The edk2 patch
SecurityPkg: Create library for setting Secure Boot variables.
moves generic functions from SecureBootConfigDxe and places
them into SecureBootVariableLib. This patch adds SecureBootVariableLib
mapping for OvmfPkg.
Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Bernacki <gjb@semihalf.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sunny Wang <sunny.wang@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
The "OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib/PlatformBootManagerLib.inf"
library instance is used in the following platform DSC files in edk2:
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc
The Xen customizations are very light-weight in this
PlatformBootManagerLib instance. Isolating them statically, for the sake
of the first three DSC files, would save negligible binary code size, and
would likely worsen code complexity (by way of introducing new internal
interfaces) or blow up source code size (by duplicating almost the entire
lib instance source code). So for now, keep this one bit of Xen dynamism
even on QEMU.
However, because it's only PlatformBootManagerLib now that uses
XenPlatformLib (for the above-stated enlightenment), restrict the
XenPlatformLib class resolution in the first three DSC files to the only
DXE driver that consumes PlatformBootManagerLib (and therefore
XenPlatformLib): BdsDxe. This will cause a build failure later if someone
attempts to call a XenPlatformLib API (that is, tries to re-introduce Xen
enlightenment) in a different module in these non-Xen DSC files.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2122
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210526201446.12554-44-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Switch the historical OvmfPkg* platforms from the AcpiPlatformDxe driver
to the QemuFwCfgAcpiPlatformDxe driver. (The latter is used by the
ArmVirtQemu* platforms as well.)
The change effectively replaces the following call tree:
InstallAcpiTables [AcpiPlatform.c]
XenDetected [XenPlatformLib] *
InstallXenTables [Xen.c] *
GetXenAcpiRsdp [Xen.c] *
InstallQemuFwCfgTables [QemuFwCfgAcpi.c]
...
InstallOvmfFvTables [AcpiPlatform.c] *
QemuDetected [Qemu.c] *
LocateFvInstanceWithTables [AcpiPlatform.c] *
QemuInstallAcpiTable [Qemu.c] *
QemuInstallAcpiMadtTable [Qemu.c] *
CountBits16 [Qemu.c] *
QemuInstallAcpiSsdtTable [Qemu.c] *
GetSuspendStates [Qemu.c] *
PopulateFwData [Qemu.c] *
with the one below:
InstallAcpiTables [QemuFwCfgAcpiPlatform.c]
InstallQemuFwCfgTables [QemuFwCfgAcpi.c]
...
eliminating the sub-trees highlighted with "*".
There are two consequences:
(1) Xen compatibility is removed from the ACPI platform driver of the
historical OvmfPkg* platforms.
(2) The ACPI tables that are statically built into OVMF (via
"OvmfPkg/AcpiTables/AcpiTables.inf") are never installed. In
particular, OVMF's own runtime preparation of the MADT and SSDT is
eliminated.
Because of (2), remove the "OvmfPkg/AcpiTables/AcpiTables.inf" module as
well -- and then the ACPITABLE build rule too.
Note that (2) only removes effectively dead code; the QEMU ACPI
linker-loader has taken priority since QEMU 1.7.1 (2014). References:
- https://wiki.qemu.org/Planning/1.7
- https://wiki.qemu.org/Features/ACPITableGeneration
- edk2 commit 96bbdbc856 ("OvmfPkg: AcpiPlatformDxe: download ACPI
tables from QEMU", 2014-03-31)
- edk2 commit 387536e472 ("OvmfPkg: AcpiPlatformDxe: implement QEMU's
full ACPI table loader interface", 2014-09-22)
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2122
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210526201446.12554-4-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3345
During PEI, the MMIO range for the TPM is marked as encrypted when running
as an SEV guest. While this isn't an issue for an SEV guest because of
the way the nested page fault is handled, it does result in an SEV-ES
guest terminating because of a mitigation check in the #VC handler to
prevent MMIO to an encrypted address. For an SEV-ES guest, this range
must be marked as unencrypted.
