BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275 In preparation for SEV-SNP support move clearing of the GHCB memory from the ResetVector/AmdSev.asm to SecMain/AmdSev.c. The GHCB page is not accessed until SevEsProtocolCheck() switch to full GHCB. So, the move does not make any changes in the code flow or logic. The move will simplify the SEV-SNP support. Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
488 lines
14 KiB
NASM
488 lines
14 KiB
NASM
;------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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; @file
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; Provide the functions to check whether SEV and SEV-ES is enabled.
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;
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; Copyright (c) 2017 - 2021, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. All rights reserved.<BR>
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; SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
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;
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;------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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BITS 32
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;
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; SEV-ES #VC exception handler support
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;
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; #VC handler local variable locations
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;
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%define VC_CPUID_RESULT_EAX 0
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%define VC_CPUID_RESULT_EBX 4
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%define VC_CPUID_RESULT_ECX 8
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%define VC_CPUID_RESULT_EDX 12
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%define VC_GHCB_MSR_EDX 16
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%define VC_GHCB_MSR_EAX 20
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%define VC_CPUID_REQUEST_REGISTER 24
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%define VC_CPUID_FUNCTION 28
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; #VC handler total local variable size
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;
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%define VC_VARIABLE_SIZE 32
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; #VC handler GHCB CPUID request/response protocol values
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;
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%define GHCB_CPUID_REQUEST 4
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%define GHCB_CPUID_RESPONSE 5
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%define GHCB_CPUID_REGISTER_SHIFT 30
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%define CPUID_INSN_LEN 2
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%define SEV_GHCB_MSR 0xc0010130
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%define SEV_STATUS_MSR 0xc0010131
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; The #VC was not for CPUID
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%define TERM_VC_NOT_CPUID 1
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; The unexpected response code
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%define TERM_UNEXPECTED_RESP_CODE 2
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%define PAGE_PRESENT 0x01
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%define PAGE_READ_WRITE 0x02
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%define PAGE_USER_SUPERVISOR 0x04
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%define PAGE_WRITE_THROUGH 0x08
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%define PAGE_CACHE_DISABLE 0x010
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%define PAGE_ACCESSED 0x020
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%define PAGE_DIRTY 0x040
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%define PAGE_PAT 0x080
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%define PAGE_GLOBAL 0x0100
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%define PAGE_2M_MBO 0x080
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%define PAGE_2M_PAT 0x01000
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%define PAGE_4K_PDE_ATTR (PAGE_ACCESSED + \
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PAGE_DIRTY + \
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PAGE_READ_WRITE + \
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PAGE_PRESENT)
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%define PAGE_PDP_ATTR (PAGE_ACCESSED + \
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PAGE_READ_WRITE + \
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PAGE_PRESENT)
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; Macro is used to issue the MSR protocol based VMGEXIT. The caller is
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; responsible to populate values in the EDX:EAX registers. After the vmmcall
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; returns, it verifies that the response code matches with the expected
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; code. If it does not match then terminate the guest. The result of request
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; is returned in the EDX:EAX.
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;
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; args 1:Request code, 2: Response code
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%macro VmgExit 2
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;
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; Add request code:
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; GHCB_MSR[11:0] = Request code
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or eax, %1
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mov ecx, SEV_GHCB_MSR
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wrmsr
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; Issue VMGEXIT - NASM doesn't support the vmmcall instruction in 32-bit
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; mode, so work around this by temporarily switching to 64-bit mode.
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;
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BITS 64
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rep vmmcall
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BITS 32
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mov ecx, SEV_GHCB_MSR
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rdmsr
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;
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; Verify the reponse code, if it does not match then request to terminate
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; GHCB_MSR[11:0] = Response code
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mov ecx, eax
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and ecx, 0xfff
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cmp ecx, %2
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jne SevEsUnexpectedRespTerminate
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%endmacro
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; Macro to terminate the guest using the VMGEXIT.
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; arg 1: reason code
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%macro TerminateVmgExit 1
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mov eax, %1
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;
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; Use VMGEXIT to request termination. At this point the reason code is
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; located in EAX, so shift it left 16 bits to the proper location.
