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OvmfPkg: Apply uncrustify changes

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REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3737

Apply uncrustify changes to .c/.h files in the OvmfPkg package

Cc: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kubacki <michael.kubacki@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com>
This commit is contained in:
Michael Kubacki
2021-12-05 14:54:09 -08:00
committed by mergify[bot]
parent d1050b9dff
commit ac0a286f4d
445 changed files with 30894 additions and 26369 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

20
OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/AuthData.c
View File

@@ -8,14 +8,13 @@
#include "EnrollDefaultKeys.h"
//
// Second KEK: "Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011".
// SHA1: 31:59:0b:fd:89:c9:d7:4e:d0:87:df:ac:66:33:4b:39:31:25:4b:30
//
// "dbx" updates in "dbxtool" are signed with a key derived from this KEK.
//
CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftKek[] = {
CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftKek[] = {
0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xe8, 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xd0, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02,
0x02, 0x0a, 0x61, 0x0a, 0xd1, 0x88, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x30,
0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05,
@@ -135,8 +134,7 @@ CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftKek[] = {
0x57, 0x4e, 0x36, 0xd2, 0x32, 0x84, 0xbf, 0x9e
};
CONST UINTN mSizeOfMicrosoftKek = sizeof mMicrosoftKek;
CONST UINTN mSizeOfMicrosoftKek = sizeof mMicrosoftKek;
//
// First DB entry: "Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011"
@@ -145,7 +143,7 @@ CONST UINTN mSizeOfMicrosoftKek = sizeof mMicrosoftKek;
// Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 R2 boot loaders are signed with a chain
// rooted in this certificate.
//
CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftPca[] = {
CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftPca[] = {
0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xd7, 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xbf, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02,
0x02, 0x0a, 0x61, 0x07, 0x76, 0x56, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x30,
0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05,
@@ -264,8 +262,7 @@ CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftPca[] = {
0x62, 0x1c, 0x59, 0x7e
};
CONST UINTN mSizeOfMicrosoftPca = sizeof mMicrosoftPca;
CONST UINTN mSizeOfMicrosoftPca = sizeof mMicrosoftPca;
//
// Second DB entry: "Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011"
@@ -273,7 +270,7 @@ CONST UINTN mSizeOfMicrosoftPca = sizeof mMicrosoftPca;
//
// To verify the "shim" binary and PCI expansion ROMs with.
//
CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftUefiCa[] = {
CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftUefiCa[] = {
0x30, 0x82, 0x06, 0x10, 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xf8, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02,
0x02, 0x0a, 0x61, 0x08, 0xd3, 0xc4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30,
0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05,
@@ -396,8 +393,7 @@ CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftUefiCa[] = {
0x07, 0x92, 0x9b, 0xf5, 0xa6, 0xbc, 0x59, 0x83, 0x58
};
CONST UINTN mSizeOfMicrosoftUefiCa = sizeof mMicrosoftUefiCa;
CONST UINTN mSizeOfMicrosoftUefiCa = sizeof mMicrosoftUefiCa;
//
// The Microsoft.UefiSecureBootLogo.Tests.OutOfBoxConfirmDBXisPresent test case
@@ -431,10 +427,10 @@ CONST UINTN mSizeOfMicrosoftUefiCa = sizeof mMicrosoftUefiCa;
// practice recommended -- in natural English langauge -- in the
// above-referenced TechNet article.
//
CONST UINT8 mSha256OfDevNull[] = {
CONST UINT8 mSha256OfDevNull[] = {
0xe3, 0xb0, 0xc4, 0x42, 0x98, 0xfc, 0x1c, 0x14, 0x9a, 0xfb, 0xf4, 0xc8, 0x99,
0x6f, 0xb9, 0x24, 0x27, 0xae, 0x41, 0xe4, 0x64, 0x9b, 0x93, 0x4c, 0xa4, 0x95,
0x99, 0x1b, 0x78, 0x52, 0xb8, 0x55
};
CONST UINTN mSizeOfSha256OfDevNull = sizeof mSha256OfDevNull;
CONST UINTN mSizeOfSha256OfDevNull = sizeof mSha256OfDevNull;

412
OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/EnrollDefaultKeys.c
View File

@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
#include "EnrollDefaultKeys.h"
/**
Fetch the X509 certificate (to be used as Platform Key and first Key Exchange
Key) from SMBIOS.
