(mnt_userns, path, stat, request_mask, query_flags);
+ if (!retval && is_sidechannel_device(inode) && !capable_noaudit(CAP_MKNOD)) {
+ stat->atime = stat->ctime;
+ stat->mtime = stat->ctime;
+ }
+ return retval;
+ }
generic_fillattr(mnt_userns, inode, stat);
return 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/cache.h b/include/linux/cache.h
index d742c57eaee5..f0222c070458 100644
--- a/include/linux/cache.h
+++ b/include/linux/cache.h
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@
#define __ro_after_init __section(".data..ro_after_init")
#endif
+#define __read_only __ro_after_init
+
#ifndef ____cacheline_aligned
#define ____cacheline_aligned __attribute__((__aligned__(SMP_CACHE_BYTES)))
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 65efb74c3585..7fca4dd7f3b1 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool capable(int cap);
+extern bool capable_noaudit(int cap);
extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
@@ -234,6 +235,10 @@ static inline bool capable(int cap)
{
return true;
}
+static inline bool capable_noaudit(int cap)
+{
+ return true;
+}
static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{
return true;
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index c3c88fdb9b2a..03da6fd69e4a 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -3722,4 +3722,15 @@ static inline int inode_drain_writes(struct inode *inode)
return filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
}
+extern int device_sidechannel_restrict;
+
+static inline bool is_sidechannel_device(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ umode_t mode;
+ if (!device_sidechannel_restrict)
+ return false;
+ mode = inode->i_mode;
+ return ((S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) && (mode & (S_IROTH | S_IWOTH)));
+}
+
#endif /* _LINUX_FS_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/fsnotify.h b/include/linux/fsnotify.h
index f8acddcf54fb..6a7d57fca5d2 100644
--- a/include/linux/fsnotify.h
+++ b/include/linux/fsnotify.h
@@ -87,6 +87,9 @@ static inline int fsnotify_file(struct file *file, __u32 mask)
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_NONOTIFY)
return 0;
+ if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_MODIFY) && is_sidechannel_device(file_inode(file)))
+ return 0;
+
return fsnotify_parent(path->dentry, mask, path, FSNOTIFY_EVENT_PATH);
}
diff --git a/include/linux/gfp.h b/include/linux/gfp.h
index 11da8af06704..7f27206434c4 100644
--- a/include/linux/gfp.h
+++ b/include/linux/gfp.h
@@ -587,9 +587,9 @@ static inline struct page *alloc_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order)
extern unsigned long __get_free_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order);
extern unsigned long get_zeroed_page(gfp_t gfp_mask);
-void *alloc_pages_exact(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask);
+void *alloc_pages_exact(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
void free_pages_exact(void *virt, size_t size);
-void * __meminit alloc_pages_exact_nid(int nid, size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask);
+void * __meminit alloc_pages_exact_nid(int nid, size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask) __attribute__((alloc_size(2)));
#define __get_free_page(gfp_mask) \
__get_free_pages((gfp_mask), 0)
diff --git a/include/linux/highmem.h b/include/linux/highmem.h
index fc80a40f5053..62ae8d4cbb23 100644
--- a/include/linux/highmem.h
+++ b/include/linux/highmem.h
@@ -204,6 +204,13 @@ static inline void clear_highpage(struct page *page)
kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
}
+static inline void verify_zero_highpage(struct page *page)
+{
+ void *kaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
+ BUG_ON(memchr_inv(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE));
+ kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
+}
+
/*
* If we pass in a base or tail page, we can zero up to PAGE_SIZE.
* If we pass in a head page, we can zero up to the size of the compound page.
diff --git a/include/linux/interrupt.h b/include/linux/interrupt.h
index 4777850a6dc7..54acea982f78 100644
--- a/include/linux/interrupt.h
+++ b/include/linux/interrupt.h
@@ -567,13 +567,13 @@ extern const char * const softirq_to_name[NR_SOFTIRQS];
struct softirq_action
{
- void (*action)(struct softirq_action *);
+ void (*action)(void);
};
asmlinkage void do_softirq(void);
asmlinkage void __do_softirq(void);
-extern void open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(struct softirq_action *));
+extern void __init open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(void));
extern void softirq_init(void);
extern void __raise_softirq_irqoff(unsigned int nr);
diff --git a/include/linux/kobject_ns.h b/include/linux/kobject_ns.h
index 2b5b64256cf4..8cdce21dce0f 100644
--- a/include/linux/kobject_ns.h
+++ b/include/linux/kobject_ns.h
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ struct kobj_ns_type_operations {
void (*drop_ns)(void *);
};
-int kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops);
+int __init kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops);
int kobj_ns_type_registered(enum kobj_ns_type type);
const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_child_ns_ops(struct kobject *parent);
const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops(struct kobject *kobj);
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 9afb8998e7e5..8294efdf9295 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -798,7 +798,7 @@ static inline int is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(const void *x)
}
#endif
-extern void *kvmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node);
+extern void *kvmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
static inline void *kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
{
return kvmalloc_node(size, flags, NUMA_NO_NODE);
@@ -933,10 +933,15 @@ static inline void set_compound_page_dtor(struct page *page,
page[1].compound_dtor = compound_dtor;
}
-static inline void destroy_compound_page(struct page *page)
+static inline compound_page_dtor *get_compound_page_dtor(struct page *page)
{
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page[1].compound_dtor >= NR_COMPOUND_DTORS, page);
- compound_page_dtors[page[1].compound_dtor](page);
+ return compound_page_dtors[page[1].compound_dtor];
+}
+
+static inline void destroy_compound_page(struct page *page)
+{
+ (*get_compound_page_dtor(page))(page);
}
static inline unsigned int compound_order(struct page *page)
diff --git a/include/linux/percpu.h b/include/linux/percpu.h
index 5e76af742c80..9a6c682ec127 100644
--- a/include/linux/percpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/percpu.h
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ extern int __init pcpu_page_first_chunk(size_t reserved_size,
pcpu_fc_populate_pte_fn_t populate_pte_fn);
#endif
-extern void __percpu *__alloc_reserved_percpu(size_t size, size_t align);
+extern void __percpu *__alloc_reserved_percpu(size_t size, size_t align) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
extern bool __is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr, unsigned long *can_addr);
extern bool is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr);
@@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ extern bool is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr);
extern void __init setup_per_cpu_areas(void);
#endif
-extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu_gfp(size_t size, size_t align, gfp_t gfp);
-extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu(size_t size, size_t align);
+extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu_gfp(size_t size, size_t align, gfp_t gfp) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu(size_t size, size_t align) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
extern void free_percpu(void __percpu *__pdata);
extern phys_addr_t per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(void *addr);
diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h
index f5a6a2f069ed..3f25e0fbdfd9 100644
--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
+++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -1317,6 +1317,14 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1;
}
+static inline int perf_allow_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
+{
+ if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 2 && !perfmon_capable())
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_OPEN);
+}
+
static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
{
if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable())
diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
index 0c97d788762c..b1a1d8a38cbd 100644
--- a/include/linux/slab.h
+++ b/include/linux/slab.h
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ int kmem_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *);
/*
* Common kmalloc functions provided by all allocators
*/
-void * __must_check krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t);
+void * __must_check krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t) __attribute((alloc_size(2)));
void kfree(const void *);
void kfree_sensitive(const void *);
size_t __ksize(const void *);
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned int kmalloc_index(size_t size)
}
#endif /* !CONFIG_SLOB */
-void *__kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc;
+void *__kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
void *kmem_cache_alloc(struct kmem_cache *, gfp_t flags) __assume_slab_alignment __malloc;
void kmem_cache_free(struct kmem_cache *, void *);
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static __always_inline void kfree_bulk(size_t size, void **p)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
-void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc;
+void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
void *kmem_cache_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_slab_alignment __malloc;
#else
static __always_inline void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ static __always_inline void *kmalloc_large(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
* Try really hard to succeed the allocation but fail
* eventually.
