The VirtHstiDxe does not work in confidential guests. There also isn't
anything we can reasonably test, neither flash storage nor SMM mode will
be used in that case. So just skip driver load when running in a
confidential guest.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Fixes: 506740982b ("OvmfPkg/VirtHstiDxe: add code flash check")
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Srikanth Aithal <sraithal@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Ensure that when a #VC exception happens, the instruction at the
instruction pointer matches the instruction that is expected given the
error code. This is to mitigate the ahoi WeSee attack [1] that could
allow hypervisors to breach integrity and confidentiality of the
firmware by maliciously injecting interrupts. This change is a
translated version of a linux patch e3ef461af35a ("x86/sev: Harden #VC
instruction emulation somewhat")
[1] https://ahoi-attacks.github.io/wesee/
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Adam Dunlap <acdunlap@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
The optimization that enabled entry with MMU and caches enabled at EL1
removed the strict alignment requirement for XIP code (roughly, any code
that might execute with the MMU and caches off, which means SEC and PEI
phase modules but also *all* BASE libraries), on the basis that QEMU can
only run guest payloads at EL2 in TCG emulation, which used to ignore
alignment violations, and execution at EL1 would always occur with the
MMU enabled.
This assumption no longer holds: not only does QEMU now enforce strict
alignment for memory accesses with device semantics, there are also
cases where this code might execute at EL2 under virtualization (i.e.,
under NV2 nested virtualization) where the strict alignment is required
too.
The latter case could be optimized too, by enabling VHE and pretending
execution is occurring at EL1, which would allow the existing logic for
entry with the MMU enabled to be reused. However, this would leave
non-VHE CPUs behind.
So in summary, strict alignment needs to be enforced for any code that
may execute with the MMU off, so drop the override that sets the XIP
flags to the empty string.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
The driver supports qemu machine types 'pc' and 'q35'.
This patch adds some helper functions to manage the bitmasks.
The implemented features depend on both OVMF build configuration
and qemu VM configuration.
For q35 a single security feature is supported and checked: In
SMM-enabled builds the driver will verify smram is properly locked.
That test should never fail.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Konstantin Kostiuk <kkostiuk@redhat.com>
Initial-patch-by: Konstantin Kostiuk <kkostiuk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
The SVSM specification documents an alternative method of discovery for
the SVSM using a reserved CPUID bit and a reserved MSR.
For the CPUID support, the #VC handler of an SEV-SNP guest should modify
the returned value in the EAX register for the 0x8000001f CPUID function
by setting bit 28 when an SVSM is present.
For the MSR support, new reserved MSR 0xc001f000 has been defined. A #VC
should be generated when accessing this MSR. The #VC handler is expected
to ignore writes to this MSR and return the physical calling area address
(CAA) on reads of this MSR.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
The RMPADJUST instruction is used to alter the VMSA attribute of a page,
but the VMSA attribute can only be changed when running at VMPL0. When
an SVSM is present, use the SVSM_CORE_CREATE_VCPU and SVSM_CORE_DELTE_VCPU
calls to add or remove the VMSA attribute on a page instead of issuing
the RMPADJUST instruction directly.
Implement the AmdSvsmSnpVmsaRmpAdjust() API to perform the proper operation
to update the VMSA attribute.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
Add initial support for the new AmdSvsmLib library to OvmfPkg. The initial
implementation fully implements the library interfaces.
The SVSM presence check, AmdSvsmIsSvsmPresent(), determines the presence
of an SVSM by checking if an SVSM has been advertised in the SEV-SNP
Secrets Page.
The VMPL API, AmdSvsmSnpGetVmpl(), returns the VMPL level at which OVMF is
currently running.
The CAA API, AmdSvsmSnpGetCaa(), returns the Calling Area Address when an
SVSM is present, 0 otherwise.
The PVALIDATE API, AmdSvsmSnpPvalidate(), copies the PVALIDATE logic from
the BaseMemEncryptSevLib library for the initial implementation. The
BaseMemEncryptSevLib library will be changed to use this new API so that
the decision as to whether the SVSM is needed to perform the operation
can be isolated to this library.
The VMSA API, AmdSvsmSnpVmsaRmpAdjust(), copies the RMPUPDATE logic from
the MpInitLib library for the initial implementation. The MpInitLib
library will be changed to use this new API so that the decision as to
whether the SVSM is needed to perform the operation can be isolated to
this library.
Cc: Anatol Belski <anbelski@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jianyong Wu <jianyong.wu@arm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
The SVSM specification relies on a specific register calling convention to
hold the parameters that are associated with the SVSM request. The SVSM is
invoked by requesting the hypervisor to run the VMPL0 VMSA of the guest
using the GHCB MSR Protocol or a GHCB NAE event.
Create a new version of the VMGEXIT instruction that will adhere to this
calling convention and load the SVSM function arguments into the proper
register before invoking the VMGEXIT instruction. On return, perform the
atomic exchange on the SVSM call pending value as specified in the SVSM
specification.
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
When building the Page State Change entries for a range of memory, it can
happen that multiple calls to BuildPageStateBuffer() need to be made. If
the size of the input work area passed to BuildPageStateBuffer() exceeds
the number of entries that can be passed to the hypervisor using the GHCB
shared buffer, the Page State Change VMGEXIT support will issue multiple
VMGEXITs to process all entries in the buffer.
However, it could be that the final VMGEXIT for each round of Page State
Changes is only for a small number of entries and subsequent VMGEXITs may
still be issued to handle the full range of memory requested. To maximize
the number of entries processed during the Page State Change VMGEXIT,
limit BuildPageStateBuffer() to not build entries that exceed the maximum
number of entries that can be handled in a single Page State Change
VMGEXIT.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
In preparation for running under an SVSM at VMPL1 or higher (higher
numerically, lower privilege), re-organize the way a page state change
is performed in order to free up the GHCB for use by the SVSM support.
Currently, the page state change logic directly uses the GHCB shared
buffer to build the page state change structures. However, this will be
in conflict with the use of the GHCB should an SVSM call be required.
Instead, use a separate buffer (an area in the workarea during SEC and
an allocated page during PEI/DXE) to hold the page state change request
and only update the GHCB shared buffer as needed.
Since the information is copied to, and operated on, in the GHCB shared
buffer this has the added benefit of not requiring to save the start and
end entries for use when validating the memory during the page state
change sequence.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
The SNP_PAGE_STATE_MAX_ENTRY is based on the number of entries that can
fit in the GHCB shared buffer. As a result, the SNP_PAGE_STATE_CHANGE_INFO
structure maps the full GHCB shared buffer based on the shared buffer size
being 2032 bytes.
Instead of using a hardcoded value for SNP_PAGE_STATE_MAX_ENTRY, use a
build calculated value. Since the SNP_PAGE_STATE_CHANGE_INFO is used as a
mapping, eliminate the hardcoded array size so that the structure can be
used based on any size buffer.
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4736
In UEFI_Spec_2_10_Aug29.pdf page 1694 section 35.5.4 for
EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_FORM_OPEN:
NOTE: EFI_FORM_BROWSER2_PROTOCOL.BrowserCallback() cannot be used with
this browser action because question values have not been retrieved yet.
So should not call HiiGetBrowserData() and HiiSetBrowserData() in FORM_OPEN
call back function.
Now use wifi list key and enroll cert key instead of the connect action key,
move wifi info display from open action to close action.
Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Cc: Felix Polyudov <Felixp@ami.com>
Signed-off-by: Liqi Liu <liqi.liu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>