@@ -54,47 +53,55 @@
STATIC
EFI_STATUS
GetPkKek1 (
OUT UINT8 **PkKek1,
OUT UINTN *SizeOfPkKek1
OUT UINT8 **PkKek1,
OUT UINTN *SizeOfPkKek1
)
{
CONST CHAR8 *Base64Cert;
CHAR8 OvmfPkKek1AppPrefix[GUID_STRING_LENGTH + 1 + 1];
EFI_STATUS Status;
EFI_SMBIOS_PROTOCOL *Smbios;
EFI_SMBIOS_HANDLE Handle;
EFI_SMBIOS_TYPE Type;
EFI_SMBIOS_TABLE_HEADER *Header;
SMBIOS_TABLE_TYPE11 *OemStringsTable;
UINTN Base64CertLen;
UINTN DecodedCertSize;
UINT8 *DecodedCert;
CONST CHAR8 *Base64Cert;
CHAR8 OvmfPkKek1AppPrefix[GUID_STRING_LENGTH + 1 + 1];
EFI_STATUS Status;
EFI_SMBIOS_PROTOCOL *Smbios;
EFI_SMBIOS_HANDLE Handle;
EFI_SMBIOS_TYPE Type;
EFI_SMBIOS_TABLE_HEADER *Header;
SMBIOS_TABLE_TYPE11 *OemStringsTable;
UINTN Base64CertLen;
UINTN DecodedCertSize;
UINT8 *DecodedCert;
Base64Cert = NULL;
//
// Format the application prefix, for OEM String matching.
//
AsciiSPrint (OvmfPkKek1AppPrefix, sizeof OvmfPkKek1AppPrefix, "%g:",
&gOvmfPkKek1AppPrefixGuid);
AsciiSPrint (
OvmfPkKek1AppPrefix,
sizeof OvmfPkKek1AppPrefix,
"%g:",
&gOvmfPkKek1AppPrefixGuid
);
//
// Scan all "OEM Strings" tables.
//
Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiSmbiosProtocolGuid, NULL,
(VOID **)&Smbios);
Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (
&gEfiSmbiosProtocolGuid,
NULL,
(VOID **)&Smbios
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
AsciiPrint ("error: failed to locate EFI_SMBIOS_PROTOCOL: %r\n", Status);
return Status;
}
Handle = SMBIOS_HANDLE_PI_RESERVED;
Type = SMBIOS_TYPE_OEM_STRINGS;
Type = SMBIOS_TYPE_OEM_STRINGS;
for (Status = Smbios->GetNext (Smbios, &Handle, &Type, &Header, NULL);
!EFI_ERROR (Status);
Status = Smbios->GetNext (Smbios, &Handle, &Type, &Header, NULL)) {
CONST CHAR8 *OemString;
UINTN Idx;
Status = Smbios->GetNext (Smbios, &Handle, &Type, &Header, NULL))
{
CONST CHAR8 *OemString;
UINTN Idx;
if (Header->Length < sizeof *OemStringsTable) {
//
@@ -102,6 +109,7 @@ GetPkKek1 (
//
continue;
}
OemStringsTable = (SMBIOS_TABLE_TYPE11 *)Header;
//
@@ -110,13 +118,17 @@ GetPkKek1 (
//
OemString = (CONST CHAR8 *)(OemStringsTable + 1);
for (Idx = 0; Idx < OemStringsTable->StringCount; ++Idx) {
CHAR8 CandidatePrefix[sizeof OvmfPkKek1AppPrefix];
CHAR8 CandidatePrefix[sizeof OvmfPkKek1AppPrefix];
//
// NUL-terminate the candidate prefix for case-insensitive comparison.