*/
-static __always_inline void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+static __always_inline __attribute__((alloc_size(1))) void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
{
if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
#ifndef CONFIG_SLOB
@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ static __always_inline void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
return __kmalloc(size, flags);
}
-static __always_inline void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
+static __always_inline __attribute__((alloc_size(1))) void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
{
#ifndef CONFIG_SLOB
if (__builtin_constant_p(size) &&
diff --git a/include/linux/slub_def.h b/include/linux/slub_def.h
index dcde82a4434c..6cf113695267 100644
--- a/include/linux/slub_def.h
+++ b/include/linux/slub_def.h
@@ -114,6 +114,11 @@ struct kmem_cache {
unsigned long random;
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY
+ unsigned long random_active;
+ unsigned long random_inactive;
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
/*
* Defragmentation by allocating from a remote node.
diff --git a/include/linux/sysctl.h b/include/linux/sysctl.h
index d99ca99837de..215e8ebeb553 100644
--- a/include/linux/sysctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/sysctl.h
@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ int proc_douintvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
int proc_dou8vec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
+int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
int proc_dointvec_jiffies(struct ctl_table *, int, void *, size_t *, loff_t *);
int proc_dointvec_userhz_jiffies(struct ctl_table *, int, void *, size_t *,
loff_t *);
diff --git a/include/linux/tty.h b/include/linux/tty.h
index e5d6b1f28823..690473376913 100644
--- a/include/linux/tty.h
+++ b/include/linux/tty.h
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <uapi/linux/tty.h>
#include <linux/rwsem.h>
#include <linux/llist.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
/*
@@ -316,6 +317,7 @@ struct tty_struct {
/* If the tty has a pending do_SAK, queue it here - akpm */
struct work_struct SAK_work;
struct tty_port *port;
+ struct user_namespace *owner_user_ns;
} __randomize_layout;
/* Each of a tty's open files has private_data pointing to tty_file_private */
@@ -325,6 +327,8 @@ struct tty_file_private {
struct list_head list;
};
+extern int tiocsti_restrict;
+
/* tty magic number */
#define TTY_MAGIC 0x5401
diff --git a/include/linux/usb.h b/include/linux/usb.h
index eaae24217e8a..85729cb36532 100644
--- a/include/linux/usb.h
+++ b/include/linux/usb.h
@@ -2046,6 +2046,17 @@ extern void usb_led_activity(enum usb_led_event ev);
static inline void usb_led_activity(enum usb_led_event ev) {}
#endif
+/* sysctl.c */
+extern int deny_new_usb;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+extern int usb_init_sysctl(void);
+extern void usb_exit_sysctl(void);
+#else
+static inline int usb_init_sysctl(void) { return 0; }
+static inline void usb_exit_sysctl(void) { }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+
+
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
index bfa6463f8a95..27aa2bd5e50a 100644
--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@ void put_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts);
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
+extern int unprivileged_userns_clone;
+
static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
{
if (ns)
@@ -149,6 +151,8 @@ extern bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns);
struct ns_common *ns_get_owner(struct ns_common *ns);
#else
+#define unprivileged_userns_clone 0
+
static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
{
return &init_user_ns;
diff --git a/include/linux/vmalloc.h b/include/linux/vmalloc.h
index bfaaf0b6fa76..ebf45c46e04f 100644
--- a/include/linux/vmalloc.h
+++ b/include/linux/vmalloc.h
@@ -121,18 +121,18 @@ static inline void vmalloc_init(void)
static inline unsigned long vmalloc_nr_pages(void) { return 0; }
#endif
-extern void *vmalloc(unsigned long size);
-extern void *vzalloc(unsigned long size);
-extern void *vmalloc_user(unsigned long size);
-extern void *vmalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node);
-extern void *vzalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node);
-extern void *vmalloc_32(unsigned long size);
-extern void *vmalloc_32_user(unsigned long size);
-extern void *__vmalloc(unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask);
+extern void *vmalloc(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+extern void *vzalloc(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+extern void *vmalloc_user(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+extern void *vmalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+extern void *vzalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+extern void *vmalloc_32(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+extern void *vmalloc_32_user(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
+extern void *__vmalloc(unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
extern void *__vmalloc_node_range(unsigned long size, unsigned long align,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end, gfp_t gfp_mask,
pgprot_t prot, unsigned long vm_flags, int node,
- const void *caller);
+ const void *caller) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
void *__vmalloc_node(unsigned long size, unsigned long align, gfp_t gfp_mask,
int node, const void *caller);
void *vmalloc_no_huge(unsigned long size);
diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index b42b3e6731ed..4a15024f326f 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ void tcp_time_wait(struct sock *sk, int state, int timeo);
/* sysctl variables for tcp */
extern int sysctl_tcp_max_orphans;
extern long sysctl_tcp_mem[3];
+extern int sysctl_tcp_simult_connect;
#define TCP_RACK_LOSS_DETECTION 0x1 /* Use RACK to detect losses */
#define TCP_RACK_STATIC_REO_WND 0x2 /* Use static RACK reo wnd */
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index a61c92066c2e..100c7964aeb1 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ config USELIB
config AUDIT
bool "Auditing support"
depends on NET
+ default y
help
Enable auditing infrastructure that can be used with another
kernel subsystem, such as SELinux (which requires this for
@@ -1195,6 +1196,22 @@ config USER_NS
If unsure, say N.
+config USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED
+ bool "Allow unprivileged users to create namespaces"
+ depends on USER_NS
+ default n
+ help
+ When disabled, unprivileged users will not be able to create
+ new namespaces. Allowing users to create their own namespaces
+ has been part of several recent local privilege escalation
+ exploits, so if you need user namespaces but are
+ paranoid^Wsecurity-conscious you want to disable this.
+
+ This setting can be overridden at runtime via the
+ kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone sysctl.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
config PID_NS
bool "PID Namespaces"
default y
@@ -1425,9 +1442,8 @@ menuconfig EXPERT
Only use this if you really know what you are doing.
config UID16
- bool "Enable 16-bit UID system calls" if EXPERT
+ bool "Enable 16-bit UID system calls"
depends on HAVE_UID16 && MULTIUSER
- default y
help
This enables the legacy 16-bit UID syscall wrappers.
@@ -1456,14 +1472,13 @@ config SGETMASK_SYSCALL
If unsure, leave the default option here.
config SYSFS_SYSCALL
- bool "Sysfs syscall support" if EXPERT
- default y
+ bool "Sysfs syscall support"
help
sys_sysfs is an obsolete system call no longer supported in libc.
Note that disabling this option is more secure but might break
compatibility with some systems.
- If unsure say Y here.
+ If unsure say N here.
config FHANDLE
bool "open by fhandle syscalls" if EXPERT
@@ -1614,8 +1629,7 @@ config SHMEM
which may be appropriate on small systems without swap.
config AIO
- bool "Enable AIO support" if EXPERT
- default y
+ bool "Enable AIO support"
help
This option enables POSIX asynchronous I/O which may by used
by some high performance threaded applications. Disabling
@@ -1842,7 +1856,7 @@ config VM_EVENT_COUNTERS
config SLUB_DEBUG
default y
- bool "Enable SLUB debugging support" if EXPERT
+ bool "Enable SLUB debugging support"
depends on SLUB && SYSFS
help
SLUB has extensive debug support features. Disabling these can
@@ -1852,7 +1866,6 @@ config SLUB_DEBUG
config COMPAT_BRK
bool "Disable heap randomization"
- default y
help
Randomizing heap placement makes heap exploits harder, but it
also breaks ancient binaries (including anything libc5 based).
@@ -1899,7 +1912,6 @@ endchoice
config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT
bool "Allow slab caches to be merged"
- default y
help
For reduced kernel memory fragmentation, slab caches can be
merged when they share the same size and other characteristics.
@@ -1914,6 +1926,7 @@ config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT
config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM
bool "Randomize slab freelist"
depends on SLAB || SLUB
+ default y
help
Randomizes the freelist order used on creating new pages. This
security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel slab
@@ -1922,6 +1935,7 @@ config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM
config SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED
bool "Harden slab freelist metadata"
depends on SLAB || SLUB
+ default y
help
Many kernel heap attacks try to target slab cache metadata and
other infrastructure. This options makes minor performance
@@ -1930,6 +1944,23 @@ config SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED
sanity-checking than others. This option is most effective with
CONFIG_SLUB.
+config SLAB_CANARY
+ depends on SLUB
+ depends on !SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT
+ bool "SLAB canaries"
+ default y
+ help
+ Place canaries at the end of kernel slab allocations, sacrificing
+ some performance and memory usage for security.
+
+ Canaries can detect some forms of heap corruption when allocations
+ are freed and as part of the HARDENED_USERCOPY feature. It provides
+ basic use-after-free detection for HARDENED_USERCOPY.
