BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 During BSP startup, the reset vector code will issue a CPUID instruction while in 32-bit mode. When running as an SEV-ES guest, this will trigger a #VC exception. Add exception handling support to the early reset vector code to catch these exceptions. Also, since the guest is in 32-bit mode at this point, writes to the GHCB will be encrypted and thus not able to be read by the hypervisor, so use the GHCB CPUID request/response protocol to obtain the requested CPUID function values and provide these to the guest. The exception handling support is active during the SEV check and uses the OVMF temporary RAM space for a stack. After the SEV check is complete, the exception handling support is removed and the stack pointer cleared. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
494 lines
14 KiB
NASM
494 lines
14 KiB
NASM
;------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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; @file
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; Sets the CR3 register for 64-bit paging
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;
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; Copyright (c) 2008 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
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; SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
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;
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;------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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BITS 32
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%define PAGE_PRESENT 0x01
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%define PAGE_READ_WRITE 0x02
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%define PAGE_USER_SUPERVISOR 0x04
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%define PAGE_WRITE_THROUGH 0x08
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%define PAGE_CACHE_DISABLE 0x010
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%define PAGE_ACCESSED 0x020
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%define PAGE_DIRTY 0x040
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%define PAGE_PAT 0x080
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%define PAGE_GLOBAL 0x0100
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%define PAGE_2M_MBO 0x080
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%define PAGE_2M_PAT 0x01000
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%define PAGE_4K_PDE_ATTR (PAGE_ACCESSED + \
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PAGE_DIRTY + \
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PAGE_READ_WRITE + \
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PAGE_PRESENT)
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%define PAGE_2M_PDE_ATTR (PAGE_2M_MBO + \
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PAGE_ACCESSED + \
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PAGE_DIRTY + \
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PAGE_READ_WRITE + \
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PAGE_PRESENT)
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%define PAGE_PDP_ATTR (PAGE_ACCESSED + \
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PAGE_READ_WRITE + \
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PAGE_PRESENT)
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;
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; SEV-ES #VC exception handler support
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;
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; #VC handler local variable locations
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;
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%define VC_CPUID_RESULT_EAX 0
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%define VC_CPUID_RESULT_EBX 4
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%define VC_CPUID_RESULT_ECX 8
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%define VC_CPUID_RESULT_EDX 12
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%define VC_GHCB_MSR_EDX 16
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%define VC_GHCB_MSR_EAX 20
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%define VC_CPUID_REQUEST_REGISTER 24
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%define VC_CPUID_FUNCTION 28
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; #VC handler total local variable size
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;
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%define VC_VARIABLE_SIZE 32
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; #VC handler GHCB CPUID request/response protocol values
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;
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%define GHCB_CPUID_REQUEST 4
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%define GHCB_CPUID_RESPONSE 5
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%define GHCB_CPUID_REGISTER_SHIFT 30
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%define CPUID_INSN_LEN 2
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; Check if Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature is enabled
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;
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; Modified: EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX, ESP
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;
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; If SEV is enabled then EAX will be at least 32.
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; If SEV is disabled then EAX will be zero.
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;
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CheckSevFeature:
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; Set the first byte of the workarea to zero to communicate to the SEC
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; phase that SEV-ES is not enabled. If SEV-ES is enabled, the CPUID
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; instruction will trigger a #VC exception where the first byte of the
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; workarea will be set to one.
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mov byte[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA], 0
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;
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; Set up exception handlers to check for SEV-ES
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; Load temporary RAM stack based on PCDs (see SevEsIdtVmmComm for
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; stack usage)
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; Establish exception handlers
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;
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mov esp, SEV_ES_VC_TOP_OF_STACK
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mov eax, ADDR_OF(Idtr)
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lidt [cs:eax]
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; Check if we have a valid (0x8000_001F) CPUID leaf
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; CPUID raises a #VC exception if running as an SEV-ES guest
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mov eax, 0x80000000
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cpuid
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; This check should fail on Intel or Non SEV AMD CPUs. In future if
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; Intel CPUs supports this CPUID leaf then we are guranteed to have exact
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; same bit definition.
