UefiPayloadPkg: Add Secureboot support
Must use RuntimeVariableDxe instead of EmuVariableDxe. Currently doesn't boot on qemu. Signed-off-by: Patrick Rudolph <patrick.rudolph@9elements.com>
This commit is contained in:
Patrick Rudolph
committed by
Tim Crawford
Tim Crawford
parent
b9564773f1
commit
eec38fd383
644
UefiPayloadPkg/SecureBootEnrollDefaultKeys/SecureBootSetup.c
Normal file
644
UefiPayloadPkg/SecureBootEnrollDefaultKeys/SecureBootSetup.c
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,644 @@
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/** @file
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Enroll default PK, KEK, DB and DBX
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Copyright (C) 2014, Red Hat, Inc.
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This program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available
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under the terms and conditions of the BSD License which accompanies this
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distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
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http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.
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THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
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WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
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**/
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#include <Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h>
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#include <Guid/GlobalVariable.h>
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#include <Guid/ImageAuthentication.h>
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#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
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#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
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#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h>
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#include <Library/UefiRuntimeServicesTableLib.h>
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#include <Library/DxeServicesLib.h>
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#include <Library/UefiBootServicesTableLib.h>
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#include <Library/UefiLib.h>
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#define EFI_MICROSOFT_KEK_CERT_GUID \
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{ 0xA23665E3, 0xACA6, 0x4F6D, {0x80, 0xCC, 0x34, 0x1E, 0x7D, 0x7B, 0x8C, 0xC6} }
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#define EFI_SECUREBOOT_PK_CERT_GUID \
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{ 0xF8104268, 0xA364, 0x45F5, {0x8E, 0x00, 0xAB, 0xA3, 0xFD, 0xEA, 0x12, 0xBE} }
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#define EFI_MICROSOFT_DB1_CERT_GUID \
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{ 0x26A517B0, 0xE3FD, 0x46C2, {0x89, 0x32, 0xE9, 0x26, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x94, 0x1F} }
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#define EFI_MICROSOFT_DB2_CERT_GUID \
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{ 0x91D2E32B, 0x0134, 0x4306, {0xBA, 0x90, 0x54, 0xED, 0xCB, 0xF3, 0x49, 0xCA} }
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#define EFI_MICROSOFT_DBX_GUID \
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{ 0x74BB6E72, 0x2A56, 0x4D0E, {0xA5, 0xB3, 0x5D, 0x39, 0xFC, 0x2E, 0xE3, 0x46} }
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#define EFI_MICROSOFT_OWNER_GUID \
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{ 0x77FA9ABD, 0x0359, 0x4D32, {0xBD, 0x60, 0x28, 0xF4, 0xE7, 0x8F, 0x78, 0x4B} }
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EFI_GUID gEfiSecureBootDb1CertGuid = EFI_MICROSOFT_DB1_CERT_GUID;
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EFI_GUID gEfiSecureBootDb2CertGuid = EFI_MICROSOFT_DB2_CERT_GUID;
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EFI_GUID gEfiSecureBootDbxCrlGuid = EFI_MICROSOFT_DBX_GUID;
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EFI_GUID gEfiSecureBootKekCertGuid = EFI_MICROSOFT_KEK_CERT_GUID;
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EFI_GUID gEfiSecureBootPkCertGuid = EFI_SECUREBOOT_PK_CERT_GUID;
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EFI_GUID gEfiMicrosoftOwnerGuid = EFI_MICROSOFT_OWNER_GUID;
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//
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// The most important thing about the variable payload is that it is a list of
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// lists, where the element size of any given *inner* list is constant.
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//
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// Since X509 certificates vary in size, each of our *inner* lists will contain
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// one element only (one X.509 certificate). This is explicitly mentioned in
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// the UEFI specification, in "28.4.1 Signature Database", in a Note.