Create a new x86 PEIM for TPM support that will map the TPM MMIO range as
unencrypted when SEV-ES is active. The gOvmfTpmMmioAccessiblePpiGuid PPI
will be unconditionally installed before exiting. The PEIM will exit with
the EFI_ABORTED status so that the PEIM does not stay resident. This new
PEIM will depend on the installation of the permanent PEI RAM, by
PlatformPei, so that in case page table splitting is required during the
clearing of the encryption bit, the new page table(s) will be allocated
from permanent PEI RAM.
Update all OVMF Ia32 and X64 build packages to include this new PEIM.
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <42794cec1f9d5bc24cbfb9dcdbe5e281ef259ef5.1619716333.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: refresh subject line]
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
In NOOPT and DEBUG builds, if "PcdMaximumLinkedListLength" is nonzero,
then several LIST_ENTRY *node* APIs in BaseLib compare the *full* list
length against the PCD.
This turns the time complexity of node-level APIs from constant to linear,
and that of full-list manipulations from linear to quadratic.
As an example, consider the EFI_SHELL_FILE_INFO list, which is a data
structure that's widely used in the UEFI shell. I randomly extracted 5000
files from "/usr/include" on my laptop, spanning 1095 subdirectories out
of 1538, and then ran "DIR -R" in the UEFI shell on this tree. These are
the wall-clock times:
PcdMaximumLinkedListLength PcdMaximumLinkedListLength
=1,000,000 =0
-------------------------- ---------------------------
FAT 4 min 31 s 18 s
virtio-fs 5 min 13 s 1 min 33 s
Checking list lengths against an arbitrary maximum (default: 1,000,000)
seems useless even in NOOPT and DEBUG builds, while the cost is
significant; so set the PCD to 0.
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Cc: Peter Grehan <grehan@freebsd.org>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Cc: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>
Cc: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3152
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Message-Id: <20210113085453.10168-10-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Some UEFI shell commands read and write files in chunks. The chunk size is
given by "PcdShellFileOperationSize", whose default in
"ShellPkg/ShellPkg.dec" is 4KB (0x1000).
The virtio-fs daemon of QEMU advertizes a 128KB maximum buffer size by
default, for the FUSE_WRITE operation.
By raising PcdShellFileOperationSize 32-fold, the number of FUSE write
requests shrinks proportionately, when writing large files. And when a
Virtio Filesystem is not used, a 128KB chunk size is still not
particularly wasteful.
Some ad-hoc measurements on my laptop, using OVMF:
- The time it takes to copy a ~270MB file from a Virtio Filesystem to the
same Virtio Filesystem improves from ~9 seconds to ~1 second.
- The time it takes to compare two identical ~270MB files on the same
Virtio Filesystem improves from ~11 seconds to ~3 seconds.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3125
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Message-Id: <20210113085453.10168-3-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
In order to be able to issue messages or make interface calls that cause
another #VC (e.g. GetLocalApicBaseAddress () issues RDMSR), add support
for nested #VCs.
In order to support nested #VCs, GHCB backup pages are required. If a #VC
is received while currently processing a #VC, a backup of the current GHCB
content is made. This allows the #VC handler to continue processing the
new #VC. Upon completion of the new #VC, the GHCB is restored from the
backup page. The #VC recursion level is tracked in the per-vCPU variable
area.
Support is added to handle up to one nested #VC (or two #VCs total). If
a second nested #VC is encountered, an ASSERT will be issued and the vCPU
will enter CpuDeadLoop ().
For SEC, the GHCB backup pages are reserved in the OvmfPkgX64.fdf memory
layout, with two new fixed PCDs to provide the address and size of the
backup area.
For PEI/DXE, the GHCB backup pages are allocated as boot services pages
using the memory allocation library.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <ac2e8203fc41a351b43f60d68bdad6b57c4fb106.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Introduce the VirtioFsFuseAttrToEfiFileInfo() function, for converting
FUSE inode attributes to EFI_FILE_INFO.
The EpochToEfiTime() function from EmbeddedPkg's TimeBaseLib proves
invaluable for converting the file access times.
This is the first time we consume TimeBaseLib in OvmfPkg, so add the
necessary lib class resolution. We need not modify any ArmVirtPkg DSC
files: see commit af5fed90bf ("ArmPlatformPkg,ArmVirtPkg: delete
redundant PL031 functions", 2017-05-10).