+
+ Canaries absorb small overflows (rendering them harmless), mitigate
+ non-NUL terminated C string overflows on 64-bit via a guaranteed zero
+ byte and provide basic double-free detection.
+
config SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR
bool "Page allocator randomization"
default SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM && ACPI_NUMA
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 121d37e700a6..da80dad5012c 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1693,6 +1693,9 @@ static int __init audit_enable(char *str)
if (audit_default == AUDIT_OFF)
audit_initialized = AUDIT_DISABLED;
+ else if (!audit_ever_enabled)
+ audit_initialized = AUDIT_UNINITIALIZED;
+
if (audit_set_enabled(audit_default))
pr_err("audit: error setting audit state (%d)\n",
audit_default);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/Kconfig b/kernel/bpf/Kconfig
index bd04f4a44c01..7b69c4a497e8 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/Kconfig
+++ b/kernel/bpf/Kconfig
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ config BPF_JIT_DEFAULT_ON
config BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF
bool "Disable unprivileged BPF by default"
depends on BPF_SYSCALL
+ default y
help
Disables unprivileged BPF by default by setting the corresponding
/proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled knob to 2. An admin can
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index b1a5fc04492b..ba09166318a9 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ void bpf_prog_kallsyms_del_all(struct bpf_prog *fp)
/* All BPF JIT sysctl knobs here. */
int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_BPF_JIT_DEFAULT_ON);
int bpf_jit_kallsyms __read_mostly = IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_BPF_JIT_DEFAULT_ON);
-int bpf_jit_harden __read_mostly;
+int bpf_jit_harden __read_mostly = 2;
long bpf_jit_limit __read_mostly;
static void
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 46a361dde042..f0c387f421a0 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -449,6 +449,12 @@ bool capable(int cap)
return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
+
+bool capable_noaudit(int cap)
+{
+ return ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, cap);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_noaudit);
#endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
/**
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 49a5678750fb..32a3ccc26c0a 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -413,8 +413,13 @@ static struct kmem_cache *perf_event_cache;
* 0 - disallow raw tracepoint access for unpriv
* 1 - disallow cpu events for unpriv
* 2 - disallow kernel profiling for unpriv
+ * 3 - disallow all unpriv perf event use
*/
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
+int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 3;
+#else
int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 2;
+#endif
/* Minimum for 512 kiB + 1 user control page */
int sysctl_perf_event_mlock __read_mostly = 512 + (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* 'free' kiB per user */
@@ -11950,7 +11955,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
return -EINVAL;
/* Do we allow access to perf_event_open(2) ? */
- err = security_perf_event_open(&attr, PERF_SECURITY_OPEN);
+ err = perf_allow_open(&attr);
if (err)
return err;
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 567fee340500..2d4986dffdef 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@
#include <linux/perf_event.h>
#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
#include <linux/user-return-notifier.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <linux/oom.h>
#include <linux/khugepaged.h>
#include <linux/signalfd.h>
@@ -1871,6 +1872,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ if ((clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone)
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+
/*
* Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads
* can only be started up within the thread group.
@@ -2973,6 +2978,12 @@ int ksys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags)
if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS)
unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS;
+ if ((unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) {
+ err = -EPERM;
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ goto bad_unshare_out;
+ }
+
err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags);
if (err)
goto bad_unshare_out;
diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tiny.c b/kernel/rcu/tiny.c
index c8a029fbb114..74d125548c41 100644
--- a/kernel/rcu/tiny.c
+++ b/kernel/rcu/tiny.c
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static inline bool rcu_reclaim_tiny(struct rcu_head *head)
}
/* Invoke the RCU callbacks whose grace period has elapsed. */
-static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(struct softirq_action *unused)
+static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(void)
{
struct rcu_head *next, *list;
unsigned long flags;
diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tree.c b/kernel/rcu/tree.c
index afbb0a337c32..0ce19c9400b9 100644
--- a/kernel/rcu/tree.c
+++ b/kernel/rcu/tree.c
@@ -2801,7 +2801,7 @@ static __latent_entropy void rcu_core(void)
queue_work_on(rdp->cpu, rcu_gp_wq, &rdp->strict_work);
}
-static void rcu_core_si(struct softirq_action *h)
+static void rcu_core_si(void)
{
rcu_core();
}
diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c
index f60ef0b4ec33..82a09b5f37f2 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/fair.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c
@@ -10743,7 +10743,7 @@ static int newidle_balance(struct rq *this_rq, struct rq_flags *rf)
* run_rebalance_domains is triggered when needed from the scheduler tick.
* Also triggered for nohz idle balancing (with nohz_balancing_kick set).
*/
-static __latent_entropy void run_rebalance_domains(struct softirq_action *h)
+static __latent_entropy void run_rebalance_domains(void)
{
struct rq *this_rq = this_rq();
enum cpu_idle_type idle = this_rq->idle_balance ?
diff --git a/kernel/softirq.c b/kernel/softirq.c
index 4992853ef53d..e637fc27c80a 100644
--- a/kernel/softirq.c
+++ b/kernel/softirq.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU_ALIGNED(irq_cpustat_t, irq_stat);
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(irq_stat);
#endif
-static struct softirq_action softirq_vec[NR_SOFTIRQS] __cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
+static struct softirq_action softirq_vec[NR_SOFTIRQS] __ro_after_init __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct task_struct *, ksoftirqd);
@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __softirq_entry __do_softirq(void)
kstat_incr_softirqs_this_cpu(vec_nr);
trace_softirq_entry(vec_nr);
- h->action(h);
+ h->action();
trace_softirq_exit(vec_nr);
if (unlikely(prev_count != preempt_count())) {
pr_err("huh, entered softirq %u %s %p with preempt_count %08x, exited with %08x?\n",
@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ void __raise_softirq_irqoff(unsigned int nr)
or_softirq_pending(1UL << nr);
}
-void open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(struct softirq_action *))
+void __init open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(void))
{
softirq_vec[nr].action = action;
}
@@ -760,8 +760,7 @@ static bool tasklet_clear_sched(struct tasklet_struct *t)
return false;
}
-static void tasklet_action_common(struct softirq_action *a,
- struct tasklet_head *tl_head,
+static void tasklet_action_common(struct tasklet_head *tl_head,
unsigned int softirq_nr)
{
struct tasklet_struct *list;
@@ -800,14 +799,14 @@ static void tasklet_action_common(struct softirq_action *a,
}
}
-static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(struct softirq_action *a)
+static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(void)
{
- tasklet_action_common(a, this_cpu_ptr(&tasklet_vec), TASKLET_SOFTIRQ);
+ tasklet_action_common(this_cpu_ptr(&tasklet_vec), TASKLET_SOFTIRQ);
}
-static __latent_entropy void tasklet_hi_action(struct softirq_action *a)
+static __latent_entropy void tasklet_hi_action(void)
{
- tasklet_action_common(a, this_cpu_ptr(&tasklet_hi_vec), HI_SOFTIRQ);
+ tasklet_action_common(this_cpu_ptr(&tasklet_hi_vec), HI_SOFTIRQ);
}
void tasklet_setup(struct tasklet_struct *t,
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index d4a78e08f6d8..c2d7bc67e7b9 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -103,38 +103,44 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
#include <linux/nmi.h>
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#endif
+#if defined CONFIG_TTY
+#include <linux/tty.h>
+#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL)
/* Constants used for minimum and maximum */
#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
-static int sixty = 60;
-#endif
-
-static int __maybe_unused neg_one = -1;
-static int __maybe_unused two = 2;
-static int __maybe_unused four = 4;
-static unsigned long zero_ul;
-static unsigned long one_ul = 1;
-static unsigned long long_max = LONG_MAX;
-static int one_hundred = 100;
-static int two_hundred = 200;
-static int one_thousand = 1000;
+static int sixty __read_only = 60;
+#endif
+
+static int __maybe_unused neg_one __read_only = -1;
+static int __maybe_unused two __read_only = 2;
+static int __maybe_unused four __read_only = 4;
+static unsigned long zero_ul __read_only;
+static unsigned long one_ul __read_only = 1;
+static unsigned long long_max __read_only = LONG_MAX;
+static int one_hundred __read_only = 100;
+static int two_hundred __read_only = 200;
+static int one_thousand __read_only = 1000;
#ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK
-static int ten_thousand = 10000;
+static int ten_thousand __read_only = 10000;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
-static int six_hundred_forty_kb = 640 * 1024;
+static int six_hundred_forty_kb __read_only = 640 * 1024;
#endif
/* this is needed for the proc_doulongvec_minmax of vm_dirty_bytes */
-static unsigned long dirty_bytes_min = 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
+static unsigned long dirty_bytes_min __read_only = 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
/* this is needed for the proc_dointvec_minmax for [fs_]overflow UID and GID */
-static int maxolduid = 65535;
-static int minolduid;
+static int maxolduid __read_only = 65535;
+static int minolduid __read_only;
-static int ngroups_max = NGROUPS_MAX;
+static int ngroups_max __read_only = NGROUPS_MAX;
static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP;
/*
@@ -142,7 +148,7 @@ static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP;
* and hung_task_check_interval_secs
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK
-static unsigned long hung_task_timeout_max = (LONG_MAX/HZ);
+static unsigned long hung_task_timeout_max __read_only = (LONG_MAX/HZ);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER
@@ -188,8 +194,8 @@ int sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPACTION
-static int min_extfrag_threshold;
-static int max_extfrag_threshold = 1000;
+static int min_extfrag_threshold __read_only;
+static int max_extfrag_threshold __read_only = 1000;
#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
@@ -899,16 +905,34 @@ static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
return err;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK
-static int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
- void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+/**
+ * proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin - read a vector of integers with min/max values
+ * checking CAP_SYS_ADMIN on write
+ * @table: the sysctl table
+ * @write: %TRUE if this is a write to the sysctl file
+ * @buffer: the user buffer
+ * @lenp: the size of the user buffer
+ * @ppos: file position
+ *
+ * Reads/writes up to table->maxlen/sizeof(unsigned int) integer
+ * values from/to the user buffer, treated as an ASCII string.