//
AsciiStrnCpyS (CandidatePrefix, sizeof CandidatePrefix, OemString,
GUID_STRING_LENGTH + 1);
AsciiStrnCpyS (
CandidatePrefix,
sizeof CandidatePrefix,
OemString,
GUID_STRING_LENGTH + 1
);
if (AsciiStriCmp (OvmfPkKek1AppPrefix, CandidatePrefix) == 0) {
//
// The current string matches the prefix.
@@ -124,6 +136,7 @@ GetPkKek1 (
Base64Cert = OemString + GUID_STRING_LENGTH + 1;
break;
}
OemString += AsciiStrSize (OemString);
}
@@ -139,8 +152,11 @@ GetPkKek1 (
//
// No table with a matching string has been found.
//
AsciiPrint ("error: OEM String with app prefix %g not found: %r\n",
&gOvmfPkKek1AppPrefixGuid, Status);
AsciiPrint (
"error: OEM String with app prefix %g not found: %r\n",
&gOvmfPkKek1AppPrefixGuid,
Status
);
return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
}
@@ -151,19 +167,23 @@ GetPkKek1 (
// Verify the base64 encoding, and determine the decoded size.
//
DecodedCertSize = 0;
Status = Base64Decode (Base64Cert, Base64CertLen, NULL, &DecodedCertSize);
Status = Base64Decode (Base64Cert, Base64CertLen, NULL, &DecodedCertSize);
switch (Status) {
case EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:
ASSERT (DecodedCertSize > 0);
break;
case EFI_SUCCESS:
AsciiPrint ("error: empty certificate after app prefix %g\n",
&gOvmfPkKek1AppPrefixGuid);
return EFI_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
default:
AsciiPrint ("error: invalid base64 string after app prefix %g\n",
&gOvmfPkKek1AppPrefixGuid);
return EFI_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
case EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:
ASSERT (DecodedCertSize > 0);
break;
case EFI_SUCCESS:
AsciiPrint (
"error: empty certificate after app prefix %g\n",
&gOvmfPkKek1AppPrefixGuid
);
return EFI_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
default:
AsciiPrint (
"error: invalid base64 string after app prefix %g\n",
&gOvmfPkKek1AppPrefixGuid
);
return EFI_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
//
@@ -178,16 +198,19 @@ GetPkKek1 (
//
// Decoding will succeed at this point.
//
Status = Base64Decode (Base64Cert, Base64CertLen, DecodedCert,
&DecodedCertSize);
Status = Base64Decode (
Base64Cert,
Base64CertLen,
DecodedCert,
&DecodedCertSize
);
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
*PkKek1 = DecodedCert;
*PkKek1 = DecodedCert;
*SizeOfPkKek1 = DecodedCertSize;
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
/**
Enroll a set of certificates in a global variable, overwriting it.
@@ -235,20 +258,20 @@ STATIC
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
EnrollListOfCerts (
IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
IN EFI_GUID *CertType,
IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
IN EFI_GUID *CertType,
...
