The PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo() function may return various error codes,
such as RETURN_INVALID_PARAMETER and RETURN_UNSUPPORTED.
Such error values should not be assigned to our "Status" variable in the
DxeImageVerificationHandler() function, because "Status" generally stands
for the main exit value of the function. And
SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION_HANDLER functions are expected to return one
of EFI_SUCCESS, EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION, and EFI_ACCESS_DENIED only.
Introduce the "PeCoffStatus" helper variable for keeping the return value
of PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo() internal to the function. If
PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo() fails, we'll jump to the "Done" label with
"Status" being EFI_ACCESS_DENIED, inherited from the top of the function.
Note that this is consistent with the subsequent PE/COFF Signature check,
where we jump to the "Done" label with "Status" having been re-set to
EFI_ACCESS_DENIED.
As a consequence, we can at once remove the
Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
assignment right after the "PeCoffStatus" check.
This patch does not change the control flow in the function, it only
changes the "Status" outcome from API-incompatible error codes to
EFI_ACCESS_DENIED, under some circumstances.
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-4-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year
Holiday: <https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/53429>; msgid
<d3fbb76dabed4e1987c512c328c82810@intel.com>]
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2439
The TCG2 DXE supports to parse the 800-155 event GUID from PEI
and puts to the beginning of the TCG2 event.
The TCG2 DXE also supports a DXE driver produces 800-155 event
and let TCG2 DXE driver record.
The 800-155 is a NO-ACTION event which does not need extend
anything to TPM2. The TCG2 DXE also supports that.
Multiple 800-155 events are supported. All of them will be put
to the beginning of the TCG2 event, just after the SpecId event.
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
We have discussed in this thread.
https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/topic/32205028
Before the change, TPM FW upgrade will impact TPM2 ACPI PCR value because
TPM2 ACPI HID include FW version.
This change make the measurement before TPM2 HID fixup. So, after TPM FW
upgrade, the ACPI PCR record remains the same.
Signed-off-by: Derek Lin <derek.lin2@hpe.com>
Reviewed by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2327
RAID drivers abstract their physical drives that make up
the array into a single unit, and do not supply individual
EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL instances for each physical drive in the array.
This breaks support for the Security Storage Command Protocol,
which currently requires an EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL to be associated
with the same device the protocol is installed on and provide
all the same parameters.
This patch remove dependency on EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL and
allows access to Opal drive members of a RAID array.
Signed-off-by: Maggie Chu <maggie.chu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
commit a7e2d20193 introduces the code to
get PcdTpm2AcpiTableRev in the driver entry point. This PCD is designed as
DynamicHii or DynamicHiiEx PCD. So, this PCD depends on Variable service.
To make sure PcdTpm2AcpiTableRev value be got, add Variable service as Depex.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
EfiCreateProtocolNotifyEvent() takes a (VOID**) for "Registration",
similarly to gBS->RegisterProtocolNotify(). We should pass the address of
an actual pointer-to-VOID, and not the address of an EFI_EVENT. EFI_EVENT
just happens to be specified as (VOID*), and has nothing to do with the
registration.
This change is a no-op in practice; it's a semantic improvement.
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jian Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Unlike the InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces() boot service, which takes
an (EFI_HANDLE*) as first parameter, the
UninstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces() boot service takes an EFI_HANDLE as
first parameter.
These are actual bugs. They must have remained hidden until now because
they are all in Unload() functions, which are probably exercised
infrequently. Fix the UninstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces() calls.
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jian Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1617
This driver implements a common checker, verifier and reporter which is
independent of hardware based root-of-trust.
Usually the hardware based root-of-trust will not verify all BIOS but
part of it. For example, Boot Guard will only verify IBB segment. The IBB
needs to verify other part of BIOS, i.e. other FVs to transfer control to
from IBB. This driver plays the role in IBB to verify FVs not covered by
hardware root-of-trust to make sure integrity of the chain of trust.
To be hardware/platform independent, PPI
gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid
is introduced for platform to pass digest information to this driver.
This PPI should include all information needed to verify required FVs in
required boot mode.
struct _EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_STORED_HASH_FV_PPI {
FV_HASH_INFO HashInfo;
UINTN FvNumber;
HASHED_FV_INFO FvInfo[1];
};
To avoid TOCTOU issue, all FVs to be verified will be copied to memory
before hash calculation. That also means this driver has to be run after
permanent memory has been discovered.
For a measured boot, this driver will install
gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPrehashedFvPpiGuid
to report digest of each FV to TCG driver.
For a verified boot, this driver will verify the final hash value
(calculated from the concatenation of each FV's hash) for indicated
FVs against the hash got from platform/hardware.
If pass, it will build EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV (consumed by DXE core) and/or
install gEfiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPpiGuid (consumed by PEI core), and
then report status code PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationPass.
If fail, it just report status code PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationFail
and go to dead loop if status report returns.
The platform can register customized handler to process pass and fail
cases differently.
Currently, this driver only supports hash (sha256/384/512) verification
for the performance consideration.
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: "Hernandez Beltran, Jorge" <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com>
Cc: Harry Han <harry.han@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1617
gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid should be installed by
platform to pass FV hash information to the common FV verify/report
driver, in which the hash value will be calculated again based on the
information fed in and then verified.
The information passed in this PPI include:
- FVs location in flash and length
- Hash values for different boot mode
The hash value must be calculated in following way (if 3 FVs to calc):
FV1 -> Hash1
FV2 -> Hash2
FV3 -> Hash3
Hash1 + Hash2 + Hash3 -> HashAll
Only HashAll is stored in this PPI. The purposes for this algorithm
are two:
1. To report each FV's hash to TCG driver and verify HashAll at the
same time without the burden to calculate the hash twice;
2. To save hash value storage due to potential hardware limitation
Different boot mode may have its own hash value so that each mode can
decide which FV will be verified. For example, for the sake of performance,
S3 may choose to skip some FVs verification and normal boot will verify
all FVs it concerns.
So in this PPI, each FV information has flag to indicate which boot mode
it will be taken into hash calculation.
And if multiple hash values passed in this PPI, each has a flag to indicate
which boot mode it's used for. Note one hash value supports more than one
boot modes if they're just the same.
PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationPass and PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationFail are
introduced to report status back to platform, and platform can choose how
to act upon verification success and failure.
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: "Hernandez Beltran, Jorge" <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com>
Cc: Harry Han <harry.han@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1782
After change behavior to send BlockSid command at EndOfDxe point,
check device ownership command will return un-authority error, it
finally caused opal driver can't show "Enable Feature" menu.
Update the code logic to send detect device ownership command
before send BlockSID command.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