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cmp eax, 0x8000001f
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jl NoSev
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; Check for memory encryption feature:
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; CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 1
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; CPUID raises a #VC exception if running as an SEV-ES guest
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mov eax, 0x8000001f
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cpuid
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bt eax, 1
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jnc NoSev
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; Check if memory encryption is enabled
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; MSR_0xC0010131 - Bit 0 (SEV enabled)
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mov ecx, 0xc0010131
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rdmsr
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bt eax, 0
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jnc NoSev
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; Get pte bit position to enable memory encryption
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; CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
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;
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mov eax, ebx
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and eax, 0x3f
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jmp SevExit
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NoSev:
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xor eax, eax
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SevExit:
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;
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; Clear exception handlers and stack
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;
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push eax
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mov eax, ADDR_OF(IdtrClear)
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lidt [cs:eax]
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pop eax
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mov esp, 0
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OneTimeCallRet CheckSevFeature
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; Check if Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State (SEV-ES) feature
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; is enabled.
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;
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; Modified: EAX, EBX, ECX
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;
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; If SEV-ES is enabled then EAX will be non-zero.
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; If SEV-ES is disabled then EAX will be zero.
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;
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CheckSevEsFeature:
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xor eax, eax
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; SEV-ES can't be enabled if SEV isn't, so first check the encryption
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; mask.
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test edx, edx
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jz NoSevEs
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; Save current value of encryption mask
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mov ebx, edx
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; Check if SEV-ES is enabled
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; MSR_0xC0010131 - Bit 1 (SEV-ES enabled)
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mov ecx, 0xc0010131
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rdmsr
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and eax, 2
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; Restore encryption mask
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mov edx, ebx
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NoSevEs:
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OneTimeCallRet CheckSevEsFeature
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;
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; Modified: EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX
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;
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SetCr3ForPageTables64:
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OneTimeCall CheckSevFeature
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xor edx, edx
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test eax, eax
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jz SevNotActive
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; If SEV is enabled, C-bit is always above 31
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sub eax, 32
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bts edx, eax
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SevNotActive:
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;
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; For OVMF, build some initial page tables at
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; PcdOvmfSecPageTablesBase - (PcdOvmfSecPageTablesBase + 0x6000).
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;
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; This range should match with PcdOvmfSecPageTablesSize which is
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; declared in the FDF files.
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;
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; At the end of PEI, the pages tables will be rebuilt into a
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; more permanent location by DxeIpl.
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;
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mov ecx, 6 * 0x1000 / 4
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xor eax, eax
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clearPageTablesMemoryLoop:
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mov dword[ecx * 4 + PT_ADDR (0) - 4], eax
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loop clearPageTablesMemoryLoop
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;
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; Top level Page Directory Pointers (1 * 512GB entry)
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;
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mov dword[PT_ADDR (0)], PT_ADDR (0x1000) + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
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mov dword[PT_ADDR (4)], edx
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;
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; Next level Page Directory Pointers (4 * 1GB entries => 4GB)
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;
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mov dword[PT_ADDR (0x1000)], PT_ADDR (0x2000) + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
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mov dword[PT_ADDR (0x1004)], edx
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mov dword[PT_ADDR (0x1008)], PT_ADDR (0x3000) + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
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mov dword[PT_ADDR (0x100C)], edx
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mov dword[PT_ADDR (0x1010)], PT_ADDR (0x4000) + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
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mov dword[PT_ADDR (0x1014)], edx
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mov dword[PT_ADDR (0x1018)], PT_ADDR (0x5000) + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
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mov dword[PT_ADDR (0x101C)], edx
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;
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; Page Table Entries (2048 * 2MB entries => 4GB)
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;
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mov ecx, 0x800
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pageTableEntriesLoop:
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mov eax, ecx
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dec eax
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shl eax, 21
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add eax, PAGE_2M_PDE_ATTR
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mov [ecx * 8 + PT_ADDR (0x2000 - 8)], eax
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mov [(ecx * 8 + PT_ADDR (0x2000 - 8)) + 4], edx
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loop pageTableEntriesLoop
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OneTimeCall CheckSevEsFeature
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test eax, eax
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jz SetCr3
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;
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; The initial GHCB will live at GHCB_BASE and needs to be un-encrypted.
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; This requires the 2MB page for this range be broken down into 512 4KB
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; pages. All will be marked encrypted, except for the GHCB.