)
{
UINTN DataSize;
SINGLE_HEADER *SingleHeader;
REPEATING_HEADER *RepeatingHeader;
VA_LIST Marker;
CONST UINT8 *Cert;
EFI_STATUS Status;
UINT8 *Data;
UINT8 *Position;
UINTN DataSize;
SINGLE_HEADER *SingleHeader;
REPEATING_HEADER *RepeatingHeader;
VA_LIST Marker;
CONST UINT8 *Cert;
EFI_STATUS Status;
UINT8 *Data;
UINT8 *Position;
Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
@@ -259,25 +282,30 @@ EnrollListOfCerts (
VA_START (Marker, CertType);
for (Cert = VA_ARG (Marker, CONST UINT8 *);
Cert != NULL;
Cert = VA_ARG (Marker, CONST UINT8 *)) {
UINTN CertSize;
Cert = VA_ARG (Marker, CONST UINT8 *))
{
UINTN CertSize;
CertSize = VA_ARG (Marker, UINTN);
(VOID)VA_ARG (Marker, CONST EFI_GUID *);
if (CertSize == 0 ||
CertSize > MAX_UINT32 - sizeof *RepeatingHeader ||
DataSize > MAX_UINT32 - sizeof *RepeatingHeader - CertSize) {
if ((CertSize == 0) ||
(CertSize > MAX_UINT32 - sizeof *RepeatingHeader) ||
(DataSize > MAX_UINT32 - sizeof *RepeatingHeader - CertSize))
{
Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
break;
}
DataSize += sizeof *RepeatingHeader + CertSize;
}
VA_END (Marker);
if (DataSize == sizeof *SingleHeader) {
Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
goto Out;
}
@@ -291,27 +319,28 @@ EnrollListOfCerts (
Position = Data;
SingleHeader = (SINGLE_HEADER *)Position;
Status = gRT->GetTime (&SingleHeader->TimeStamp, NULL);
Status = gRT->GetTime (&SingleHeader->TimeStamp, NULL);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
goto FreeData;
}
SingleHeader->TimeStamp.Pad1 = 0;
SingleHeader->TimeStamp.Nanosecond = 0;
SingleHeader->TimeStamp.TimeZone = 0;
SingleHeader->TimeStamp.Daylight = 0;
SingleHeader->TimeStamp.Pad2 = 0;
#if 0
SingleHeader->dwLength = DataSize - sizeof SingleHeader->TimeStamp;
#else
#if 0
SingleHeader->dwLength = DataSize - sizeof SingleHeader->TimeStamp;
#else
//
// This looks like a bug in edk2. According to the UEFI specification,
// dwLength is "The length of the entire certificate, including the length of
// the header, in bytes". That shouldn't stop right after CertType -- it
// should include everything below it.
//
SingleHeader->dwLength = sizeof *SingleHeader
- sizeof SingleHeader->TimeStamp;
#endif
SingleHeader->dwLength = sizeof *SingleHeader
- sizeof SingleHeader->TimeStamp;
#endif
SingleHeader->wRevision = 0x0200;
SingleHeader->wCertificateType = WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID;
CopyGuid (&SingleHeader->CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid);
@@ -320,16 +349,17 @@ EnrollListOfCerts (
VA_START (Marker, CertType);
for (Cert = VA_ARG (Marker, CONST UINT8 *);
Cert != NULL;
Cert = VA_ARG (Marker, CONST UINT8 *)) {
UINTN CertSize;
CONST EFI_GUID *OwnerGuid;
Cert = VA_ARG (Marker, CONST UINT8 *))
{
UINTN CertSize;
CONST EFI_GUID *OwnerGuid;
CertSize = VA_ARG (Marker, UINTN);
OwnerGuid = VA_ARG (Marker, CONST EFI_GUID *);
RepeatingHeader = (REPEATING_HEADER *)Position;
CopyGuid (&RepeatingHeader->SignatureType, CertType);
RepeatingHeader->SignatureListSize =
RepeatingHeader->SignatureListSize =
(UINT32)(sizeof *RepeatingHeader + CertSize);
RepeatingHeader->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;
RepeatingHeader->SignatureSize =
@@ -340,29 +370,39 @@ EnrollListOfCerts (
CopyMem (Position, Cert, CertSize);
Position += CertSize;
}
VA_END (Marker);
ASSERT (Data + DataSize == Position);
Status = gRT->SetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid,
Status = gRT->SetVariable (
VariableName,
VendorGuid,
(EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE |
EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS),
DataSize, Data);
DataSize,
Data
);
FreeData:
FreePool (Data);
Out:
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
AsciiPrint ("error: %a(\"%s\", %g): %r\n", __FUNCTION__, VariableName,
VendorGuid, Status);
AsciiPrint (
"error: %a(\"%s\", %g): %r\n",
__FUNCTION__,
VariableName,
VendorGuid,
Status
);
}
return Status;
}
/**
Read a UEFI variable into a caller-allocated buffer, enforcing an exact size.