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//
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// The list structure looks as follows:
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//
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// struct EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 { |
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// struct EFI_TIME { |
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// UINT16 Year; |
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// UINT8 Month; |
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// UINT8 Day; |
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// UINT8 Hour; |
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// UINT8 Minute; |
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// UINT8 Second; |
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// UINT8 Pad1; |
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// UINT32 Nanosecond; |
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// INT16 TimeZone; |
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// UINT8 Daylight; |
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// UINT8 Pad2; |
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// } TimeStamp; |
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// |
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// struct WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID { | |
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// struct WIN_CERTIFICATE { | |
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// UINT32 dwLength; ----------------------------------------+ |
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// UINT16 wRevision; | |
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// UINT16 wCertificateType; | |
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// } Hdr; | +- DataSize
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// | |
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// EFI_GUID CertType; | |
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// UINT8 CertData[1] = { <--- "struct hack" | |
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// struct EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST { | | |
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// EFI_GUID SignatureType; | | |
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// UINT32 SignatureListSize; -------------------------+ | |
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// UINT32 SignatureHeaderSize; | | |
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// UINT32 SignatureSize; ---------------------------+ | | |
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// UINT8 SignatureHeader[SignatureHeaderSize]; | | | |
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// v | | |
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// struct EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA { | | | |
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// EFI_GUID SignatureOwner; | | | |
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// UINT8 SignatureData[1] = { <--- "struct hack" | | | |
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// X.509 payload | | | |
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// } | | | |
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// } Signatures[]; | | |
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// } SigLists[]; | |
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// }; | |
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// } AuthInfo; | |
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// }; |
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//
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// Given that the "struct hack" invokes undefined behavior (which is why C99
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// introduced the flexible array member), and because subtracting those pesky
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// sizes of 1 is annoying, and because the format is fully specified in the
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// UEFI specification, we'll introduce two matching convenience structures that
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// are customized for our X.509 purposes.
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//
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#pragma pack(1)
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typedef struct {
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EFI_TIME TimeStamp;
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//
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// dwLength covers data below
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//
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UINT32 dwLength;
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UINT16 wRevision;
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UINT16 wCertificateType;
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EFI_GUID CertType;
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} SINGLE_HEADER;
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typedef struct {
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//
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// SignatureListSize covers data below
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//
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EFI_GUID SignatureType;
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UINT32 SignatureListSize;
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UINT32 SignatureHeaderSize; // constant 0
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UINT32 SignatureSize;
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//
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// SignatureSize covers data below
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//
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EFI_GUID SignatureOwner;
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//
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// X.509 certificate follows
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//
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} REPEATING_HEADER;
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#pragma pack()
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/**
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Enroll a set of certificates in a global variable, overwriting it.
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The variable will be rewritten with NV+BS+RT+AT attributes.
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@param[in] VariableName The name of the variable to overwrite.
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@param[in] VendorGuid The namespace (ie. vendor GUID) of the variable to
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overwrite.
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@param[in] CertType The GUID determining the type of all the
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certificates in the set that is passed in. For
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example, gEfiCertX509Guid stands for DER-encoded
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X.509 certificates, while gEfiCertSha256Guid stands
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for SHA256 image hashes.
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@param[in] ... A list of
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IN CONST UINT8 *Cert,
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IN UINTN CertSize,
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IN CONST EFI_GUID *OwnerGuid
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triplets. If the first component of a triplet is
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NULL, then the other two components are not
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accessed, and processing is terminated. The list of
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certificates is enrolled in the variable specified,
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overwriting it. The OwnerGuid component identifies
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the agent installing the certificate.
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@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The triplet list is empty (ie. the first Cert
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value is NULL), or one of the CertSize values
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is 0, or one of the CertSize values would
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overflow the accumulated UINT32 data size.
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@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Out of memory while formatting variable
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payload.
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@retval EFI_SUCCESS Enrollment successful; the variable has been
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overwritten (or created).