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;
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; EAX[11:0] => 0x100 - request termination
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; EAX[15:12] => 0x1 - OVMF
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; EAX[23:16] => 0xXX - REASON CODE
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;
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shl eax, 16
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or eax, 0x1100
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xor edx, edx
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mov ecx, SEV_GHCB_MSR
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wrmsr
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;
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; Issue VMGEXIT - NASM doesn't support the vmmcall instruction in 32-bit
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; mode, so work around this by temporarily switching to 64-bit mode.
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;
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BITS 64
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rep vmmcall
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BITS 32
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;
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; We shouldn't come back from the VMGEXIT, but if we do, just loop.
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;
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%%TerminateHlt:
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hlt
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jmp %%TerminateHlt
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%endmacro
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; Terminate the guest due to unexpected response code.
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SevEsUnexpectedRespTerminate:
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TerminateVmgExit TERM_UNEXPECTED_RESP_CODE
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; If SEV-ES is enabled then initialize and make the GHCB page shared
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SevClearPageEncMaskForGhcbPage:
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; Check if SEV is enabled
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cmp byte[WORK_AREA_GUEST_TYPE], 1
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jnz SevClearPageEncMaskForGhcbPageExit
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; Check if SEV-ES is enabled
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cmp byte[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA], 1
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jnz SevClearPageEncMaskForGhcbPageExit
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;
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; The initial GHCB will live at GHCB_BASE and needs to be un-encrypted.
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; This requires the 2MB page for this range be broken down into 512 4KB
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; pages. All will be marked encrypted, except for the GHCB.
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;
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mov ecx, (GHCB_BASE >> 21)
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mov eax, GHCB_PT_ADDR + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
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mov [ecx * 8 + PT_ADDR (0x2000)], eax
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;
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; Page Table Entries (512 * 4KB entries => 2MB)
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;
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mov ecx, 512
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pageTableEntries4kLoop:
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mov eax, ecx
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dec eax
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shl eax, 12
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add eax, GHCB_BASE & 0xFFE0_0000
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add eax, PAGE_4K_PDE_ATTR
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mov [ecx * 8 + GHCB_PT_ADDR - 8], eax
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mov [(ecx * 8 + GHCB_PT_ADDR - 8) + 4], edx
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loop pageTableEntries4kLoop
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;
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; Clear the encryption bit from the GHCB entry
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;
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mov ecx, (GHCB_BASE & 0x1F_FFFF) >> 12
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mov [ecx * 8 + GHCB_PT_ADDR + 4], strict dword 0
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SevClearPageEncMaskForGhcbPageExit:
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OneTimeCallRet SevClearPageEncMaskForGhcbPage
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; Check if SEV is enabled, and get the C-bit mask above 31.
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; Modified: EDX
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;
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; The value is returned in the EDX
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GetSevCBitMaskAbove31:
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xor edx, edx
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; Check if SEV is enabled
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cmp byte[WORK_AREA_GUEST_TYPE], 1
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jnz GetSevCBitMaskAbove31Exit
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mov edx, dword[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_ENC_MASK + 4]
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GetSevCBitMaskAbove31Exit:
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OneTimeCallRet GetSevCBitMaskAbove31
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; Check if Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) features are enabled.
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;
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; Register usage is tight in this routine, so multiple calls for the
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; same CPUID and MSR data are performed to keep things simple.
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;
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; Modified: EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX, ESP
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;
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; If SEV is enabled then EAX will be at least 32.
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; If SEV is disabled then EAX will be zero.
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;
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CheckSevFeatures:
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; Set the first byte of the workarea to zero to communicate to the SEC
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; phase that SEV-ES is not enabled. If SEV-ES is enabled, the CPUID
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; instruction will trigger a #VC exception where the first byte of the
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; workarea will be set to one or, if CPUID is not being intercepted,
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; the MSR check below will set the first byte of the workarea to one.