+ *
+ * This routine will ensure the values are within the range specified by
+ * table->extra1 (min) and table->extra2 (max).
+ *
+ * Writing is only allowed when the current task has CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure or -EINVAL on write
+ * when the range check fails.
+ */
+int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
}
-#endif
/**
* struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param - proc_dointvec_minmax() range checking structure
@@ -1659,6 +1683,12 @@ int proc_dou8vec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
return -ENOSYS;
}
+int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ return -ENOSYS;
+}
+
int proc_dointvec_jiffies(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
@@ -1896,6 +1926,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
+ {
+ .procname = "unprivileged_userns_clone",
+ .data = &unprivileged_userns_clone,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
+ },
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
{
.procname = "tainted",
@@ -2254,6 +2293,26 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
.extra2 = &two,
},
#endif
+#if defined CONFIG_TTY
+ {
+ .procname = "tiocsti_restrict",
+ .data = &tiocsti_restrict,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
+ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
+ .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
+ },
+#endif
+ {
+ .procname = "device_sidechannel_restrict",
+ .data = &device_sidechannel_restrict,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
+ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
+ .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
+ },
{
.procname = "ngroups_max",
.data = &ngroups_max,
@@ -3426,6 +3485,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_douintvec);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_dointvec_jiffies);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_dointvec_minmax);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(proc_douintvec_minmax);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_dointvec_userhz_jiffies);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_dostring);
diff --git a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
index 4a66725b1d4a..07d88871197c 100644
--- a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
@@ -1605,7 +1605,7 @@ static void __hrtimer_run_queues(struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base, ktime_t now,
}
}
-static __latent_entropy void hrtimer_run_softirq(struct softirq_action *h)
+static __latent_entropy void hrtimer_run_softirq(void)
{
struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base = this_cpu_ptr(&hrtimer_bases);
unsigned long flags;
diff --git a/kernel/time/timer.c b/kernel/time/timer.c
index 2870a7a51638..ee712bbeee81 100644
--- a/kernel/time/timer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/timer.c
@@ -1754,7 +1754,7 @@ static inline void __run_timers(struct timer_base *base)
/*
* This function runs timers and the timer-tq in bottom half context.
*/
-static __latent_entropy void run_timer_softirq(struct softirq_action *h)
+static __latent_entropy void run_timer_softirq(void)
{
struct timer_base *base = this_cpu_ptr(&timer_bases[BASE_STD]);
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index 27670ab7a4ed..300c72d2a381 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -21,6 +21,13 @@
#include <linux/bsearch.h>
#include <linux/sort.h>
+/* sysctl */
+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED
+int unprivileged_userns_clone = 1;
+#else
+int unprivileged_userns_clone;
+#endif
+
static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
index 1e1bd6f4a13d..2ea1f6f77ca5 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -400,6 +400,9 @@ config SECTION_MISMATCH_WARN_ONLY
If unsure, say Y.
+config DEBUG_WRITABLE_FUNCTION_POINTERS_VERBOSE
+ bool "Enable verbose reporting of writable function pointers"
+
config DEBUG_FORCE_FUNCTION_ALIGN_32B
bool "Force all function address 32B aligned" if EXPERT
help
@@ -535,7 +538,7 @@ config DEBUG_FS
choice
prompt "Debugfs default access"
depends on DEBUG_FS
- default DEBUG_FS_ALLOW_ALL
+ default DEBUG_FS_ALLOW_NONE
help
This selects the default access restrictions for debugfs.
It can be overridden with kernel command line option
@@ -964,6 +967,7 @@ menu "Debug Oops, Lockups and Hangs"
config PANIC_ON_OOPS
bool "Panic on Oops"
+ default y
help
Say Y here to enable the kernel to panic when it oopses. This
has the same effect as setting oops=panic on the kernel command
@@ -973,7 +977,7 @@ config PANIC_ON_OOPS
anything erroneous after an oops which could result in data
corruption or other issues.
- Say N if unsure.
+ Say Y if unsure.
config PANIC_ON_OOPS_VALUE
int
@@ -1588,6 +1592,7 @@ menu "Debug kernel data structures"
config DEBUG_LIST
bool "Debug linked list manipulation"
depends on DEBUG_KERNEL || BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
+ default y
help
Enable this to turn on extended checks in the linked-list
walking routines.
@@ -1627,6 +1632,7 @@ config DEBUG_NOTIFIERS
config BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
bool "Trigger a BUG when data corruption is detected"
select DEBUG_LIST
+ default y
help
Select this option if the kernel should BUG when it encounters
data corruption in kernel memory structures when they get checked
@@ -1781,6 +1787,7 @@ config STRICT_DEVMEM
config IO_STRICT_DEVMEM
bool "Filter I/O access to /dev/mem"
depends on STRICT_DEVMEM
+ default y
help
If this option is disabled, you allow userspace (root) access to all
io-memory regardless of whether a driver is actively using that
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kfence b/lib/Kconfig.kfence
index e641add33947..38a0a6424450 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.kfence
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.kfence
@@ -80,4 +80,13 @@ config KFENCE_KUNIT_TEST
during boot; say M if you want the test to build as a module; say N
if you are unsure.
+config KFENCE_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
+ bool "Trigger a BUG when data corruption is detected"
+ default y
+ help
+ Select this option if the kernel should BUG when kfence encounters
+ data corruption of kfence managed objects after error report.
+
+ If unsure, say Y.
+
endif # KFENCE
diff --git a/lib/irq_poll.c b/lib/irq_poll.c
index 2f17b488d58e..b6e7996a0058 100644
--- a/lib/irq_poll.c
+++ b/lib/irq_poll.c
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ void irq_poll_complete(struct irq_poll *iop)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(irq_poll_complete);
-static void __latent_entropy irq_poll_softirq(struct softirq_action *h)
+static void __latent_entropy irq_poll_softirq(void)
{
struct list_head *list = this_cpu_ptr(&blk_cpu_iopoll);
int rearm = 0, budget = irq_poll_budget;
diff --git a/lib/kobject.c b/lib/kobject.c
index ea53b30cf483..5343bbeea5f8 100644
--- a/lib/kobject.c
+++ b/lib/kobject.c
@@ -1023,9 +1023,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kset_create_and_add);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(kobj_ns_type_lock);
-static const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops_tbl[KOBJ_NS_TYPES];
+static const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops_tbl[KOBJ_NS_TYPES] __ro_after_init;
-int kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops)
+int __init kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops)
{
enum kobj_ns_type type = ops->type;
int error;
diff --git a/lib/nlattr.c b/lib/nlattr.c
index 1d051ef66afe..4dd3c165d1da 100644
--- a/lib/nlattr.c
+++ b/lib/nlattr.c
@@ -790,6 +790,8 @@ int nla_memcpy(void *dest, const struct nlattr *src, int count)
{
int minlen = min_t(int, count, nla_len(src));
+ BUG_ON(minlen < 0);
+
memcpy(dest, nla_data(src), minlen);
if (count > minlen)
memset(dest + minlen, 0, count - minlen);
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index 077a4a7c6f00..f3a9299c28ae 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
return pointer_string(buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec);
}
-int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
+int kptr_restrict __read_mostly = 2;
static noinline_for_stack
char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
index 02d44e3420f5..f45d37570e54 100644
--- a/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/mm/Kconfig
@@ -337,7 +337,8 @@ config KSM
config DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
int "Low address space to protect from user allocation"
depends on MMU
- default 4096
+ default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
+ default 65536
help
This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
diff --git a/mm/Kconfig.debug b/mm/Kconfig.debug
index 1e73717802f8..4a023b575370 100644
--- a/mm/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/mm/Kconfig.debug
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ config DEBUG_WX
depends on ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_WX
depends on MMU
select PTDUMP_CORE
+ default y
help
Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot.
