BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3345
During PEI, the MMIO range for the TPM is marked as encrypted when running
as an SEV guest. While this isn't an issue for an SEV guest because of
the way the nested page fault is handled, it does result in an SEV-ES
guest terminating because of a mitigation check in the #VC handler to
prevent MMIO to an encrypted address. For an SEV-ES guest, this range
must be marked as unencrypted.
Create a new x86 PEIM for TPM support that will map the TPM MMIO range as
unencrypted when SEV-ES is active. The gOvmfTpmMmioAccessiblePpiGuid PPI
will be unconditionally installed before exiting. The PEIM will exit with
the EFI_ABORTED status so that the PEIM does not stay resident. This new
PEIM will depend on the installation of the permanent PEI RAM, by
PlatformPei, so that in case page table splitting is required during the
clearing of the encryption bit, the new page table(s) will be allocated
from permanent PEI RAM.
Update all OVMF Ia32 and X64 build packages to include this new PEIM.
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <42794cec1f9d5bc24cbfb9dcdbe5e281ef259ef5.1619716333.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: refresh subject line]
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
In NOOPT and DEBUG builds, if "PcdMaximumLinkedListLength" is nonzero,
then several LIST_ENTRY *node* APIs in BaseLib compare the *full* list
length against the PCD.
This turns the time complexity of node-level APIs from constant to linear,
and that of full-list manipulations from linear to quadratic.
As an example, consider the EFI_SHELL_FILE_INFO list, which is a data
structure that's widely used in the UEFI shell. I randomly extracted 5000
files from "/usr/include" on my laptop, spanning 1095 subdirectories out
of 1538, and then ran "DIR -R" in the UEFI shell on this tree. These are
the wall-clock times:
PcdMaximumLinkedListLength PcdMaximumLinkedListLength
=1,000,000 =0
-------------------------- ---------------------------
FAT 4 min 31 s 18 s
virtio-fs 5 min 13 s 1 min 33 s
Checking list lengths against an arbitrary maximum (default: 1,000,000)
seems useless even in NOOPT and DEBUG builds, while the cost is
significant; so set the PCD to 0.
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Cc: Peter Grehan <grehan@freebsd.org>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Cc: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>
Cc: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3152
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Message-Id: <20210113085453.10168-10-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
In order to be able to issue messages or make interface calls that cause
another #VC (e.g. GetLocalApicBaseAddress () issues RDMSR), add support
for nested #VCs.
In order to support nested #VCs, GHCB backup pages are required. If a #VC
is received while currently processing a #VC, a backup of the current GHCB
content is made. This allows the #VC handler to continue processing the
new #VC. Upon completion of the new #VC, the GHCB is restored from the
backup page. The #VC recursion level is tracked in the per-vCPU variable
area.
Support is added to handle up to one nested #VC (or two #VCs total). If
a second nested #VC is encountered, an ASSERT will be issued and the vCPU
will enter CpuDeadLoop ().
For SEC, the GHCB backup pages are reserved in the OvmfPkgX64.fdf memory
layout, with two new fixed PCDs to provide the address and size of the
backup area.
For PEI/DXE, the GHCB backup pages are allocated as boot services pages
using the memory allocation library.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <ac2e8203fc41a351b43f60d68bdad6b57c4fb106.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
It is anticipated that this part of the code will work for both Intel
TDX and AMD SEV, so remove the SEV specific naming and change to
ConfidentialComputing as a more architecture neutral prefix. Apart
from the symbol rename, there are no code changes.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Message-Id: <20201216014146.2229-3-jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
This is used to package up the grub bootloader into a firmware volume
where it can be executed as a shell like the UEFI Shell. Grub itself
is built as a minimal entity into a Fv and then added as a boot
option. By default the UEFI shell isn't built but for debugging
purposes it can be enabled and will then be presented as a boot option
(This should never be allowed for secure boot in an external data
centre but may be useful for local debugging). Finally all other boot
options except grub and possibly the shell are stripped and the boot
timeout forced to 0 so the system will not enter a setup menu and will
only boot to grub. This is done by copying the
Library/PlatformBootManagerLib into Library/PlatformBootManagerLibGrub
and then customizing it.
Boot failure is fatal to try to prevent secret theft.
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-4-jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: replace local variable initialization with assignment]
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: squash 'OvmfPkg: add "gGrubFileGuid=Grub" to
GuidCheck.IgnoreDuplicates', reviewed stand-alone by Phil (msgid
<e6eae551-8563-ccfb-5547-7a97da6d46e5@redhat.com>) and Ard (msgid
<10aeda37-def6-d9a4-6e02-4c66c1492f57@arm.com>)]