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mov byte[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA], 0
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;
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; Set up exception handlers to check for SEV-ES
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; Load temporary RAM stack based on PCDs (see SevEsIdtVmmComm for
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; stack usage)
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; Establish exception handlers
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;
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mov esp, SEV_ES_VC_TOP_OF_STACK
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mov eax, ADDR_OF(Idtr)
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lidt [cs:eax]
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; Check if we have a valid (0x8000_001F) CPUID leaf
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; CPUID raises a #VC exception if running as an SEV-ES guest
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mov eax, 0x80000000
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cpuid
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; This check should fail on Intel or Non SEV AMD CPUs. In future if
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; Intel CPUs supports this CPUID leaf then we are guranteed to have exact
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; same bit definition.
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cmp eax, 0x8000001f
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jl NoSev
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; Check for SEV memory encryption feature:
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; CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 1
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; CPUID raises a #VC exception if running as an SEV-ES guest
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mov eax, 0x8000001f
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cpuid
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bt eax, 1
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jnc NoSev
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; Check if SEV memory encryption is enabled
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; MSR_0xC0010131 - Bit 0 (SEV enabled)
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mov ecx, SEV_STATUS_MSR
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rdmsr
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bt eax, 0
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jnc NoSev
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; Set the work area header to indicate that the SEV is enabled
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mov byte[WORK_AREA_GUEST_TYPE], 1
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; Check for SEV-ES memory encryption feature:
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; CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 3
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; CPUID raises a #VC exception if running as an SEV-ES guest
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mov eax, 0x8000001f
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cpuid
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bt eax, 3
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jnc GetSevEncBit
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; Check if SEV-ES is enabled
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; MSR_0xC0010131 - Bit 1 (SEV-ES enabled)
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mov ecx, SEV_STATUS_MSR
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rdmsr
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bt eax, 1
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jnc GetSevEncBit
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; Set the first byte of the workarea to one to communicate to the SEC
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; phase that SEV-ES is enabled.
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mov byte[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA], 1
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GetSevEncBit:
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; Get pte bit position to enable memory encryption
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; CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
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;
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and ebx, 0x3f
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mov eax, ebx
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; The encryption bit position is always above 31
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sub ebx, 32
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jns SevSaveMask
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; Encryption bit was reported as 31 or below, enter a HLT loop
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SevEncBitLowHlt:
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cli
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hlt
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jmp SevEncBitLowHlt
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SevSaveMask:
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xor edx, edx
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bts edx, ebx
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mov dword[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_ENC_MASK], 0
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mov dword[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_ENC_MASK + 4], edx
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jmp SevExit
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NoSev:
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;
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; Perform an SEV-ES sanity check by seeing if a #VC exception occurred.
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;
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cmp byte[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA], 0
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jz NoSevPass
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;
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; A #VC was received, yet CPUID indicates no SEV-ES support, something
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; isn't right.
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;
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NoSevEsVcHlt:
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cli
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hlt
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jmp NoSevEsVcHlt
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NoSevPass:
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xor eax, eax
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SevExit:
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;
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; Clear exception handlers and stack
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;
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push eax
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mov eax, ADDR_OF(IdtrClear)
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lidt [cs:eax]
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pop eax
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mov esp, 0
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OneTimeCallRet CheckSevFeatures
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; Start of #VC exception handling routines
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;
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SevEsIdtNotCpuid:
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TerminateVmgExit TERM_VC_NOT_CPUID
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iret
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;
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; Total stack usage for the #VC handler is 44 bytes:
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; - 12 bytes for the exception IRET (after popping error code)
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; - 32 bytes for the local variables.
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;
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SevEsIdtVmmComm:
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;
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; If we're here, then we are an SEV-ES guest and this
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; was triggered by a CPUID instruction
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;
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; Set the first byte of the workarea to one to communicate that
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; a #VC was taken.
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mov byte[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA], 1
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pop ecx ; Error code
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cmp ecx, 0x72 ; Be sure it was CPUID
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jne SevEsIdtNotCpuid
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; Set up local variable room on the stack
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; CPUID function : + 28
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; CPUID request register : + 24
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; GHCB MSR (EAX) : + 20
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; GHCB MSR (EDX) : + 16
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; CPUID result (EDX) : + 12
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; CPUID result (ECX) : + 8
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; CPUID result (EBX) : + 4
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; CPUID result (EAX) : + 0
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sub esp, VC_VARIABLE_SIZE
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; Save the CPUID function being requested
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mov [esp + VC_CPUID_FUNCTION], eax
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; The GHCB CPUID protocol uses the following mapping to request
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; a specific register:
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; 0 => EAX, 1 => EBX, 2 => ECX, 3 => EDX
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;
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; Set EAX as the first register to request. This will also be used as a
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; loop variable to request all register values (EAX to EDX).