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3097
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201216211125.19496-22-lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
The purpose of the driver is to ease file exchange (file sharing) between
the guest firmware and the virtualization host. The driver is supposed to
interoperate with QEMU's "virtiofsd" (Virtio Filesystem Daemon).
References:
- https://virtio-fs.gitlab.io/
- https://libvirt.org/kbase/virtiofs.html
VirtioFsDxe will bind virtio-fs devices, and produce
EFI_SIMPLE_FILE_SYSTEM_PROTOCOL instances on them.
In the longer term, assuming QEMU will create "bootorder" fw_cfg file
entries for virtio-fs devices, booting guest OSes from host-side
directories should become possible (dependent on the matching
QemuBootOrderLib enhancement).
Add the skeleton of the driver. Install EFI_DRIVER_BINDING_PROTOCOL with
stub member functions. Install EFI_COMPONENT_NAME2_PROTOCOL with final
member functions. This suffices for the DRIVERS command in the UEFI Shell
to list the driver with a human-readable name.
The file permission model is described immediately in the INF file as a
comment block, for future reference.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3097
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201216211125.19496-2-lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198
Allocate memory for the GHCB pages and the per-CPU variable pages during
SEV initialization for use during Pei and Dxe phases. The GHCB page(s)
must be shared pages, so clear the encryption mask from the current page
table entries. Upon successful allocation, set the GHCB PCDs (PcdGhcbBase
and PcdGhcbSize).
The per-CPU variable page needs to be unique per AP. Using the page after
the GHCB ensures that it is unique per AP. Only the GHCB page is marked as
shared, keeping the per-CPU variable page encyrpted. The same logic is
used in DXE using CreateIdentityMappingPageTables() before switching to
the DXE pagetables.
The GHCB pages (one per vCPU) will be used by the PEI and DXE #VC
exception handlers. The #VC exception handler will fill in the necessary
fields of the GHCB and exit to the hypervisor using the VMGEXIT
instruction. The hypervisor then accesses the GHCB associated with the
vCPU in order to perform the requested function.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
The base VmgExitLib library provides a default limited interface. As it
does not provide full support, create an OVMF version of this library to
begin the process of providing full support of SEV-ES within OVMF.
SEV-ES support is only provided for X64 builds, so only OvmfPkgX64.dsc is
updated to make use of the OvmfPkg version of the library.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
This reverts commit ced77332ca.
The command
virt-install --location NETWORK-URL
downloads the vmlinuz and initrd files from the remote OS tree, and passes
them to the guest firmware via fw_cfg.
When used with IA32 / X64 guests, virt-install expects the guest firmware
to do two things, at the same time:
- launch the fw_cfg kernel image even if the latter does not pass SB
verification (SB checking is supposed to be bypassed entirely in favor
of the Linux/x86 Boot Protocol),
- still let the guest kernel perceive SB as enabled.
Commit ced77332ca prevented this, by removing the Linux/x86 Boot
Protocol from such an OVMF image that was built with SECURE_BOOT_ENALBE.
While that's the right thing in theory, in practice "virt-install
--location NETWORK-URL" is entrenched, and we shouldn't break it.
We can tolerate the Linux/x86 Boot Protocol as a one-of-a-kind SB bypass
for direct-booted kernels, because:
- the fw_cfg content comes from QEMU, and the guest is already at QEMU's
mercy,
- in the guest, OS boots after the initial installation will use "shim"
rather than an fw_cfg kernel, which we can consider somewhat similar to
"Audit Mode / Deployed Mode" (~ trust for install, lock down after).
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Message-Id: <20200615144514.24597-1-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: truncate the subject line, originally auto-generated
by git-revert, to pacify PatchCheck.py]
Any new OVMF binary (containing commit d42fdd6f83, and built with
SMM_REQUIRE) is likely to reboot during its first boot, regardless of
whether the variable store is logically empty, or it contains a
MemoryTypeInformation variable from an earlier OVMF binary.
This "reboot on first boot after OVMF upgrade" occurs despite having
eliminated BS Code/Data tracking in earlier parts of this series. Meaning
that we've outgrown the bins of those memory types too that matter for SMM
security.