diff --git a/mm/kfence/report.c b/mm/kfence/report.c
index 2a319c21c939..c696adaba482 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/report.c
+++ b/mm/kfence/report.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/lockdep.h>
#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <linux/sched/debug.h>
@@ -260,6 +261,10 @@ void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *r
lockdep_on();
+#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
+ BUG();
+#endif
+
if (panic_on_warn)
panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 0584e540246e..ad148c1b46b9 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -236,6 +236,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(brk, unsigned long, brk)
newbrk = PAGE_ALIGN(brk);
oldbrk = PAGE_ALIGN(mm->brk);
+ /* properly handle unaligned min_brk as an empty heap */
+ if (min_brk & ~PAGE_MASK) {
+ if (brk == min_brk)
+ newbrk -= PAGE_SIZE;
+ if (mm->brk == min_brk)
+ oldbrk -= PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
if (oldbrk == newbrk) {
mm->brk = brk;
goto success;
diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c
index de392908bf64..bf444a14240d 100644
--- a/mm/page_alloc.c
+++ b/mm/page_alloc.c
@@ -148,6 +148,15 @@ struct pcpu_drain {
static DEFINE_MUTEX(pcpu_drain_mutex);
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct pcpu_drain, pcpu_drain);
+bool __meminitdata extra_latent_entropy;
+
+static int __init setup_extra_latent_entropy(char *str)
+{
+ extra_latent_entropy = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("extra_latent_entropy", setup_extra_latent_entropy);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
volatile unsigned long latent_entropy __latent_entropy;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(latent_entropy);
@@ -1583,6 +1592,25 @@ static void __free_pages_ok(struct page *page, unsigned int order,
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
+static void __init __gather_extra_latent_entropy(struct page *page,
+ unsigned int nr_pages)
+{
+ if (extra_latent_entropy && !PageHighMem(page) && page_to_pfn(page) < 0x100000) {
+ unsigned long hash = 0;
+ size_t index, end = PAGE_SIZE * nr_pages / sizeof hash;
+ const unsigned long *data = lowmem_page_address(page);
+
+ for (index = 0; index < end; index++)
+ hash ^= hash + data[index];
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
+ latent_entropy ^= hash;
+ add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy));
+#else
+ add_device_randomness((const void *)&hash, sizeof(hash));
+#endif
+ }
+}
+
void __free_pages_core(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
{
unsigned int nr_pages = 1 << order;
@@ -1602,7 +1630,6 @@ void __free_pages_core(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
}
__ClearPageReserved(p);
set_page_count(p, 0);
-
atomic_long_add(nr_pages, &page_zone(page)->managed_pages);
/*
@@ -1669,6 +1696,7 @@ void __init memblock_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned long pfn,
{
if (early_page_uninitialised(pfn))
return;
+ __gather_extra_latent_entropy(page, 1 << order);
__free_pages_core(page, order);
}
@@ -1760,6 +1788,7 @@ static void __init deferred_free_range(unsigned long pfn,
if (nr_pages == pageblock_nr_pages &&
(pfn & (pageblock_nr_pages - 1)) == 0) {
set_pageblock_migratetype(page, MIGRATE_MOVABLE);
+ __gather_extra_latent_entropy(page, 1 << pageblock_order);
__free_pages_core(page, pageblock_order);
return;
}
@@ -1767,6 +1796,7 @@ static void __init deferred_free_range(unsigned long pfn,
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++, page++, pfn++) {
if ((pfn & (pageblock_nr_pages - 1)) == 0)
set_pageblock_migratetype(page, MIGRATE_MOVABLE);
+ __gather_extra_latent_entropy(page, 1);
__free_pages_core(page, 0);
}
}
@@ -2342,6 +2372,12 @@ inline void post_alloc_hook(struct page *page, unsigned int order,
*/
kernel_unpoison_pages(page, 1 << order);
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE_VERIFY) && want_init_on_free()) {
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
+ verify_zero_highpage(page + i);
+ }
+
/*
* As memory initialization might be integrated into KASAN,
* kasan_alloc_pages and kernel_init_free_pages must be
diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
index aed67dbc7965..80c1bea54551 100644
--- a/mm/slab.h
+++ b/mm/slab.h
@@ -414,9 +414,13 @@ static inline struct kmem_cache *virt_to_cache(const void *obj)
struct page *page;
page = virt_to_head_page(obj);
+#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
+ BUG_ON(!PageSlab(page));
+#else
if (WARN_ONCE(!PageSlab(page), "%s: Object is not a Slab page!\n",
__func__))
return NULL;
+#endif
return page->slab_cache;
}
@@ -450,10 +454,15 @@ static inline struct kmem_cache *cache_from_obj(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x)
return s;
cachep = virt_to_cache(x);
- if (WARN(cachep && cachep != s,
- "%s: Wrong slab cache. %s but object is from %s\n",
- __func__, s->name, cachep->name))
+ if (cachep && cachep != s) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
+ BUG();
+#else
+ WARN(1, "%s: Wrong slab cache. %s but object is from %s\n",
+ __func__, s->name, cachep->name);
print_tracking(cachep, x);
+#endif
+ }
return cachep;
}
@@ -478,7 +487,7 @@ static inline size_t slab_ksize(const struct kmem_cache *s)
* back there or track user information then we can
* only use the space before that information.
*/
- if (s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_STORE_USER))
+ if ((s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_STORE_USER)) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
return s->inuse;
/*
* Else we can use all the padding etc for the allocation
@@ -523,6 +532,8 @@ static inline void slab_post_alloc_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
p[i] = kasan_slab_alloc(s, p[i], flags, init);
if (p[i] && init && !kasan_has_integrated_init())
memset(p[i], 0, s->object_size);
+ if (p[i] && init && s->ctor)
+ s->ctor(p[i]);
kmemleak_alloc_recursive(p[i], s->object_size, 1,
s->flags, flags);
}
@@ -611,8 +622,10 @@ static inline bool slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfp_t flags, struct kmem_cache *c)
{
if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON,
&init_on_alloc)) {
+#ifndef CONFIG_SLUB
if (c->ctor)
return false;
+#endif
if (c->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON))
return flags & __GFP_ZERO;
return true;
@@ -623,9 +636,15 @@ static inline bool slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfp_t flags, struct kmem_cache *c)
static inline bool slab_want_init_on_free(struct kmem_cache *c)
{
if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON,
- &init_on_free))
- return !(c->ctor ||
- (c->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)));
+ &init_on_free)) {
+#ifndef CONFIG_SLUB
+ if (c->ctor)
+ return false;
+#endif
+ if (c->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON))
+ return false;
+ return true;
+ }
return false;
}
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 7cab77655f11..c581bdaf2e53 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -32,10 +32,10 @@
#include "slab.h"
-enum slab_state slab_state;
+enum slab_state slab_state __ro_after_init;
LIST_HEAD(slab_caches);
DEFINE_MUTEX(slab_mutex);
-struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache;
+struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache __ro_after_init;
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
bool usercopy_fallback __ro_after_init =
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static DECLARE_WORK(slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_work,
/*
* Merge control. If this is set then no merging of slab caches will occur.