@@ -404,39 +444,48 @@ Out:
STATIC
EFI_STATUS
GetExact (
IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
OUT VOID *Data,
IN UINTN DataSize,
IN BOOLEAN AllowMissing
IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
OUT VOID *Data,
IN UINTN DataSize,
IN BOOLEAN AllowMissing
)
{
UINTN Size;
EFI_STATUS Status;
UINTN Size;
EFI_STATUS Status;
Size = DataSize;
Size = DataSize;
Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &Size, Data);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
if (Status == EFI_NOT_FOUND && AllowMissing) {
if ((Status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) && AllowMissing) {
ZeroMem (Data, DataSize);
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
AsciiPrint ("error: GetVariable(\"%s\", %g): %r\n", VariableName,
VendorGuid, Status);
AsciiPrint (
"error: GetVariable(\"%s\", %g): %r\n",
VariableName,
VendorGuid,
Status
);
return Status;
}
if (Size != DataSize) {
AsciiPrint ("error: GetVariable(\"%s\", %g): expected size 0x%Lx, "
"got 0x%Lx\n", VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT64)DataSize, (UINT64)Size);
AsciiPrint (
"error: GetVariable(\"%s\", %g): expected size 0x%Lx, "
"got 0x%Lx\n",
VariableName,
VendorGuid,
(UINT64)DataSize,
(UINT64)Size
);
return EFI_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
/**
Populate a SETTINGS structure from the underlying UEFI variables.
@@ -464,42 +513,65 @@ GetExact (
STATIC
EFI_STATUS
GetSettings (
OUT SETTINGS *Settings
OUT SETTINGS *Settings
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
EFI_STATUS Status;
Status = GetExact (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
&Settings->SetupMode, sizeof Settings->SetupMode, FALSE);
Status = GetExact (
EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
&Settings->SetupMode,
sizeof Settings->SetupMode,
FALSE
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return Status;
}
Status = GetExact (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
&Settings->SecureBoot, sizeof Settings->SecureBoot, FALSE);
Status = GetExact (
EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
&Settings->SecureBoot,
sizeof Settings->SecureBoot,
FALSE
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return Status;
}
Status = GetExact (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
&gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, &Settings->SecureBootEnable,
sizeof Settings->SecureBootEnable, TRUE);
Status = GetExact (
EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
&gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
&Settings->SecureBootEnable,
sizeof Settings->SecureBootEnable,
TRUE
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return Status;
}
Status = GetExact (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,
&Settings->CustomMode, sizeof Settings->CustomMode, FALSE);
Status = GetExact (
EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,
&gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,
&Settings->CustomMode,
sizeof Settings->CustomMode,
FALSE
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return Status;
}
Status = GetExact (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
&Settings->VendorKeys, sizeof Settings->VendorKeys, FALSE);
Status = GetExact (
EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME,
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
&Settings->VendorKeys,
sizeof Settings->VendorKeys,
FALSE
);
return Status;
}
/**
Print the contents of a SETTINGS structure to the UEFI console.
@@ -508,33 +580,38 @@ GetSettings (
STATIC
VOID
PrintSettings (
IN CONST SETTINGS *Settings
IN CONST SETTINGS *Settings
)
{
AsciiPrint ("info: SetupMode=%d SecureBoot=%d SecureBootEnable=%d "
"CustomMode=%d VendorKeys=%d\n", Settings->SetupMode, Settings->SecureBoot,
Settings->SecureBootEnable, Settings->CustomMode, Settings->VendorKeys);
AsciiPrint (
"info: SetupMode=%d SecureBoot=%d SecureBootEnable=%d "
"CustomMode=%d VendorKeys=%d\n",
Settings->SetupMode,
Settings->SecureBoot,
Settings->SecureBootEnable,
Settings->CustomMode,
Settings->VendorKeys
);
}
/**
Entry point function of this shell application.