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@return Error codes from gRT->GetTime() and
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gRT->SetVariable().
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**/
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STATIC
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EFI_STATUS
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EFIAPI
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EnrollListOfCerts (
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IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
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IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
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IN EFI_GUID *CertType,
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...
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)
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{
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UINTN DataSize;
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SINGLE_HEADER *SingleHeader;
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REPEATING_HEADER *RepeatingHeader;
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VA_LIST Marker;
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CONST UINT8 *Cert;
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EFI_STATUS Status;
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UINT8 *Data;
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UINT8 *Position;
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Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
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//
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// compute total size first, for UINT32 range check, and allocation
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//
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DataSize = sizeof *SingleHeader;
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VA_START (Marker, CertType);
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for (Cert = VA_ARG (Marker, CONST UINT8 *);
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Cert != NULL;
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Cert = VA_ARG (Marker, CONST UINT8 *)) {
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UINTN CertSize;
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CertSize = VA_ARG (Marker, UINTN);
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(VOID)VA_ARG (Marker, CONST EFI_GUID *);
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if (CertSize == 0 ||
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CertSize > MAX_UINT32 - sizeof *RepeatingHeader ||
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DataSize > MAX_UINT32 - sizeof *RepeatingHeader - CertSize) {
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Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
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break;
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}
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DataSize += sizeof *RepeatingHeader + CertSize;
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}
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VA_END (Marker);
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if (DataSize == sizeof *SingleHeader) {
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Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
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}
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if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
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DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SecureBootSetup: Invalid certificate parameters\n"));
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goto Out;
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}
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Data = AllocatePool (DataSize);
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if (Data == NULL) {
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Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
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goto Out;
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}
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Position = Data;
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SingleHeader = (SINGLE_HEADER *)Position;
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Status = gRT->GetTime (&SingleHeader->TimeStamp, NULL);
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if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
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DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "SecureBootSetup: GetTime failed\n"));
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// Fill in dummy values
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SingleHeader->TimeStamp.Year = 2018;
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SingleHeader->TimeStamp.Month = 1;
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SingleHeader->TimeStamp.Day = 1;
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SingleHeader->TimeStamp.Hour = 0;
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SingleHeader->TimeStamp.Minute = 0;
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SingleHeader->TimeStamp.Second = 0;
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Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
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}
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SingleHeader->TimeStamp.Pad1 = 0;
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SingleHeader->TimeStamp.Nanosecond = 0;
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SingleHeader->TimeStamp.TimeZone = 0;
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SingleHeader->TimeStamp.Daylight = 0;
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SingleHeader->TimeStamp.Pad2 = 0;
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//
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// This looks like a bug in edk2. According to the UEFI specification,
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// dwLength is "The length of the entire certificate, including the length of
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// the header, in bytes". That shouldn't stop right after CertType -- it
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// should include everything below it.