*/
-static bool slab_nomerge = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT);
+static bool slab_nomerge __ro_after_init = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT);
static int __init setup_slab_nomerge(char *str)
{
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index e32ded30506e..d659db0f5b01 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -129,6 +129,12 @@ static inline bool kmem_cache_debug(struct kmem_cache *s)
return kmem_cache_debug_flags(s, SLAB_DEBUG_FLAGS);
}
+static inline bool has_sanitize_verify(struct kmem_cache *s)
+{
+ return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY) &&
+ slab_want_init_on_free(s);
+}
+
void *fixup_red_left(struct kmem_cache *s, void *p)
{
if (kmem_cache_debug_flags(s, SLAB_RED_ZONE))
@@ -445,6 +451,55 @@ static inline bool cmpxchg_double_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
return false;
}
+#if defined(CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG) || defined(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY)
+/*
+ * See comment in calculate_sizes().
+ */
+static inline bool freeptr_outside_object(struct kmem_cache *s)
+{
+ return s->offset >= s->inuse;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return offset of the end of info block which is inuse + free pointer if
+ * not overlapping with object.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int get_info_end(struct kmem_cache *s)
+{
+ if (freeptr_outside_object(s))
+ return s->inuse + sizeof(void *);
+ else
+ return s->inuse;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY
+static inline unsigned long *get_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
+{
+ return object + get_info_end(s);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long get_canary_value(const void *canary, unsigned long value)
+{
+ return (value ^ (unsigned long)canary) & CANARY_MASK;
+}
+
+static inline void set_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long value)
+{
+ unsigned long *canary = get_canary(s, object);
+ *canary = get_canary_value(canary, value);
+}
+
+static inline void check_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long value)
+{
+ unsigned long *canary = get_canary(s, object);
+ BUG_ON(*canary != get_canary_value(canary, value));
+}
+#else
+#define set_canary(s, object, value)
+#define check_canary(s, object, value)
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG
static unsigned long object_map[BITS_TO_LONGS(MAX_OBJS_PER_PAGE)];
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(object_map_lock);
@@ -499,13 +554,13 @@ static inline void *restore_red_left(struct kmem_cache *s, void *p)
* Debug settings:
*/
#if defined(CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG_ON)
-static slab_flags_t slub_debug = DEBUG_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
+static slab_flags_t slub_debug __ro_after_init = DEBUG_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
#else
-static slab_flags_t slub_debug;
+static slab_flags_t slub_debug __ro_after_init;
#endif
-static char *slub_debug_string;
-static int disable_higher_order_debug;
+static char *slub_debug_string __ro_after_init;
+static int disable_higher_order_debug __ro_after_init;
/*
* slub is about to manipulate internal object metadata. This memory lies
@@ -556,26 +611,6 @@ static void print_section(char *level, char *text, u8 *addr,
metadata_access_disable();
}
-/*
- * See comment in calculate_sizes().
- */
-static inline bool freeptr_outside_object(struct kmem_cache *s)
-{
- return s->offset >= s->inuse;
-}
-
-/*
- * Return offset of the end of info block which is inuse + free pointer if
- * not overlapping with object.
- */
-static inline unsigned int get_info_end(struct kmem_cache *s)
-{
- if (freeptr_outside_object(s))
- return s->inuse + sizeof(void *);
- else
- return s->inuse;
-}
-
static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
enum track_item alloc)
{
@@ -583,6 +618,9 @@ static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
p = object + get_info_end(s);
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
+ p = (void *)p + sizeof(void *);
+
return kasan_reset_tag(p + alloc);
}
@@ -726,6 +764,9 @@ static void print_trailer(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p)
off = get_info_end(s);
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
+ off += sizeof(void *);
+
if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
off += 2 * sizeof(struct track);
@@ -834,8 +875,9 @@ static int check_bytes_and_report(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
* Meta data starts here.
*
* A. Free pointer (if we cannot overwrite object on free)
- * B. Tracking data for SLAB_STORE_USER
- * C. Padding to reach required alignment boundary or at minimum
+ * B. Canary for SLAB_CANARY
+ * C. Tracking data for SLAB_STORE_USER
+ * D. Padding to reach required alignment boundary or at minimum
* one word if debugging is on to be able to detect writes
* before the word boundary.
*
@@ -853,6 +895,9 @@ static int check_pad_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p)
{
unsigned long off = get_info_end(s); /* The end of info */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
+ off += sizeof(void *);
+
if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
/* We also have user information there */
off += 2 * sizeof(struct track);
@@ -1538,6 +1583,15 @@ static __always_inline void kfree_hook(void *x)
static __always_inline bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
void *x, bool init)
{
+ /*
+ * Postpone setting the inactive canary until the metadata
+ * has potentially been cleared at the end of this function.
+ */
+ bool is_kfence = is_kfence_address(x);
+ if (!is_kfence) {
+ check_canary(s, x, s->random_active);
+ }
+
kmemleak_free_recursive(x, s->flags);
/*
@@ -1578,7 +1632,14 @@ static __always_inline bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
rsize = (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) ? s->red_left_pad : 0;
memset((char *)kasan_reset_tag(x) + s->inuse, 0,
s->size - s->inuse - rsize);
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY) && s->ctor)
+ s->ctor(x);
+ }
+
+ if (!is_kfence) {
+ set_canary(s, x, s->random_inactive);
}
+
/* KASAN might put x into memory quarantine, delaying its reuse. */
return kasan_slab_free(s, x, init);
}
@@ -1611,6 +1672,18 @@ static inline bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
*head = object;
if (!*tail)
*tail = object;
+ } else if (slab_want_init_on_free(s) && s->ctor) {
+ /* Objects that are put into quarantine by KASAN will
+ * still undergo free_consistency_checks() and thus
+ * need to show a valid freepointer to check_object().
+ *
+ * Note that doing this for all caches (not just ctor
+ * ones, which have s->offset >= object_size)) causes a
+ * GPF, due to KASAN poisoning and the way
+ * set_freepointer() eventually dereferences the
+ * freepointer.
+ */
+ set_freepointer(s, object, NULL);
}
} while (object != old_tail);
@@ -1624,8 +1697,9 @@ static void *setup_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
void *object)
{
setup_object_debug(s, page, object);
+ set_canary(s, object, s->random_inactive);
object = kasan_init_slab_obj(s, object);
- if (unlikely(s->ctor)) {
+ if (unlikely(s->ctor) && !has_sanitize_verify(s)) {
kasan_unpoison_object_data(s, object);
s->ctor(object);
kasan_poison_object_data(s, object);
@@ -2908,7 +2982,24 @@ static __always_inline void *slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s,
}
maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(s, object);
- init = slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfpflags, s);
+
+ if (has_sanitize_verify(s) && object) {
+ /* KASAN hasn't unpoisoned the object yet (this is done in the
+ * post-alloc hook), so let's do it temporarily.
+ */
+ kasan_unpoison_object_data(s, object);
+ BUG_ON(memchr_inv(object, 0, s->object_size));
+ if (s->ctor)
+ s->ctor(object);
+ kasan_poison_object_data(s, object);
+ } else {
+ init = slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfpflags, s);
+ }
+
+ if (object) {
+ check_canary(s, object, s->random_inactive);
+ set_canary(s, object, s->random_active);
+ }
out:
slab_post_alloc_hook(s, objcg, gfpflags, 1, &object, init);
@@ -3308,8 +3399,9 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
void **p)
{
struct kmem_cache_cpu *c;
- int i;
+ int i, k;
struct obj_cgroup *objcg = NULL;
+ bool init = false;
/* memcg and kmem_cache debug support */
s = slab_pre_alloc_hook(s, &objcg, size, flags);
@@ -3363,12 +3455,35 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
c->tid = next_tid(c->tid);
local_irq_enable();
+ if (has_sanitize_verify(s)) {
+ int j;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
+ /* KASAN hasn't unpoisoned the object yet (this is done in the
+ * post-alloc hook), so let's do it temporarily.
+ */
+ kasan_unpoison_object_data(s, p[j]);
+ BUG_ON(memchr_inv(p[j], 0, s->object_size));
+ if (s->ctor)
+ s->ctor(p[j]);
+ kasan_poison_object_data(s, p[j]);
+ }
+ } else {
+ init = slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, s);
+ }
+
+ for (k = 0; k < i; k++) {
+ if (!is_kfence_address(p[k])) {
+ check_canary(s, p[k], s->random_inactive);
+ set_canary(s, p[k], s->random_active);
+ }
+ }
+
/*
* memcg and kmem_cache debug support and memory initialization.
* Done outside of the IRQ disabled fastpath loop.
