In order to support secure boot with authenticated type variable store
and non secure boot with normal type variable store, add one flag to
switch them.
User can append '-D VPD_AUTHENTICATED_VARIABLE_STORE' to build command
to enable authenticated type varaible store.
Also, user can add 'VPD_AUTHENTICATED_VARIABLE_STORE = TRUE/FALSE' to the
defines section of Dsc file to switch authenticated/normal type variable
store.
VPD_AUTHENTICATED_VARIABLE_STORE is a new reserved key word for this function.
Signed-off-by: Chen Lin Z <lin.z.chen@intel.com>
Cc: Bob Feng <bob.c.feng@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Bob Feng <bob.c.feng@intel.com>
Enhance RelocateCapsuleToRam() to skip creation of the Capsule on Disk
file name capsule if PcdSupportUpdateCapsuleReset feature is not enabled.
This avoids an EFI_UNSUPPORTED return status from UpdateCapsule() when the
file name capsule is encountered and PcdSupportUpdateCapsuleReset is FALSE.
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Morgan <bobm@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Bugzilla: 3578 (https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3579)
Since the Common Memory Device (formerly Memory Aggregator Device) was
introduced in ACPI 5.0, the edk2 type values have not matched the
values defined in the ACPI specification.
Fix this discrepancy by aligning the code to match the specification.
Signed-off-by: Chris Jones <christopher.jones@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Add a comment to clarify that in Acpiview the ItemPtr is not set until
after the FieldValidator has been called.
Signed-off-by: Chris Jones <christopher.jones@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
The current UEFI implementation of HTTPS during its TLS configuration
uses
EFI_TLS_VERIFY_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS for host name verification. As per the
spec
this flag does is "to disable the match of any wildcards in the host
name". So,
certificates which are issued with wildcards(*.dm.corp.net etc) in it
will fail
the TLS host name matching. On the other hand,
EFI_TLS_VERIFY_FLAG_NONE(misnomer) means "no additional flags set for
hostname
validation. Wildcards are supported and they match only in the left-most
label."
this behavior/definition is coming from openssl's X509_check_host() api
https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/man3/X509_check_host.html
Without EFI_TLS_VERIFY_FLAG_NONE any UEFI application using certificates
issued
with wildcards in them would fail to match while trying to communicate
with
HTTPS endpoint.
BugZilla: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3691
Signed-off-by: Vineel Kovvuri <vineelko@microsoft.com>
Cc: Maciej Rabeda <maciej.rabeda@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiaxin Wu <jiaxin.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Siyuan Fu <siyuan.fu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiaxin Wu <jiaxin.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Maciej Rabeda <maciej.rabeda@linux.intel.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2673
M mean that Measured Boot, V mean that Verified Boot.
The FvReport do below:
1. Do nothing if neither M nor V
2. Allocate pages to save the firmware volume and use it to install
firmware info Ppi
3. Install PreHashFv Ppi if the FV need measurement.
4. Verify the Hash if the FV need verification
Notes:
1. The component is used to verify the FV or measure the FV
2. Copy action is just for security purpose but not main purpose.
3. If you use this component, Doesn't need to copy in other compoent
which result time consumption.
Signed-off-by: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
PCH SMM module would install SMM SW dispatch2 protocol.
And it supports to register SMI handlers based on SMI APM
interrupt from the bootloader information gSmmRegisterInfoGuid.
It is possible to extend bootloader HOB to pass other information
to support more SMI sources.
If this module is not required by bootloader for some reason, the
bootloader could skip this HOB or build a HOB without EOS info.
Signed-off-by: Guo Dong <guo.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Maurice Ma <maurice.ma@intel.com>
Cc: Benjamin You <benjamin.you@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin You <benjamin.you@intel.com>
This FVB module is used to initialize NV variable region
and provide SMM FVB protocol to read/write SPI variable region.
This module consume HOB gNvVariableInfoGuid and depends on
FlashDeviceLib for the actual SPI device operate.