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//
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SingleHeader->dwLength = sizeof *SingleHeader - sizeof SingleHeader->TimeStamp;
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SingleHeader->wRevision = 0x0200;
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SingleHeader->wCertificateType = WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID;
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CopyGuid (&SingleHeader->CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid);
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Position += sizeof *SingleHeader;
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VA_START (Marker, CertType);
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for (Cert = VA_ARG (Marker, CONST UINT8 *);
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Cert != NULL;
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Cert = VA_ARG (Marker, CONST UINT8 *)) {
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UINTN CertSize;
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CONST EFI_GUID *OwnerGuid;
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CertSize = VA_ARG (Marker, UINTN);
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OwnerGuid = VA_ARG (Marker, CONST EFI_GUID *);
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RepeatingHeader = (REPEATING_HEADER *)Position;
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CopyGuid (&RepeatingHeader->SignatureType, CertType);
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RepeatingHeader->SignatureListSize =
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(UINT32)(sizeof *RepeatingHeader + CertSize);
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RepeatingHeader->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;
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RepeatingHeader->SignatureSize =
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(UINT32)(sizeof RepeatingHeader->SignatureOwner + CertSize);
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CopyGuid (&RepeatingHeader->SignatureOwner, OwnerGuid);
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Position += sizeof *RepeatingHeader;
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CopyMem (Position, Cert, CertSize);
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Position += CertSize;
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}
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VA_END (Marker);
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ASSERT (Data + DataSize == Position);
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Status = gRT->SetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid,
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(EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE |
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EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS |
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EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
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EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS),
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DataSize, Data);
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FreePool (Data);
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Out:
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if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
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DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SecureBootSetup: %a(\"%s\", %g): %r\n", __FUNCTION__, VariableName,
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VendorGuid, Status));
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}
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return Status;
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}
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STATIC
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EFI_STATUS
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EFIAPI
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GetExact (
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IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
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IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
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OUT VOID *Data,
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IN UINTN DataSize,
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IN BOOLEAN AllowMissing
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)
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{
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UINTN Size;
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EFI_STATUS Status;
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Size = DataSize;
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Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &Size, Data);
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if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
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if (Status == EFI_NOT_FOUND && AllowMissing) {
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ZeroMem (Data, DataSize);
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return EFI_SUCCESS;
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}
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DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SecureBootSetup: GetVariable(\"%s\", %g): %r\n", VariableName,
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VendorGuid, Status));
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return Status;
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}
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if (Size != DataSize) {
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DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "SecureBootSetup: GetVariable(\"%s\", %g): expected size 0x%Lx, "
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"got 0x%Lx\n", VariableName, VendorGuid, (UINT64)DataSize, (UINT64)Size));
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return EFI_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
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}
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return EFI_SUCCESS;
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}
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typedef struct {
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UINT8 SetupMode;
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UINT8 SecureBoot;
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UINT8 SecureBootEnable;
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UINT8 CustomMode;
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UINT8 VendorKeys;
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} SETTINGS;
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STATIC
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EFI_STATUS
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EFIAPI
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GetSettings (
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OUT SETTINGS *Settings,
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BOOLEAN AllowMissing
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)
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{
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EFI_STATUS Status;
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ZeroMem (Settings, sizeof(SETTINGS));
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Status = GetExact (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
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&Settings->SetupMode, sizeof Settings->SetupMode, AllowMissing);
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if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
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return Status;
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}
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Status = GetExact (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
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&Settings->SecureBoot, sizeof Settings->SecureBoot, AllowMissing);
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if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
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return Status;
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}
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Status = GetExact (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
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&gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, &Settings->SecureBootEnable,
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sizeof Settings->SecureBootEnable, AllowMissing);
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if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
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return Status;
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}
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Status = GetExact (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,
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&Settings->CustomMode, sizeof Settings->CustomMode, AllowMissing);
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if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
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return Status;
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}
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Status = GetExact (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
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&Settings->VendorKeys, sizeof Settings->VendorKeys, AllowMissing);
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return Status;
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}
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STATIC
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VOID
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EFIAPI
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PrintSettings (
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IN CONST SETTINGS *Settings
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)
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{
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DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "SecureBootSetup: SetupMode=%d SecureBoot=%d SecureBootEnable=%d "
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"CustomMode=%d VendorKeys=%d\n", Settings->SetupMode, Settings->SecureBoot,
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Settings->SecureBootEnable, Settings->CustomMode, Settings->VendorKeys));
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}
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/**
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Install SecureBoot certificates once the VariableDriver is running.