*/
- slab_post_alloc_hook(s, objcg, flags, size, p,
- slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, s));
+ slab_post_alloc_hook(s, objcg, flags, size, p, init);
return i;
error:
local_irq_enable();
@@ -3398,9 +3513,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc_bulk);
* and increases the number of allocations possible without having to
* take the list_lock.
*/
-static unsigned int slub_min_order;
-static unsigned int slub_max_order = PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER;
-static unsigned int slub_min_objects;
+static unsigned int slub_min_order __ro_after_init;
+static unsigned int slub_max_order __ro_after_init = PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER;
+static unsigned int slub_min_objects __ro_after_init;
/*
* Calculate the order of allocation given an slab object size.
@@ -3582,6 +3697,7 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node)
init_object(kmem_cache_node, n, SLUB_RED_ACTIVE);
init_tracking(kmem_cache_node, n);
#endif
+ set_canary(kmem_cache_node, n, kmem_cache_node->random_active);
n = kasan_slab_alloc(kmem_cache_node, n, GFP_KERNEL, false);
page->freelist = get_freepointer(kmem_cache_node, n);
page->inuse = 1;
@@ -3755,6 +3871,9 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int forced_order)
s->offset = ALIGN_DOWN(s->object_size / 2, sizeof(void *));
}
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
+ size += sizeof(void *);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG
if (flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
/*
@@ -3828,6 +3947,10 @@ static int kmem_cache_open(struct kmem_cache *s, slab_flags_t flags)
#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED
s->random = get_random_long();
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY
+ s->random_active = get_random_long();
+ s->random_inactive = get_random_long();
+#endif
if (!calculate_sizes(s, -1))
goto error;
@@ -4147,6 +4270,9 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page,
offset -= s->red_left_pad;
}
+ if (!is_kfence)
+ check_canary(s, (void *)ptr - offset, s->random_active);
+
/* Allow address range falling entirely within usercopy region. */
if (offset >= s->useroffset &&
offset - s->useroffset <= s->usersize &&
@@ -4180,7 +4306,11 @@ size_t __ksize(const void *object)
page = virt_to_head_page(object);
if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
+ BUG_ON(!PageCompound(page));
+#else
WARN_ON(!PageCompound(page));
+#endif
return page_size(page);
}
diff --git a/mm/swap.c b/mm/swap.c
index dfb48cf9c2c9..65ecff11aec8 100644
--- a/mm/swap.c
+++ b/mm/swap.c
@@ -100,6 +100,8 @@ static void __put_single_page(struct page *page)
static void __put_compound_page(struct page *page)
{
+ compound_page_dtor *dtor;
+
/*
* __page_cache_release() is supposed to be called for thp, not for
* hugetlb. This is because hugetlb page does never have PageLRU set
@@ -108,7 +110,15 @@ static void __put_compound_page(struct page *page)
*/
if (!PageHuge(page))
__page_cache_release(page);
- destroy_compound_page(page);
+ dtor = get_compound_page_dtor(page);
+ if (!PageHuge(page))
+ BUG_ON(dtor != free_compound_page
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
+ && dtor != free_transhuge_page
+#endif
+ );
+
+ (*dtor)(page);
}
void __put_page(struct page *page)
diff --git a/mm/util.c b/mm/util.c
index a8bf17f18a81..6522fab1d360 100644
--- a/mm/util.c
+++ b/mm/util.c
@@ -348,9 +348,9 @@ unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
/* Is the current task 32bit ? */
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) || is_compat_task())
- return randomize_page(mm->brk, SZ_32M);
+ return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_32M + PAGE_SIZE;
- return randomize_page(mm->brk, SZ_1G);
+ return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_1G + PAGE_SIZE;
}
unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
index 04c4e236952f..f06830dab9ab 100644
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -4987,7 +4987,7 @@ int netif_rx_any_context(struct sk_buff *skb)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(netif_rx_any_context);
-static __latent_entropy void net_tx_action(struct softirq_action *h)
+static __latent_entropy void net_tx_action(void)
{
struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data);
@@ -7136,7 +7136,7 @@ static int napi_threaded_poll(void *data)
return 0;
}
-static __latent_entropy void net_rx_action(struct softirq_action *h)
+static __latent_entropy void net_rx_action(void)
{
struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data);
unsigned long time_limit = jiffies +
diff --git a/net/ipv4/Kconfig b/net/ipv4/Kconfig
index 87983e70f03f..d1584b4b39f9 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/Kconfig
+++ b/net/ipv4/Kconfig
@@ -267,6 +267,7 @@ config IP_PIMSM_V2
config SYN_COOKIES
bool "IP: TCP syncookie support"
+ default y
help
Normal TCP/IP networking is open to an attack known as "SYN
flooding". This denial-of-service attack prevents legitimate remote
@@ -742,3 +743,26 @@ config TCP_MD5SIG
on the Internet.
If unsure, say N.
+
+config TCP_SIMULT_CONNECT_DEFAULT_ON
+ bool "Enable TCP simultaneous connect"
+ help
+ Enable TCP simultaneous connect that adds a weakness in Linux's strict
+ implementation of TCP that allows two clients to connect to each other
+ without either entering a listening state. The weakness allows an
+ attacker to easily prevent a client from connecting to a known server
+ provided the source port for the connection is guessed correctly.
+
+ As the weakness could be used to prevent an antivirus or IPS from
+ fetching updates, or prevent an SSL gateway from fetching a CRL, it
+ should be eliminated by disabling this option. Though Linux is one of
+ few operating systems supporting simultaneous connect, it has no
+ legitimate use in practice and is rarely supported by firewalls.
+
+ Disabling this may break TCP STUNT which is used by some applications
+ for NAT traversal.
+
+ This setting can be overridden at runtime via the
+ net.ipv4.tcp_simult_connect sysctl.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
index a62934b9f15a..545970e3f877 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
@@ -586,6 +586,15 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_table[] = {
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_do_static_key,
},
+ {
+ .procname = "tcp_simult_connect",
+ .data = &sysctl_tcp_simult_connect,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
+ .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
+ },
{ }
};
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index 0f1b4bfddfd4..fa0f40b6a6c1 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@
#include <net/mptcp.h>
int sysctl_tcp_max_orphans __read_mostly = NR_FILE;
+int sysctl_tcp_simult_connect __read_mostly = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TCP_SIMULT_CONNECT_DEFAULT_ON);
#define FLAG_DATA 0x01 /* Incoming frame contained data. */
#define FLAG_WIN_UPDATE 0x02 /* Incoming ACK was a window update. */
@@ -6220,7 +6221,7 @@ static int tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
tcp_paws_reject(&tp->rx_opt, 0))
goto discard_and_undo;
- if (th->syn) {
+ if (th->syn && sysctl_tcp_simult_connect) {
/* We see SYN without ACK. It is attempt of
* simultaneous connect with crossed SYNs.
* Particularly, it can be connect to self.
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.modpost b/scripts/Makefile.modpost
index c383ba33d837..65227e7492af 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.modpost
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.modpost
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ MODPOST = scripts/mod/modpost \
$(if $(CONFIG_MODVERSIONS),-m) \
$(if $(CONFIG_MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL),-a) \
$(if $(CONFIG_SECTION_MISMATCH_WARN_ONLY),,-E) \
+ $(if $(CONFIG_DEBUG_WRITABLE_FUNCTION_POINTERS_VERBOSE),-f) \
-o $@
ifdef MODPOST_VMLINUX
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
index ab9eb4cbe33a..2870588ef733 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
@@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
is some slowdown of the boot process (about 0.5%) and fork and
irq processing.
+ When extra_latent_entropy is passed on the kernel command line,
+ entropy will be extracted from up to the first 4GB of RAM while the
+ runtime memory allocator is being initialized. This costs even more
+ slowdown of the boot process.