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;
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mov ecx, (GHCB_BASE >> 21)
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mov eax, GHCB_PT_ADDR + PAGE_PDP_ATTR
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mov [ecx * 8 + PT_ADDR (0x2000)], eax
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;
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; Page Table Entries (512 * 4KB entries => 2MB)
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;
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mov ecx, 512
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pageTableEntries4kLoop:
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mov eax, ecx
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dec eax
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shl eax, 12
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add eax, GHCB_BASE & 0xFFE0_0000
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add eax, PAGE_4K_PDE_ATTR
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mov [ecx * 8 + GHCB_PT_ADDR - 8], eax
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mov [(ecx * 8 + GHCB_PT_ADDR - 8) + 4], edx
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loop pageTableEntries4kLoop
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;
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; Clear the encryption bit from the GHCB entry
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;
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mov ecx, (GHCB_BASE & 0x1F_FFFF) >> 12
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mov [ecx * 8 + GHCB_PT_ADDR + 4], strict dword 0
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mov ecx, GHCB_SIZE / 4
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xor eax, eax
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clearGhcbMemoryLoop:
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mov dword[ecx * 4 + GHCB_BASE - 4], eax
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loop clearGhcbMemoryLoop
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SetCr3:
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;
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; Set CR3 now that the paging structures are available
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;
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mov eax, PT_ADDR (0)
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mov cr3, eax
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OneTimeCallRet SetCr3ForPageTables64
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;
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; Start of #VC exception handling routines
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;
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SevEsIdtNotCpuid:
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;
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; Use VMGEXIT to request termination.
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; 1 - #VC was not for CPUID
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;
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mov eax, 1
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jmp SevEsIdtTerminate
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SevEsIdtNoCpuidResponse:
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;
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; Use VMGEXIT to request termination.
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; 2 - GHCB_CPUID_RESPONSE not received
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;
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mov eax, 2
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SevEsIdtTerminate:
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;
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; Use VMGEXIT to request termination. At this point the reason code is
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; located in EAX, so shift it left 16 bits to the proper location.
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;
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; EAX[11:0] => 0x100 - request termination
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; EAX[15:12] => 0x1 - OVMF
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; EAX[23:16] => 0xXX - REASON CODE
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;
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shl eax, 16
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or eax, 0x1100
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xor edx, edx
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mov ecx, 0xc0010130
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wrmsr
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;
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; Issue VMGEXIT - NASM doesn't support the vmmcall instruction in 32-bit
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; mode, so work around this by temporarily switching to 64-bit mode.
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;
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BITS 64
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rep vmmcall
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BITS 32
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;
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; We shouldn't come back from the VMGEXIT, but if we do, just loop.
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;
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SevEsIdtHlt:
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hlt
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jmp SevEsIdtHlt
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iret
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;
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; Total stack usage for the #VC handler is 44 bytes:
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; - 12 bytes for the exception IRET (after popping error code)
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; - 32 bytes for the local variables.
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;
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SevEsIdtVmmComm:
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;
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; If we're here, then we are an SEV-ES guest and this
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; was triggered by a CPUID instruction
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;
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; Set the first byte of the workarea to one to communicate to the SEC
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; phase that SEV-ES is enabled.
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mov byte[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA], 1
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pop ecx ; Error code
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cmp ecx, 0x72 ; Be sure it was CPUID
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jne SevEsIdtNotCpuid
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; Set up local variable room on the stack
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; CPUID function : + 28
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; CPUID request register : + 24
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; GHCB MSR (EAX) : + 20
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; GHCB MSR (EDX) : + 16
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; CPUID result (EDX) : + 12
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; CPUID result (ECX) : + 8
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; CPUID result (EBX) : + 4
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; CPUID result (EAX) : + 0
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sub esp, VC_VARIABLE_SIZE
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; Save the CPUID function being requested
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mov [esp + VC_CPUID_FUNCTION], eax
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; The GHCB CPUID protocol uses the following mapping to request
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; a specific register:
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; 0 => EAX, 1 => EBX, 2 => ECX, 3 => EDX
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;
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; Set EAX as the first register to request. This will also be used as a
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; loop variable to request all register values (EAX to EDX).