**/
INTN
EFIAPI
ShellAppMain (
IN UINTN Argc,
IN CHAR16 **Argv
IN UINTN Argc,
IN CHAR16 **Argv
)
{
INTN RetVal;
EFI_STATUS Status;
SETTINGS Settings;
UINT8 *PkKek1;
UINTN SizeOfPkKek1;
BOOLEAN NoDefault;
INTN RetVal;
EFI_STATUS Status;
SETTINGS Settings;
UINT8 *PkKek1;
UINTN SizeOfPkKek1;
BOOLEAN NoDefault;
if (Argc == 2 && StrCmp (Argv[1], L"--no-default") == 0) {
if ((Argc == 2) && (StrCmp (Argv[1], L"--no-default") == 0)) {
NoDefault = TRUE;
} else {
NoDefault = FALSE;
@@ -552,6 +629,7 @@ ShellAppMain (
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return RetVal;
}
PrintSettings (&Settings);
if (Settings.SetupMode != 1) {
@@ -563,7 +641,7 @@ ShellAppMain (
// Set PkKek1 and SizeOfPkKek1 to suppress incorrect compiler/analyzer
// warnings.
//
PkKek1 = NULL;
PkKek1 = NULL;
SizeOfPkKek1 = 0;
//
@@ -581,13 +659,21 @@ ShellAppMain (
//
if (Settings.CustomMode != CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {
Settings.CustomMode = CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;
Status = gRT->SetVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,
(EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE |
EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS),
sizeof Settings.CustomMode, &Settings.CustomMode);
Status = gRT->SetVariable (
EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,
&gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,
(EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE |
EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS),
sizeof Settings.CustomMode,
&Settings.CustomMode
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
AsciiPrint ("error: SetVariable(\"%s\", %g): %r\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,
&gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, Status);
AsciiPrint (
"error: SetVariable(\"%s\", %g): %r\n",
EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,
&gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,
Status
);
goto FreePkKek1;
}
}
@@ -600,17 +686,26 @@ ShellAppMain (
EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,
&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
&gEfiCertX509Guid,
PkKek1, SizeOfPkKek1, &gEfiCallerIdGuid,
NULL);
PkKek1,
SizeOfPkKek1,
&gEfiCallerIdGuid,
NULL
);
} else {
Status = EnrollListOfCerts (
EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,
&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
&gEfiCertX509Guid,
mMicrosoftPca, mSizeOfMicrosoftPca, &gMicrosoftVendorGuid,
mMicrosoftUefiCa, mSizeOfMicrosoftUefiCa, &gMicrosoftVendorGuid,
NULL);
mMicrosoftPca,
mSizeOfMicrosoftPca,
&gMicrosoftVendorGuid,
mMicrosoftUefiCa,
mSizeOfMicrosoftUefiCa,
&gMicrosoftVendorGuid,
NULL
);
}
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
goto FreePkKek1;
}
@@ -622,8 +717,11 @@ ShellAppMain (
EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,
&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
&gEfiCertSha256Guid,
mSha256OfDevNull, mSizeOfSha256OfDevNull, &gEfiCallerIdGuid,
NULL);
mSha256OfDevNull,
mSizeOfSha256OfDevNull,
&gEfiCallerIdGuid,
NULL
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
goto FreePkKek1;
}
@@ -636,17 +734,26 @@ ShellAppMain (
EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
&gEfiCertX509Guid,
PkKek1, SizeOfPkKek1, &gEfiCallerIdGuid,
NULL);
PkKek1,
SizeOfPkKek1,
&gEfiCallerIdGuid,
NULL
);
} else {
Status = EnrollListOfCerts (
EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
&gEfiCertX509Guid,
PkKek1, SizeOfPkKek1, &gEfiCallerIdGuid,
mMicrosoftKek, mSizeOfMicrosoftKek, &gMicrosoftVendorGuid,
NULL);
PkKek1,
SizeOfPkKek1,
&gEfiCallerIdGuid,
mMicrosoftKek,
mSizeOfMicrosoftKek,
&gMicrosoftVendorGuid,
NULL
);
}
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
goto FreePkKek1;
}
@@ -658,8 +765,11 @@ ShellAppMain (
EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
&gEfiCertX509Guid,
PkKek1, SizeOfPkKek1, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
NULL);
PkKek1,
SizeOfPkKek1,
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
NULL
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
goto FreePkKek1;
}
@@ -669,12 +779,20 @@ ShellAppMain (
// signatures.