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@param[in] Event Event whose notification function is being invoked
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@param[in] Context Pointer to the notification function's context
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**/
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VOID
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EFIAPI
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InstallSecureBootHook (
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IN EFI_EVENT Event,
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IN VOID *Context
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)
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{
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EFI_STATUS Status;
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VOID *Protocol;
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SETTINGS Settings;
|
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UINT8 *MicrosoftPCA = 0;
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UINTN MicrosoftPCASize;
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UINT8 *MicrosoftUefiCA = 0;
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UINTN MicrosoftUefiCASize;
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UINT8 *MicrosoftKEK = 0;
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UINTN MicrosoftKEKSize;
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UINT8 *SecureBootPk = 0;
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UINTN SecureBootPkSize;
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UINT8 *MicrosoftDbx = 0;
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UINTN MicrosoftDbxSize;
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Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiVariableWriteArchProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **)&Protocol);
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if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
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return;
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}
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Status = GetSettings (&Settings, TRUE);
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if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
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DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SecureBootSetup: Failed to get current settings\n"));
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return;
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}
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if (Settings.SetupMode != SETUP_MODE) {
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DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SecureBootSetup: already in User Mode\n"));
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return;
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}
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PrintSettings (&Settings);
|
||||
|
||||
if (Settings.CustomMode != CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {
|
||||
Settings.CustomMode = CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;
|
||||
Status = gRT->SetVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,
|
||||
(EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE |
|
||||
EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS),
|
||||
sizeof Settings.CustomMode, &Settings.CustomMode);
|
||||
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SecureBootSetup: SetVariable(\"%s\", %g): %r\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,
|
||||
&gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, Status));
|
||||
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Status = GetSectionFromAnyFv(&gEfiSecureBootDb1CertGuid, EFI_SECTION_RAW, 0, (void **)&MicrosoftPCA, &MicrosoftPCASize);
|
||||
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
|
||||
Status = GetSectionFromAnyFv(&gEfiSecureBootDb2CertGuid, EFI_SECTION_RAW, 0, (void **)&MicrosoftUefiCA, &MicrosoftUefiCASize);
|
||||
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
|
||||
Status = GetSectionFromAnyFv(&gEfiSecureBootKekCertGuid, EFI_SECTION_RAW, 0, (void **)&MicrosoftKEK, &MicrosoftKEKSize);
|
||||
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
|
||||
Status = GetSectionFromAnyFv(&gEfiSecureBootPkCertGuid, EFI_SECTION_RAW, 0, (void **)&SecureBootPk, &SecureBootPkSize);
|
||||
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
|
||||
Status = GetSectionFromAnyFv(&gEfiSecureBootDbxCrlGuid, EFI_SECTION_RAW, 0, (void **)&MicrosoftDbx, &MicrosoftDbxSize);
|
||||
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
|
||||
Status = gRT->SetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
|
||||
(EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE |
|
||||
EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
|
||||
EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS),
|
||||
MicrosoftDbxSize, MicrosoftDbx);
|
||||
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
|
||||
Status = EnrollListOfCerts (
|
||||
EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,
|
||||
&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
|
||||
&gEfiCertX509Guid,
|
||||
MicrosoftPCA, MicrosoftPCASize, &gEfiMicrosoftOwnerGuid,
|
||||
MicrosoftUefiCA, MicrosoftUefiCASize, &gEfiMicrosoftOwnerGuid,
|
||||
NULL);
|
||||
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
|
||||
Status = EnrollListOfCerts (
|
||||
EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,
|
||||
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
|
||||
&gEfiCertX509Guid,
|
||||
SecureBootPk, SecureBootPkSize, &gEfiCallerIdGuid,
|
||||
MicrosoftKEK, MicrosoftKEKSize, &gEfiMicrosoftOwnerGuid,
|
||||
NULL);
|
||||
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
|
||||
Status = EnrollListOfCerts (
|
||||
EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,
|
||||
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
|
||||
&gEfiCertX509Guid,
|
||||
SecureBootPk, SecureBootPkSize, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
|
||||
NULL);
|
||||
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
|
||||
FreePool (MicrosoftPCA);
|
||||
FreePool (MicrosoftUefiCA);
|
||||
FreePool (MicrosoftKEK);
|
||||
FreePool (SecureBootPk);
|
||||
FreePool (MicrosoftDbx);
|
||||
|
||||
Settings.CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;
|
||||
Status = gRT->SetVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,
|
||||
EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
|
||||
sizeof Settings.CustomMode, &Settings.CustomMode);
|
||||
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SecureBootSetup: SetVariable(\"%s\", %g): %r\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,
|
||||
&gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, Status));
|
||||
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// FIXME: Force SecureBoot to ON. The AuthService will do this if authenticated variables
|
||||
// are supported, which aren't as the SMM handler isn't able to verify them.