+
Note that entropy extracted this way is not cryptographically
secure!
diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
index 3e623ccc020b..85d815902dfa 100644
--- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c
+++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ static int warn_unresolved = 0;
/* How a symbol is exported */
static int sec_mismatch_count = 0;
static int sec_mismatch_warn_only = true;
+static int writable_fptr_count = 0;
+static int writable_fptr_verbose = false;
/* ignore missing files */
static int ignore_missing_files;
/* If set to 1, only warn (instead of error) about missing ns imports */
@@ -984,6 +986,7 @@ enum mismatch {
ANY_EXIT_TO_ANY_INIT,
EXPORT_TO_INIT_EXIT,
EXTABLE_TO_NON_TEXT,
+ DATA_TO_TEXT
};
/**
@@ -1110,6 +1113,12 @@ static const struct sectioncheck sectioncheck[] = {
.good_tosec = {ALL_TEXT_SECTIONS , NULL},
.mismatch = EXTABLE_TO_NON_TEXT,
.handler = extable_mismatch_handler,
+},
+/* Do not reference code from writable data */
+{
+ .fromsec = { DATA_SECTIONS, NULL },
+ .bad_tosec = { ALL_TEXT_SECTIONS, NULL },
+ .mismatch = DATA_TO_TEXT
}
};
@@ -1297,10 +1306,10 @@ static Elf_Sym *find_elf_symbol(struct elf_info *elf, Elf64_Sword addr,
continue;
if (!is_valid_name(elf, sym))
continue;
- if (sym->st_value == addr)
- return sym;
/* Find a symbol nearby - addr are maybe negative */
d = sym->st_value - addr;
+ if (d == 0)
+ return sym;
if (d < 0)
d = addr - sym->st_value;
if (d < distance) {
@@ -1435,7 +1444,13 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname,
char *prl_from;
char *prl_to;
- sec_mismatch_count++;
+ if (mismatch->mismatch == DATA_TO_TEXT) {
+ writable_fptr_count++;
+ if (!writable_fptr_verbose)
+ return;
+ } else {
+ sec_mismatch_count++;
+ }
get_pretty_name(from_is_func, &from, &from_p);
get_pretty_name(to_is_func, &to, &to_p);
@@ -1557,6 +1572,12 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname,
fatal("There's a special handler for this mismatch type, "
"we should never get here.");
break;
+ case DATA_TO_TEXT:
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "The %s %s:%s references\n"
+ "the %s %s:%s%s\n",
+ from, fromsec, fromsym, to, tosec, tosym, to_p);
+ break;
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
@@ -2491,7 +2512,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
struct dump_list *dump_read_start = NULL;
struct dump_list **dump_read_iter = &dump_read_start;
- while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ei:mnT:o:awENd:")) != -1) {
+ while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ei:fmnT:o:awENd:")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case 'e':
external_module = 1;
@@ -2502,6 +2523,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
(*dump_read_iter)->file = optarg;
dump_read_iter = &(*dump_read_iter)->next;
break;
+ case 'f':
+ writable_fptr_verbose = true;
+ break;
case 'm':
modversions = 1;
break;
@@ -2597,6 +2621,11 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
nr_unresolved - MAX_UNRESOLVED_REPORTS);
free(buf.p);
+ if (writable_fptr_count && !writable_fptr_verbose)
+ warn("modpost: Found %d writable function pointer%s.\n"
+ "To see full details build your kernel with:\n"
+ "'make CONFIG_DEBUG_WRITABLE_FUNCTION_POINTERS_VERBOSE=y'\n",
+ writable_fptr_count, (writable_fptr_count == 1 ? "" : "s"));
return error_occurred ? 1 : 0;
}
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 0ced7fd33e4d..5dfbe7fff49e 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ source "security/keys/Kconfig"
config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
- default n
+ default y
help
This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
syslog via dmesg(8).
@@ -19,10 +19,34 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
+ bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events"
+ depends on PERF_EVENTS
+ default y
+ help
+ If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl
+ will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the
+ perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is
+ changed.
+
+config SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT
+ bool "Restrict unprivileged use of tiocsti command injection"
+ default y
+ help
+ This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users injecting commands
+ into other processes which share a tty session using the TIOCSTI
+ ioctl. This option makes TIOCSTI use require CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
+
+ If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
+ unless the tiocsti_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
+
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
config SECURITY
bool "Enable different security models"
depends on SYSFS
depends on MULTIUSER
+ default y
help
This allows you to choose different security modules to be
configured into your kernel.
@@ -48,6 +72,7 @@ config SECURITYFS
config SECURITY_NETWORK
bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
depends on SECURITY
+ default y
help
This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
@@ -154,6 +179,7 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY
bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
imply STRICT_DEVMEM
+ default y
help
This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
@@ -166,7 +192,6 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY
config HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK
bool "Allow usercopy whitelist violations to fallback to object size"
depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
- default y
help
This is a temporary option that allows missing usercopy whitelists
to be discovered via a WARN() to the kernel log, instead of
@@ -191,6 +216,7 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
config FORTIFY_SOURCE
bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
+ default y
help
Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index a56c36470cb1..ea4c4aeed9cd 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
config INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON
bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on allocation by default"
+ default yes
help
This has the effect of setting "init_on_alloc=1" on the kernel
command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_alloc=0".
@@ -202,6 +203,7 @@ config INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON
config INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON
bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on free by default"
+ default yes
help
This has the effect of setting "init_on_free=1" on the kernel
command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_free=0".
@@ -217,6 +219,21 @@ config INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON
touching "cold" memory areas. Most cases see 3-5% impact. Some
synthetic workloads have measured as high as 8%.
+config PAGE_SANITIZE_VERIFY
+ bool "Verify sanitized pages"
+ default y
+ help
+ When init_on_free is enabled, verify that newly allocated pages
+ are zeroed to detect write-after-free bugs.
+
+config SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY
+ bool "Verify sanitized SLAB allocations"
+ default y
+ depends on !KASAN
+ help
+ When init_on_free is enabled, verify that newly allocated slab
+ objects are zeroed to detect write-after-free bugs.
+
endmenu
endmenu
diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index 9e921fc72538..ae851a826c26 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX
bool "NSA SELinux Support"
depends on SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT && NET && INET
select NETWORK_SECMARK
- default n
+ default y
help
This selects NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux).
You will also need a policy configuration and a labeled filesystem.
@@ -70,29 +70,6 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats, which may be monitored via
tools such as avcstat.
-config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE
- int "NSA SELinux checkreqprot default value"
- depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
- range 0 1
- default 0
- help
- This option sets the default value for the 'checkreqprot' flag
- that determines whether SELinux checks the protection requested
- by the application or the protection that will be applied by the
- kernel (including any implied execute for read-implies-exec) for
- mmap and mprotect calls. If this option is set to 0 (zero),
- SELinux will default to checking the protection that will be applied
- by the kernel. If this option is set to 1 (one), SELinux will
- default to checking the protection requested by the application.
- The checkreqprot flag may be changed from the default via the
- 'checkreqprot=' boot parameter. It may also be changed at runtime
- via /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy.
-
- WARNING: this option is deprecated and will be removed in a future
- kernel release.
-
- If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0.
-
config SECURITY_SELINUX_SIDTAB_HASH_BITS
int "NSA SELinux sidtab hashtable size"
depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index eaea837d89d1..39eab3c5cc8d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -136,21 +136,7 @@ static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
#endif
-static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
- CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
-
-static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
-{
- unsigned long checkreqprot;
-
- if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) {
- selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
- if (checkreqprot)
- pr_warn("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n");
- }
- return 1;
-}
-__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
+static const unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot;
/**
* selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index e4cd7cb856f3..812bd46804bd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -748,18 +748,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
return PTR_ERR(page);
length = -EINVAL;
- if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
+ if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1 || new_value)
goto out;
- if (new_value) {
- char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
-
- memcpy(comm, current->comm, sizeof(comm));
- pr_warn_once("SELinux: %s (%d) set checkreqprot to 1. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n",
- comm, current->pid);
- }
-
- checkreqprot_set(fsi->state, (new_value ? 1 : 0));
length = count;
selinux_ima_measure_state(fsi->state);
diff --git a/security/yama/Kconfig b/security/yama/Kconfig
index a810304123ca..b809050b25d2 100644
--- a/security/yama/Kconfig
+++ b/security/yama/Kconfig
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
config SECURITY_YAMA
bool "Yama support"
depends on SECURITY
- default n
+ default y
help
This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional
system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary
diff --git a/tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt b/tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt
index 4fe3b8b1958f..a7d88cc23a70 100644
--- a/tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt
+++ b/tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ Perf tool provides a message similar to the one below:
>= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access
>= 1: Disallow CPU event access
>= 2: Disallow kernel profiling
+ >= 3: Disallow use of any event
To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it
in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>)
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
index a8d8463f8ee5..0777793fc6fc 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
@@ -2698,6 +2698,7 @@ int evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target,
">= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access\n"
">= 1: Disallow CPU event access\n"
">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling\n"
+ ">= 3: Disallow use of any event\n"
"To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it\n"
"in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>)",
perf_event_paranoid());
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