//
Settings.CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;
Status = gRT->SetVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,
EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
sizeof Settings.CustomMode, &Settings.CustomMode);
Status = gRT->SetVariable (
EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,
&gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,
EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
sizeof Settings.CustomMode,
&Settings.CustomMode
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
AsciiPrint ("error: SetVariable(\"%s\", %g): %r\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,
&gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, Status);
AsciiPrint (
"error: SetVariable(\"%s\", %g): %r\n",
EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,
&gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,
Status
);
goto FreePkKek1;
}
@@ -713,11 +831,13 @@ ShellAppMain (
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
goto FreePkKek1;
}
PrintSettings (&Settings);
if (Settings.SetupMode != 0 || Settings.SecureBoot != 1 ||
Settings.SecureBootEnable != 1 || Settings.CustomMode != 0 ||
Settings.VendorKeys != 0) {
if ((Settings.SetupMode != 0) || (Settings.SecureBoot != 1) ||
(Settings.SecureBootEnable != 1) || (Settings.CustomMode != 0) ||
(Settings.VendorKeys != 0))
{
AsciiPrint ("error: unexpected\n");
goto FreePkKek1;
}

48
OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/EnrollDefaultKeys.h
View File

@@ -75,30 +75,30 @@
//
#pragma pack (1)
typedef struct {
EFI_TIME TimeStamp;
EFI_TIME TimeStamp;
//
// dwLength covers data below
//
UINT32 dwLength;
UINT16 wRevision;
UINT16 wCertificateType;
EFI_GUID CertType;
UINT32 dwLength;
UINT16 wRevision;
UINT16 wCertificateType;
EFI_GUID CertType;
} SINGLE_HEADER;
typedef struct {
//
// SignatureListSize covers data below
//
EFI_GUID SignatureType;
UINT32 SignatureListSize;
UINT32 SignatureHeaderSize; // constant 0
UINT32 SignatureSize;
EFI_GUID SignatureType;
UINT32 SignatureListSize;
UINT32 SignatureHeaderSize; // constant 0
UINT32 SignatureSize;
//
// SignatureSize covers data below
//
EFI_GUID SignatureOwner;
EFI_GUID SignatureOwner;
//
// X.509 certificate follows
@@ -106,33 +106,31 @@ typedef struct {
} REPEATING_HEADER;
#pragma pack ()
//
// A structure that collects the values of UEFI variables related to Secure
// Boot.
//
typedef struct {
UINT8 SetupMode;
UINT8 SecureBoot;
UINT8 SecureBootEnable;
UINT8 CustomMode;
UINT8 VendorKeys;
UINT8 SetupMode;
UINT8 SecureBoot;
UINT8 SecureBootEnable;
UINT8 CustomMode;
UINT8 VendorKeys;
} SETTINGS;
//
// Refer to "AuthData.c" for details on the following objects.
//
extern CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftKek[];
extern CONST UINTN mSizeOfMicrosoftKek;
extern CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftKek[];
extern CONST UINTN mSizeOfMicrosoftKek;
extern CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftPca[];
extern CONST UINTN mSizeOfMicrosoftPca;
extern CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftPca[];
extern CONST UINTN mSizeOfMicrosoftPca;
extern CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftUefiCa[];
extern CONST UINTN mSizeOfMicrosoftUefiCa;
extern CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftUefiCa[];
extern CONST UINTN mSizeOfMicrosoftUefiCa;
extern CONST UINT8 mSha256OfDevNull[];
extern CONST UINTN mSizeOfSha256OfDevNull;
extern CONST UINT8 mSha256OfDevNull[];
extern CONST UINTN mSizeOfSha256OfDevNull;
#endif /* ENROLL_DEFAULT_KEYS_H_ */