REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4534
These tests confirm that the report bug...
"Out-of-bounds read when processing IA_NA/IA_TA options in a
DHCPv6 Advertise message"
..has been patched.
The following functions are tested to confirm an out of bounds read is
patched and that the correct statuses are returned:
Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe
Dhcp6SeekStsOption
TCBZ4534
CVE-2023-45229
CVSS 6.5 : CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4535
Confirms that reported issue...
"Buffer overflow in the DHCPv6 client via a long Server ID option"
..has been corrected by the provided patch.
Tests the following functions to ensure they appropriately handle
untrusted data (either too long or too small) to prevent a buffer
overflow:
Dhcp6AppendOption
Dhcp6AppendETOption
Dhcp6AppendIaOption
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4535
Bug Details:
PixieFail Bug #2
CVE-2023-45230
CVSS 8.3 : CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H
CWE-119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds
of a Memory Buffer
Changes Overview:
> -UINT8 *
> +EFI_STATUS
> Dhcp6AppendOption (
> - IN OUT UINT8 *Buf,
> - IN UINT16 OptType,
> - IN UINT16 OptLen,
> - IN UINT8 *Data
> + IN OUT EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet,
> + IN OUT UINT8 **PacketCursor,
> + IN UINT16 OptType,
> + IN UINT16 OptLen,
> + IN UINT8 *Data
> );
Dhcp6AppendOption() and variants can return errors now. All callsites
are adapted accordingly.
It gets passed in EFI_DHCP6_PACKET as additional parameter ...
> + //
> + // Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet
> + //
> + if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option)
> + || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option +
(Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER))))
> + {
> + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
> + }
... so it can look at Packet->Size when checking buffer space.
Also to allow Packet->Length updates.
Lots of checks added.
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
We still return EFI_SUCCESS to the caller when TlsConfigCertificate
returns error, for the use case the platform doesn't require
certificate for the specific HTTP session. This ensures
HttpInitSession function still initiated and returns EFI_SUCCESS to
the caller. The failure is pushed back to TLS DXE driver if the
HTTP communication actually requires certificate.
Signed-off-by: Abner Chang <abner.chang@amd.com>
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Cc: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Cc: Nickle Wang <nicklew@nvidia.com>
Cc: Igor Kulchytskyy <igork@ami.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4504
The BaseRngLibTimerLib allows to generate number based on a timer.
This mechanism allows to have a basic non-secure implementation
for non-production platforms.
To bind and identify Random Number Generators implementations with
a GUID, an unsafe GUID should be added. This GUID cannot be added
to the MdePkg unless it is also added to a specification.
To keep the MdePkg self-contained, copy the BaseRngLibTimerLib to
the MdeModulePkg. This will allow to define an unsafe Rng GUID
in a later patch in the MdeModulePkg.
The MdePkg implementation will be removed later. This allows to give
some time to platform owners to switch to the MdeModulePkg
implementation.
Signed-off-by: Pierre Gondois <pierre.gondois@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Kun Qin <kun.qin@microsoft.com>
__FUNCTION__ is a pre-standard extension that gcc and Visual C++ among
others support, while __func__ was standardized in C99.
Since it's more standard, replace __FUNCTION__ with __func__ throughout
NetworkPkg.
Signed-off-by: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
RVCT is obsolete and no longer used.
Remove support for it.
Signed-off-by: Rebecca Cran <quic_rcran@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
The current UEFI implementation of HTTPS during its TLS configuration
uses
EFI_TLS_VERIFY_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS for host name verification. As per the
spec
this flag does is "to disable the match of any wildcards in the host
name". So,
certificates which are issued with wildcards(*.dm.corp.net etc) in it
will fail
the TLS host name matching. On the other hand,
EFI_TLS_VERIFY_FLAG_NONE(misnomer) means "no additional flags set for
hostname
validation. Wildcards are supported and they match only in the left-most
label."
this behavior/definition is coming from openssl's X509_check_host() api
https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/man3/X509_check_host.html
Without EFI_TLS_VERIFY_FLAG_NONE any UEFI application using certificates
issued
with wildcards in them would fail to match while trying to communicate
with
HTTPS endpoint.