|
||||
|
||||
Settings.SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;
|
||||
Status = gRT->SetVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
|
||||
EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
|
||||
sizeof Settings.SecureBootEnable, &Settings.SecureBootEnable);
|
||||
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SecureBootSetup: SetVariable(\"%s\", %g): %r\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
|
||||
&gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, Status));
|
||||
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Settings.SecureBoot = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;
|
||||
Status = gRT->SetVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
|
||||
EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
|
||||
sizeof Settings.SecureBoot, &Settings.SecureBoot);
|
||||
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SecureBootSetup: SetVariable(\"%s\", %g): %r\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
|
||||
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, Status));
|
||||
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Status = GetSettings (&Settings, FALSE);
|
||||
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Final sanity check:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// [SetupMode]
|
||||
// (read-only, standardized by UEFI)
|
||||
// / \_
|
||||
// 0 1, default
|
||||
// / \_
|
||||
// PK enrolled no PK enrolled yet,
|
||||
// (this is called "User Mode") PK enrollment possible
|
||||
// |
|
||||
// |
|
||||
// [SecureBootEnable]
|
||||
// (read-write, edk2-specific, boot service only)
|
||||
// / \_
|
||||
// 0 1, default
|
||||
// / \_
|
||||
// [SecureBoot]=0 [SecureBoot]=1
|
||||
// (read-only, standardized by UEFI) (read-only, standardized by UEFI)
|
||||
// images are not verified images are verified, platform is
|
||||
// operating in Secure Boot mode
|
||||
// |
|
||||
// |
|
||||
// [CustomMode]
|
||||
// (read-write, edk2-specific, boot service only)
|
||||
// / \_
|
||||
// 0, default 1
|
||||
// / \_
|
||||
// PK, KEK, db, dbx PK, KEK, db, dbx
|
||||
// updates are verified updates are not verified
|
||||
//
|
||||
|
||||
PrintSettings (&Settings);
|
||||
|
||||
if (Settings.SetupMode != 0 || Settings.SecureBoot != 1 ||
|
||||
Settings.SecureBootEnable != 1 || Settings.CustomMode != 0 ||
|
||||
Settings.VendorKeys != 0) {
|
||||
DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SecureBootSetup: disabled\n"));
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "SecureBootSetup: SecureBoot enabled\n"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
EFI_STATUS
|
||||
EFIAPI
|
||||
DriverEntry (
|
||||
IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,
|
||||
IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable
|
||||
)
|
||||
{
|
||||
EFI_STATUS Status;
|
||||
|
||||
VOID *TcgProtocol;
|
||||
VOID *Registration;
|
||||
|
||||
Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiTcgProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **) &TcgProtocol);
|
||||
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
|
||||
DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "SecureBootSetup: Started too late."
|
||||
"TPM is already running!\n"));
|
||||
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Create event callback, because we need access variable on SecureBootPolicyVariable
|
||||
// We should use VariableWriteArch instead of VariableArch, because Variable driver
|
||||
// may update SecureBoot value based on last setting.
|
||||
//
|
||||
EfiCreateProtocolNotifyEvent (
|
||||
&gEfiVariableWriteArchProtocolGuid,
|
||||
TPL_CALLBACK,
|
||||
InstallSecureBootHook,
|
||||
NULL,
|
||||
&Registration);
|
||||
|
||||
return EFI_SUCCESS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user