security/intel: Add option to enable SMM flash access only
On platforms where the boot media can be updated externally, e.g. using a BMC, add the possibility to enable writes in SMM only. This allows to protect the BIOS region even without the use of vboot, but keeps SMMSTORE working for use in payloads. Note that this breaks flashconsole, since the flash becomes read-only. Tested on Asrock B85M Pro4 and HP 280 G2, SMM BIOS write protection works as expected, and SMMSTORE can still be used. Change-Id: I157db885b5f1d0f74009ede6fb2342b20d9429fa Signed-off-by: Patrick Rudolph <patrick.rudolph@9elements.com> Signed-off-by: Angel Pons <th3fanbus@gmail.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/40830 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Patrick Rudolph <siro@das-labor.org>
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committed by
Patrick Rudolph
parent
44a4c0a58d
commit
d21b463fb0
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ void intel_pch_finalize_smm(void)
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pci_write_config32(PCI_DEV(0, 27, 0), 0x74,
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pci_read_config32(PCI_DEV(0, 27, 0), 0x74));
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if (CONFIG(BOOTMEDIA_SMM_BWP))
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write_pmbase16(SMI_EN, read_pmbase16(SMI_EN) | TCO_EN);
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write_pmbase16(TCO1_CNT, read_pmbase16(TCO1_CNT) | TCO_LOCK);
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post_code(POST_OS_BOOT);
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@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
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static int spi_is_multichip(void);
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static void spi_set_smm_only_flashing(bool enable);
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struct ich7_spi_regs {
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uint16_t spis;
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uint16_t spic;
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@@ -282,7 +284,6 @@ static void *get_spi_bar(pci_devfn_t dev)
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void spi_init(void)
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{
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uint8_t bios_cntl;
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struct ich9_spi_regs *ich9_spi;
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struct ich7_spi_regs *ich7_spi;
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uint16_t hsfs;
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@@ -332,13 +333,8 @@ void spi_init(void)
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ich_set_bbar(0);
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if (CONFIG(SOUTHBRIDGE_INTEL_I82801GX) || CONFIG(SOUTHBRIDGE_INTEL_COMMON_SPI_ICH9)) {
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/* Disable the BIOS write protect so write commands are allowed. */
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bios_cntl = pci_read_config8(dev, 0xdc);
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/* Deassert SMM BIOS Write Protect Disable. */
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bios_cntl &= ~(1 << 5);
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pci_write_config8(dev, 0xdc, bios_cntl | 0x1);
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}
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/* Disable the BIOS write protect so write commands are allowed. */
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spi_set_smm_only_flashing(false);
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}
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static int spi_locked(void)
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@@ -1096,12 +1092,39 @@ void spi_finalize_ops(void)
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writeb_(spi_config->ops[i].op, &cntlr.opmenu[i]);
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}
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writew_(optype, cntlr.optype);
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spi_set_smm_only_flashing(CONFIG(BOOTMEDIA_SMM_BWP));
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}
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__weak void intel_southbridge_override_spi(struct intel_swseq_spi_config *spi_config)
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{
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}
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#define BIOS_CNTL 0xdc
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#define BIOS_CNTL_BIOSWE (1 << 0)
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#define BIOS_CNTL_BLE (1 << 1)
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#define BIOS_CNTL_SMM_BWP (1 << 5)
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static void spi_set_smm_only_flashing(bool enable)
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{
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if (!(CONFIG(SOUTHBRIDGE_INTEL_I82801GX) || CONFIG(SOUTHBRIDGE_INTEL_COMMON_SPI_ICH9)))
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return;
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const pci_devfn_t dev = PCI_DEV(0, 31, 0);
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uint8_t bios_cntl = pci_read_config8(dev, BIOS_CNTL);
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if (enable) {
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bios_cntl &= ~BIOS_CNTL_BIOSWE;
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bios_cntl |= BIOS_CNTL_BLE | BIOS_CNTL_SMM_BWP;
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} else {
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bios_cntl &= ~(BIOS_CNTL_BLE | BIOS_CNTL_SMM_BWP);
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bios_cntl |= BIOS_CNTL_BIOSWE;
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}
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pci_write_config8(dev, BIOS_CNTL, bios_cntl);
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}
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static const struct spi_ctrlr spi_ctrlr = {
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.xfer_vector = xfer_vectors,
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.max_xfer_size = member_size(struct ich9_spi_regs, fdata),
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