Eliminating said reboot will make an upgrade to edk2-stable202005 more
comfortable for users. Increase the defaults empirically. (The total
doesn't exceed 3MB by much.)
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2706
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200508121651.16045-5-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
OVMF booting stops with the assert if built with Xcode on macOS:
Loading driver at 0x0001FAB8000 EntryPoint=0x0001FABF249 LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand.efi
InstallProtocolInterface: BC62157E-3E33-4FEC-9920-2D3B36D750DF 1F218398
ProtectUefiImageCommon - 0x1F218140
- 0x000000001FAB8000 - 0x0000000000008A60
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status = Unsupported)
ASSERT LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand.c(378): !EFI_ERROR (Status)
The assert comes from InitializeHiiPackage() after an attempt to
retrieve HII package list from ImageHandle.
Xcode still doesn't support HII resource section and
LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand depends on it. Likewise 277a3958d9
("OvmfPkg: Don't include TftpDynamicCommand in XCODE5 tool chain"),
disable initrd command if built with Xcode toolchain
Fixes: ec41733cfd ("OvmfPkg: add the 'initrd' dynamic shell command")
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Roman Bolshakov <r.bolshakov@yadro.com>
Message-Id: <20200514134820.62047-1-r.bolshakov@yadro.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Add a minimal, NULL class library called "PxeBcPcdProducerLib" for setting
the "PcdIPv4PXESupport" and "PcdIPv6PXESupport" PCDs of NetworkPkg, from
fw_cfg.
These PCDs control whether the UefiPxeBcDxe driver supports PXEv4 / PXEv6
boot. If a PXE version is disabled, the corresponding LoadFile protocol
instance is not produced by UefiPxeBcDxe, and so
EfiBootManagerRefreshAllBootOption() in UefiBootManagerLib does not
generate corresponding *new* boot options either. (Existent boot options
are not deleted.)
Hook the library into the UefiPxeBcDxe driver. (The driver is already
included from "NetworkComponents.dsc.inc", but we can list it again in the
DSC file, for providing <LibraryClasses> overrides.)
In OVMF, the PCDs could be set in PlatformPei too, but ArmVirtQemu does
not have fw_cfg access in the PEI phase. Hence a NULL class library that
can be linked into UefiPxeBcDxe.
When listing the PCDs under [PcdsDynamicDefault], stick with the DEC
default values.
QEMU switches:
-fw_cfg name=opt/org.tianocore/IPv4PXESupport,string=[yn]
-fw_cfg name=opt/org.tianocore/IPv6PXESupport,string=[yn]
The "opt/org.tianocore" prefix follows the "opt/RFQDN/" recommendation
from QEMU's "docs/specs/fw_cfg.txt".
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Per Sundstrom <per_sundstrom@yahoo.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2681
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200424075353.8489-6-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
The BaseResetSystemLib instance is not suitable for OS runtime, because
its ResetShutdown() implementation calls PciRead16 (OVMF_HOSTBRIDGE_DID).
On q35, this boils down to a memory-mapped config space access -- but we
never ask the OS to map MMCONFIG for runtime.
There are at least three alternatives to approach this:
(1) Investigate "MdePkg/Library/DxeRuntimePciExpressLib", which offers
some kind of runtime mapping for MMCONFIG.
(2) Consume PciCf8Lib directly, rather than PciLib, in ResetSystemLib.
Then we'll read OVMF_HOSTBRIDGE_DID from the config space with IO port
accesses on q35 too, not just on i440fx. IO ports don't depend on page
tables.
(3) In the lib constructor, cache "mAcpiPmBaseAddress" based on
"PcdOvmfHostBridgePciDevId" (which is set by PlatformPei). Then the
host bridge type will be known at runtime without PCI config space
accesses.
This patch follows approach (3), in order to mirror AcpiTimerLib.
Notes:
* This patch is best viewed with "git show --find-copies-harder -C43".
* PCDs are not usable in the DXE_CORE, as the PCD PPI is gone, and the PCD
protocol is not available yet. (The DXE_CORE does consume ResetSystemLib
in practice, when OVMF is built with -D SOURCE_DEBUG_ENABLE.)