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xor eax, eax
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mov [esp + VC_CPUID_REQUEST_REGISTER], eax
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; Save current GHCB MSR value
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mov ecx, SEV_GHCB_MSR
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rdmsr
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mov [esp + VC_GHCB_MSR_EAX], eax
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mov [esp + VC_GHCB_MSR_EDX], edx
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NextReg:
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;
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; Setup GHCB MSR
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; GHCB_MSR[63:32] = CPUID function
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; GHCB_MSR[31:30] = CPUID register
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; GHCB_MSR[11:0] = CPUID request protocol
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;
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mov eax, [esp + VC_CPUID_REQUEST_REGISTER]
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cmp eax, 4
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jge VmmDone
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shl eax, GHCB_CPUID_REGISTER_SHIFT
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mov edx, [esp + VC_CPUID_FUNCTION]
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VmgExit GHCB_CPUID_REQUEST, GHCB_CPUID_RESPONSE
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;
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; Response GHCB MSR
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; GHCB_MSR[63:32] = CPUID register value
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; GHCB_MSR[31:30] = CPUID register
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; GHCB_MSR[11:0] = CPUID response protocol
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;
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; Save returned value
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shr eax, GHCB_CPUID_REGISTER_SHIFT
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mov [esp + eax * 4], edx
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; Next register
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inc word [esp + VC_CPUID_REQUEST_REGISTER]
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jmp NextReg
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VmmDone:
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;
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; At this point we have all CPUID register values. Restore the GHCB MSR,
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; set the return register values and return.
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;
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mov eax, [esp + VC_GHCB_MSR_EAX]
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mov edx, [esp + VC_GHCB_MSR_EDX]
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mov ecx, SEV_GHCB_MSR
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wrmsr
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mov eax, [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EAX]
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mov ebx, [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EBX]
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mov ecx, [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_ECX]
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mov edx, [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EDX]
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add esp, VC_VARIABLE_SIZE
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; Update the EIP value to skip over the now handled CPUID instruction
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; (the CPUID instruction has a length of 2)
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add word [esp], CPUID_INSN_LEN
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iret
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ALIGN 2
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Idtr:
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dw IDT_END - IDT_BASE - 1 ; Limit
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dd ADDR_OF(IDT_BASE) ; Base
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IdtrClear:
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dw 0 ; Limit
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dd 0 ; Base
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ALIGN 16
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;
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; The Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT)
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; This will be used to determine if SEV-ES is enabled. Upon execution
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; of the CPUID instruction, a VMM Communication Exception will occur.
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; This will tell us if SEV-ES is enabled. We can use the current value
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; of the GHCB MSR to determine the SEV attributes.
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;
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IDT_BASE:
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;
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; Vectors 0 - 28 (No handlers)
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;
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%rep 29
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dw 0 ; Offset low bits 15..0
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dw 0x10 ; Selector
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db 0 ; Reserved
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db 0x8E ; Gate Type (IA32_IDT_GATE_TYPE_INTERRUPT_32)
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dw 0 ; Offset high bits 31..16
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%endrep
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;
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; Vector 29 (VMM Communication Exception)
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;
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dw (ADDR_OF(SevEsIdtVmmComm) & 0xffff) ; Offset low bits 15..0
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dw 0x10 ; Selector
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db 0 ; Reserved
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db 0x8E ; Gate Type (IA32_IDT_GATE_TYPE_INTERRUPT_32)
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dw (ADDR_OF(SevEsIdtVmmComm) >> 16) ; Offset high bits 31..16
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;
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; Vectors 30 - 31 (No handlers)
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;
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%rep 2
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dw 0 ; Offset low bits 15..0
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dw 0x10 ; Selector
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db 0 ; Reserved
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db 0x8E ; Gate Type (IA32_IDT_GATE_TYPE_INTERRUPT_32)
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dw 0 ; Offset high bits 31..16
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%endrep
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IDT_END:
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