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xor eax, eax
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mov [esp + VC_CPUID_REQUEST_REGISTER], eax
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; Save current GHCB MSR value
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mov ecx, 0xc0010130
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rdmsr
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mov [esp + VC_GHCB_MSR_EAX], eax
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mov [esp + VC_GHCB_MSR_EDX], edx
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NextReg:
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;
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; Setup GHCB MSR
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; GHCB_MSR[63:32] = CPUID function
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; GHCB_MSR[31:30] = CPUID register
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; GHCB_MSR[11:0] = CPUID request protocol
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;
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mov eax, [esp + VC_CPUID_REQUEST_REGISTER]
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cmp eax, 4
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jge VmmDone
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shl eax, GHCB_CPUID_REGISTER_SHIFT
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or eax, GHCB_CPUID_REQUEST
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mov edx, [esp + VC_CPUID_FUNCTION]
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mov ecx, 0xc0010130
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wrmsr
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;
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; Issue VMGEXIT - NASM doesn't support the vmmcall instruction in 32-bit
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; mode, so work around this by temporarily switching to 64-bit mode.
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;
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BITS 64
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rep vmmcall
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BITS 32
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;
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; Read GHCB MSR
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; GHCB_MSR[63:32] = CPUID register value
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; GHCB_MSR[31:30] = CPUID register
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; GHCB_MSR[11:0] = CPUID response protocol
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;
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mov ecx, 0xc0010130
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rdmsr
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mov ecx, eax
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and ecx, 0xfff
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cmp ecx, GHCB_CPUID_RESPONSE
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jne SevEsIdtNoCpuidResponse
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; Save returned value
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shr eax, GHCB_CPUID_REGISTER_SHIFT
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mov [esp + eax * 4], edx
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; Next register
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inc word [esp + VC_CPUID_REQUEST_REGISTER]
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jmp NextReg
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VmmDone:
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;
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; At this point we have all CPUID register values. Restore the GHCB MSR,
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; set the return register values and return.
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;
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mov eax, [esp + VC_GHCB_MSR_EAX]
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mov edx, [esp + VC_GHCB_MSR_EDX]
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mov ecx, 0xc0010130
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wrmsr
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mov eax, [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EAX]
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mov ebx, [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EBX]
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mov ecx, [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_ECX]
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mov edx, [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EDX]
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add esp, VC_VARIABLE_SIZE
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; Update the EIP value to skip over the now handled CPUID instruction
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; (the CPUID instruction has a length of 2)
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add word [esp], CPUID_INSN_LEN
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iret
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ALIGN 2
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Idtr:
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dw IDT_END - IDT_BASE - 1 ; Limit
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dd ADDR_OF(IDT_BASE) ; Base
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IdtrClear:
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dw 0 ; Limit
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dd 0 ; Base
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ALIGN 16
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;
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; The Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT)
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; This will be used to determine if SEV-ES is enabled. Upon execution
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; of the CPUID instruction, a VMM Communication Exception will occur.
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; This will tell us if SEV-ES is enabled. We can use the current value
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; of the GHCB MSR to determine the SEV attributes.
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;
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IDT_BASE:
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;
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; Vectors 0 - 28 (No handlers)
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;
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%rep 29
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dw 0 ; Offset low bits 15..0
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dw 0x10 ; Selector
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db 0 ; Reserved
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db 0x8E ; Gate Type (IA32_IDT_GATE_TYPE_INTERRUPT_32)
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dw 0 ; Offset high bits 31..16
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%endrep
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;
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; Vector 29 (VMM Communication Exception)
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;
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dw (ADDR_OF(SevEsIdtVmmComm) & 0xffff) ; Offset low bits 15..0
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dw 0x10 ; Selector
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db 0 ; Reserved
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db 0x8E ; Gate Type (IA32_IDT_GATE_TYPE_INTERRUPT_32)
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dw (ADDR_OF(SevEsIdtVmmComm) >> 16) ; Offset high bits 31..16
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;
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; Vectors 30 - 31 (No handlers)
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;
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%rep 2
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dw 0 ; Offset low bits 15..0
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dw 0x10 ; Selector
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db 0 ; Reserved
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db 0x8E ; Gate Type (IA32_IDT_GATE_TYPE_INTERRUPT_32)
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dw 0 ; Offset high bits 31..16
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%endrep
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IDT_END:
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