BugZilla: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3691
Signed-off-by: Vineel Kovvuri <vineelko@microsoft.com>
Cc: Maciej Rabeda <maciej.rabeda@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiaxin Wu <jiaxin.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Siyuan Fu <siyuan.fu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiaxin Wu <jiaxin.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Maciej Rabeda <maciej.rabeda@linux.intel.com>
Introduce the NETWORK_ISCSI_MD5_ENABLE feature test macro for NetworkPkg.
When explicitly set to FALSE, remove MD5 from IScsiDxe's CHAP algorithm
list.
Set NETWORK_ISCSI_MD5_ENABLE to TRUE by default, for compatibility
reasons. Not just to minimize the disruption for platforms that currently
include IScsiDxe, but also because RFC 7143 mandates MD5 for CHAP, and
some vendors' iSCSI targets support MD5 only.
With MD5 enabled, IScsiDxe will suggest SHA256, and then fall back to MD5
if the target requests it. With MD5 disabled, IScsiDxe will suggest
SHA256, and break off the connection (and session) if the target doesn't
support SHA256.
Cc: Jiaxin Wu <jiaxin.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Maciej Rabeda <maciej.rabeda@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Cc: Siyuan Fu <siyuan.fu@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3355
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Maciej Rabeda <maciej.rabeda@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210629163337.14120-7-lersek@redhat.com>
Introduce the "mChapHash" table, containing the hash algorithms supported
for CHAP. Hash algos listed at the beginning of the table are preferred by
the initiator.
In ISCSI_CHAP_STEP_ONE, send such a CHAP_A value that is the
comma-separated, ordered list of algorithm identifiers from "mChapHash".
Pre-format this value string at driver startup, in the new function
IScsiCHAPInitHashList().
(In IScsiCHAPInitHashList(), also enforce that every hash algo's digest
size fit into ISCSI_CHAP_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE, as the latter controls the
digest, outgoing challenge, and hex *allocations*.)
In ISCSI_CHAP_STEP_TWO, allow the target to select one of the offered hash
algorithms, and remember the selection for the later steps. For
ISCSI_CHAP_STEP_THREE, hash the challenge from the target with the
selected hash algo.
In ISCSI_CHAP_STEP_THREE, send the correctly sized digest to the target.
If the initiator wants mutual authentication, then generate a challenge
with as many bytes as the target's digest will have, in
ISCSI_CHAP_STEP_FOUR.
In ISCSI_CHAP_STEP_FOUR (i.e., when mutual authentication is required by
the initiator), verify the target's response (digest) with the selected
algorithm.
Clear the selected hash algorithm before every login (remember that in
IScsiDxe, every login is a leading login).
There is no peer-observable change from this patch, as it only reworks the
current MD5 support into the new internal representation.
Cc: Jiaxin Wu <jiaxin.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Maciej Rabeda <maciej.rabeda@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Cc: Siyuan Fu <siyuan.fu@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3355
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210629163337.14120-5-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Maciej Rabeda <maciej.rabeda@linux.intel.com>
IScsiDxe uses the ISCSI_CHAP_RSP_LEN macro for expressing the size of the
digest (16) that it solely supports at this point (MD5).
ISCSI_CHAP_RSP_LEN is used for both (a) *allocating* digest-related
buffers (binary buffers and hex encodings alike), and (b) *processing*
binary digest buffers (comparing them, filling them, reading them).
In preparation for adding other hash algorithms, split purpose (a) from
purpose (b). For purpose (a) -- buffer allocation --, introduce
ISCSI_CHAP_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE. For purpose (b) -- processing --, rely on
MD5_DIGEST_SIZE from <BaseCryptLib.h>.
Distinguishing these purposes is justified because purpose (b) --
processing -- must depend on the hashing algorithm negotiated between
initiator and target, while for purpose (a) -- allocation --, using the
maximum supported digest size is suitable. For now, because only MD5 is
supported, introduce ISCSI_CHAP_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE *as* MD5_DIGEST_SIZE.
Note that the argument for using the digest size as the size of the
outgoing challenge (in case mutual authentication is desired by the
initiator) remains in place. Because of this, the above two purposes are
distinguished for the "ISCSI_CHAP_AUTH_DATA.OutChallenge" field as well.
This patch is functionally a no-op, just yet.
Cc: Jiaxin Wu <jiaxin.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Maciej Rabeda <maciej.rabeda@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Cc: Siyuan Fu <siyuan.fu@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3355
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Maciej Rabeda <maciej.rabeda@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210629163337.14120-4-lersek@redhat.com>