During FVB initialization, it will initialize the variable region
if the variable region is not valid. And it support to write initial
variable data from FFS file if it is found.
Signed-off-by: Guo Dong <guo.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Maurice Ma <maurice.ma@intel.com>
Cc: Benjamin You <benjamin.you@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin You <benjamin.you@intel.com>
This module is only used for SMM S3 support for the bootloader that
doesn't support SMM.
The payload would save SMM rebase info to SMM communication area in
normal boot and expect the bootloader in S3 path to rebase the SMM
and trigger SMI by writing 0xB2 port with the given value from SMM
communication area. The payload SMM handler would get chance to
restore some registers in S3 path.
Signed-off-by: Guo Dong <guo.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Maurice Ma <maurice.ma@intel.com>
Cc: Benjamin You <benjamin.you@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin You <benjamin.you@intel.com>
This module consumes SMM Registers HOB (SMI_GBL_EN and SMI_APM_EN) to
install SMM control 2 protocol gEfiSmmControl2ProtocolGuid.
The protocol activate() would set SMI_GBL_EN and SMI_APM_EN and trigger
SMI by writing to IO port 0xB3 and 0xB2.
Signed-off-by: Guo Dong <guo.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Maurice Ma <maurice.ma@intel.com>
Cc: Benjamin You <benjamin.you@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin You <benjamin.you@intel.com>
RFC： https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3429
Intel's Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX) refers to an Intel technology
that extends Virtual Machines Extensions (VMX) and Multi-Key Total Memory
Encryption (MKTME) with a new kind of virutal machines guest called a
Trust Domain (TD). A TD is desinged to run in a CPU mode that protects the
confidentiality of TD memory contents and the TD's CPU state from other
software, including the hosting Virtual-Machine Monitor (VMM), unless
explicitly shared by the TD itself.
Note: Intel TDX is only available on X64, so the Tdx related changes are
in X64 path. In IA32 path, there may be null stub to make the build
success.
This patch includes below major changes.
1. Ia32/IntelTdx.asm
IntelTdx.asm includes below routines used in ResetVector
- IsTdx
Check if the running system is Tdx guest.
- InitTdxWorkarea
It initialize the TDX_WORK_AREA. Because it is called by both BSP and
APs and to avoid the race condition, only BSP can initialize the
WORK_AREA. AP will wait until the field of TDX_WORK_AREA_PGTBL_READY
is set.
- ReloadFlat32
After reset all CPUs in TDX are initialized to 32-bit protected mode.
But GDT register is not set. So this routine loads the GDT then jump
to Flat 32 protected mode again.
- InitTdx
This routine wrap above 3 routines together to do Tdx initialization
in ResetVector phase.
- IsTdxEnabled
It is a OneTimeCall to probe if TDX is enabled by checking the
CC_WORK_AREA.
- CheckTdxFeaturesBeforeBuildPagetables
This routine is called to check if it is Non-TDX guest, TDX-Bsp or
TDX-APs. Because in TDX guest all the initialization is done by BSP
(including the page tables). APs should not build the tables.
- TdxPostBuildPageTables
It is called after Page Tables are built by BSP.
byte[TDX_WORK_AREA_PGTBL_READY] is set by BSP to indicate APs can
leave spin and go.
2. Ia32/PageTables64.asm
As described above only the TDX BSP build the page tables. So
PageTables64.asm is updated to make sure only TDX BSP build the
PageTables. TDX APs will skip the page table building and set Cr3
directly.
3. Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm
In Tdx all CPUs "reset" to run on 32-bit protected mode with flat
descriptor (paging disabled). But in Non-Td guest the initial state of
CPUs is 16-bit real mode. To resolve this conflict, BITS 16/32 is used
in the ResetVectorVtf0.asm. It checks the 32-bit protected mode or 16-bit
real mode, then jump to the corresponding entry point.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
RFC： https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3429
In TDX when host VMM creates a new guest TD, some initial set of
TD-private pages are added using the TDH.MEM.PAGE.ADD function. These
pages typically contain Virtual BIOS code and data along with some clear
pages for stacks and heap. In the meanwhile, some configuration data
need be measured by host VMM. Tdx Metadata is designed for this purpose
to indicate host VMM how to do the above tasks.