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Cc: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2675
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200417153751.7110-7-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: move third Note (with repro info) to BZ comment]
FaultTolerantWritePei consumes:
- PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase,
- PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase.
VariablePei consumes:
- PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64.
Due to the previous patches in this series, the above PCDs are available
in the PEI phase, in the SMM_REQUIRE build.
FaultTolerantWritePei produces a GUID-ed HOB with
FAULT_TOLERANT_WRITE_LAST_WRITE_DATA as contents. It also installs a Null
PPI that carries the same gEdkiiFaultTolerantWriteGuid as the HOB.
VariablePei depends on the Null PPI mentioned above with a DEPEX, consumes
the HOB (which is safe due to the DEPEX), and produces
EFI_PEI_READ_ONLY_VARIABLE2_PPI.
This enables read-only access to non-volatile UEFI variables in the PEI
phase, in the SMM_REQUIRE build.
For now, the DxeLoadCore() function in
"MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/DxeLoad.c" will not access the
"MemoryTypeInformation" variable, because OVMF's PlatformPei always
produces the MemoryTypeInformation HOB.
(Note: when the boot mode is BOOT_ON_S3_RESUME, PlatformPei doesn't build
the HOB, but that's in sync with DxeLoadCore() also not looking for either
the HOB or the UEFI variable.)
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=386
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200310222739.26717-5-lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
The following flash-related base addresses:
- PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64,
- PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase,
- PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase,
are always set to constant (invariable) values in the "-D SMM_REQUIRE"
build of OVMF. (That's because in the SMM build, actual pflash is a hard
requirement, and the RAM-based emulation is never available.)
Set said PCDs statically, at build. This will allow us to depend on their
values in the PEI phase.
When SMM_REQUIRE is FALSE, this change has no effect (confirmed by report
file comparison).
When SMM_REQUIRE is TRUE, the report file shows the following changes:
- "PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase" and
"PcdOvmfFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase" are no longer consumed by any
module directly,
- for "PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase", "PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase"
and "PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64", the access method changes from
DYN to FIXED,
- for the latter PCDs, the zero (dynamic default) values are replaced with
the desired constants.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=386
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200310222739.26717-4-lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
The QemuLoadImageLib implementation we currently use for all OVMF
builds copies the behavior of the QEMU loader code that precedes it,
which is to disregard UEFI secure boot policies entirely when it comes
to loading kernel images that have been specified on the QEMU command
line. This behavior deviates from ArmVirtQemu based builds, which do
take UEFI secure boot policies into account, and refuse to load images
from the command line that cannot be authenticated.
The disparity was originally due to the fact that the QEMU command line
kernel loader did not use LoadImage and StartImage at all, but this
changed recently, and now, there are only a couple of reasons left to
stick with the legacy loader:
- it permits loading images that lack a valid PE/COFF header,
- it permits loading X64 kernels on IA32 firmware running on a X64
capable system.
Since every non-authentic PE/COFF image can trivially be converted into
an image that lacks a valid PE/COFF header, the former case can simply
not be supported in a UEFI secure boot context. The latter case is highly
theoretical, given that one could easily switch to native X64 firmware in
a VM scenario.
That leaves us with little justification to use the legacy loader at all
when UEFI secure boot policies are in effect, so let's switch to the
generic loader for UEFI secure boot enabled builds.
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2566
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
The @file comments in UefiCpuPkg/CpuS3DataDxe say,
[...] It also only supports the number of CPUs reported by the MP
Services Protocol, so this module does not support hot plug CPUs. This
module can be copied into a CPU specific package and customized if these
additional features are required. [...]
The driver is so small that the simplest way to extend it with hotplug
support is indeed to clone it at first. In this patch, customize the
driver only with the following no-op steps:
- Update copyright notices.
- Update INF_VERSION to the latest INF spec version (1.29).
- Update FILE_GUID.
- Drop the UNI files.
- Replace EFI_D_VERBOSE with DEBUG_VERBOSE, to appease "PatchCheck.py".
This patch is best reviewed with:
$ git show --find-copies-harder
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1512
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200226221156.29589-15-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