More detailed information of Metadata is in [TDVF] Section 11.
Tdx Metadata describes the information about the image for VMM use.
For example, the base address and length of the TdHob, Bfv, Cfv, etc.
The offset of the Metadata is stored in a GUID-ed structure which is
appended in the GUID-ed chain from a fixed GPA (0xffffffd0).
In this commit there are 2 new definitions of BFV & CFV.
Tdx Virtual Firmware (TDVF) includes one Firmware Volume (FV) known
as the Boot Firmware Volume (BFV). The FV format is defined in the
UEFI Platform Initialization (PI) spec. BFV includes all TDVF
components required during boot.
TDVF also include a configuration firmware volume (CFV) that is
separated from the BFV. The reason is because the CFV is measured in
RTMR, while the BFV is measured in MRTD.
In practice BFV is the code part of Ovmf image (OVMF_CODE.fd). CFV is
the vars part of Ovmf image (OVMF_VARS.fd).
Since AMD SEV has already defined some SEV specific memory region in
MEMFD. TDX re-uses some of the memory regions defined by SEV.
- MailBox : PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupBase|PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupSize
- TdHob : PcdOvmfSecGhcbBase|PcdOvmfSecGhcbSize
[TDVF] https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/
documents/tdx-virtual-firmware-design-guide-rev-1.pdf
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
RFC： https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3429
Previously WORK_AREA_GUEST_TYPE was cleared in SetCr3ForPageTables64.
This is workable for Legacy guest and SEV guest. But it doesn't work
after Intel TDX is introduced. It is because all TDX CPUs (BSP and APs)
start to run from 0xfffffff0, thus WORK_AREA_GUEST_TYPE will be cleared
multi-times if it is TDX guest. So the clearance of WORK_AREA_GUEST_TYPE
is moved to Main16 entry point in Main.asm.
Note: WORK_AREA_GUEST_TYPE is only defined for ARCH_X64.
For Intel TDX, its corresponding entry point is Main32 (which will be
introduced in next commit in this patch-set). WORK_AREA_GUEST_TYPE will
be cleared there.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
LinuxBoot is a firmware that replaces specific firmware functionality
like the UEFI DXE phase with a Linux kernel and runtime. It is built-in
UEFI image like an application, which is executed at the end of DXE
phase.
To achieve the LinuxBoot boot flow "SEC->PEI->DXE->BDS->LinuxBoot",
today we use the common well-known GUID of UEFI Shell for LinuxBoot
payload, so LinuxBoot developers can effortlessly find the UEFI Shell
Application and replace it with the LinuxBoot payload without
recompiling platform EDK2 (There might be an issue with a few systems
that don't have a UEFI Shell). Also, we have a hard requirement to force
the BDS to boot into the LinuxBoot as it is essentially required that
only the LinuxBoot boot option is permissible and UEFI is an
intermediate bootstrap phase. Considering all the above, it is
reasonable to just have a new GUID for LinuxBoot and require a LinuxBoot
specific BDS implementation. In addition, with making the BDS
implementation simpler, we can reduce many DXE drivers which we think it
is not necessary for LinuxBoot booting.
This patch adds a new PlatformBootManagerLib implementation which
registers only the gArmTokenSpaceGuid.PcdLinuxBootFileGuid for LinuxBoot
payload as an active boot option. It allows BDS to jump to the LinuxBoot
quickly by skipping the UiApp and UEFI Shell.
The PlatformBootManagerLib library derived from
ArmPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLib.
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nhi Pham <nhi@os.amperecomputing.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Samer El-Haj-Mahmoud <Samer.El-Haj-Mahmoud@arm.com>
Acked-by: Moritz Fischer <moritzf@google.com>
