REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2881
Currently, the build tool try to read the section alignment
from efi file if the section alignment type is Auto.
If there is no efi generated, the section alignment will
be set to zero. This behavior causes the Makefile to be different
between the full build and the incremental build.
Since the Genffs can auto get the section alignment from
efi file during Genffs procedure, the build tool can just set section
alignment as zero. This change can make the autogen makefile
consistent for the full build and the incremental build.
Signed-off-by: Bob Feng <bob.c.feng@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Yuwei Chen <yuwei.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Yuwei Chen<yuwei.chen@intel.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2978
If a module add a new PCD, the pcd token number will be
reassigned. The new Pcd token number should be updated
to all module's autogen files. CanSkip can only detect a
single module's change but not others. CanSkip block the
pcd token number update in incremental build, so this
patch is going to remove this call.
Signed-off-by: Bob Feng <bob.c.feng@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Yuwei Chen <yuwei.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yuwei Chen<yuwei.chen@intel.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2880
Currently, When doing the Incremental build, the directory
macros extended to absolute path in output Makefile, which
is inconsistent with the output of Clean build.
When we do macro replacement, we can't replace macro due to
inconsistent path case, which results in inconsistent display
of incremental build and clean build in makefile.Therefore,
the path is converted to achieve the correct macro replacement.
Signed-off-by: Mingyue Liang <mingyuex.liang@intel.com>
Cc: Bob Feng <bob.c.feng@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Yuwei Chen <yuwei.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Feng <bob.c.feng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yuwei Chen <yuwei.chen@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2947
When calculating memory regions and store the information in the
gSystemMemory in file WinHost.c, the code below will cause overflow,
because _wtoi (MemorySizeStr) return an int value and SIZE_1MB is
also an int value, if MemorySizeStr is lager for example 2048, then
result of multiplication will overflow.
for (Index = 0, Done = FALSE; !Done; Index++) {
//
// Save the size of the memory and make a Unicode filename SystemMemory00
//
gSystemMemory[Index].Size = _wtoi (MemorySizeStr) * SIZE_1MB;
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wenyi Xie <xiewenyi2@huawei.com>
In QEMU commit range 4abf70a661a5..69699f3055a5 (later fixed up in QEMU
commit 4318432ccd3f), Phil implemented a QEMU facility for exposing the
host-side TLS cipher suite configuration to OVMF. The purpose is to
control the permitted ciphers in the guest's UEFI HTTPS boot. This
complements the forwarding of the host-side crypto policy from the host to
the guest -- the other facet was the set of CA certificates (for which
p11-kit patches had been upstreamed, on the host side).
Mention the new command line options in "OvmfPkg/README".
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2852
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200922091827.12617-1-lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
... for git-shortlog purposes.
NOTE: this patch does not introduce a cross-domain mapping; it only maps
both email addresses of Rebecca to the full name "Rebecca Cran".
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Cc: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>
... for git-shortlog purposes.
NOTE: this patch does not introduce a cross-domain mapping; it only maps
the name "gaoliming" in Liming's new email address to "Liming Gao" (see
the Author field on commit aad9cba85f).
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
* Recently, OpensslLib [LibraryClasses] has been changed
to include RngLib which causes the SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE
build to fail in want of RngLib
* This patch adds the RngLib for OpensslLib
Signed-off-by: Divneil Rai Wadhawan <divneil.r.wadhawan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE feature flag is introduced to enable Secure Boot.
The following gets enabled with this patch:
* Secure Boot Menu in "Device Manager" for enrolling keys
* Storage space for Authenticated Variables
* Authenticated execution of 3rd party images
Signed-off-by: Divneil Rai Wadhawan <divneil.r.wadhawan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Add check for NULL HostAddress in AllocateBuffer as required by UEFI
specification.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Brasen <jbrasen@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
There is a DEBUG warning printout in VirtioMmioDeviceLib if the current
device's VendorID does not match the traditional 16-bit Red Hat PCIe
vendor ID used with virtio-pci. The virtio-mmio vendor ID is 32-bit and
has no connection to the PCIe registry.
Most specifically, this causes a bunch of noise when booting an AArch64
QEMU platform, since QEMU's virtio-mmio implementation used 'QEMU' as
the vendor ID:
VirtioMmioInit: Warning:
The VendorId (0x554D4551) does not match the VirtIo VendorId (0x1AF4).
Drop the warning message.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
The BaseSerialPortLib16550 does fallback to a fixed address UART defined
by PcdSerialRegisterBase and does not initialize if it is zero. Do not
assume a serial port at 0x3F8, otherwise it could cause errors during
initialization of a non-existent serial port on non legacy platforms.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Rudolph <patrick.rudolph@9elements.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcello Sylvester Bauer <marcello.bauer@9elements.com>
Reviewed-by: Maurice Ma <maurice.ma@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Guo Dong <guo.dong@intel.com>
If VPD PcdNvStoreDefaultValueBuffer is used, all DynamicHii and
DynamicExHii PCD value will be generated into that VPD.
In order to generate the same VPD binary file in every build,
sort the Pcd set when generating VPD.
Signed-off-by: Bob Feng <bob.c.feng@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Yuwei Chen <yuwei.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
The following two quantities:
SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size
SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet
are used multiple times in DxeImageVerificationHandler(). Introduce helper
variables for them: "SecDataDirEnd" and "SecDataDirLeft", respectively.
This saves us multiple calculations and significantly simplifies the code.
Note that all three summands above have type UINT32, therefore the new
variables are also of type UINT32.
This patch does not change behavior.
(Note that the code already handles the case when the
SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size
UINT32 addition overflows -- namely, in that case, the certificate loop is
never entered, and the corruption check right after the loop fires.)
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Wenyi Xie <xiewenyi2@huawei.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2215
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200901091221.20948-2-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Wenyi Xie <xiewenyi2@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Min M Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
The "virsh setvcpus" (plural) command may hot-plug several VCPUs in quick
succession -- it means a series of "device_add" QEMU monitor commands,
back-to-back.
If a "device_add" occurs *just after* ACPI raises the broadcast SMI, then:
- the CPU_FOREACH() loop in QEMU's ich9_apm_ctrl_changed() cannot make the
SMI pending for the new CPU -- at that time, the new CPU doesn't even
exist yet,
- OVMF will find the new CPU however (in the CPU hotplug register block),
in QemuCpuhpCollectApicIds().
As a result, when the firmware sends an INIT-SIPI-SIPI to the new CPU in
SmbaseRelocate(), expecting it to boot into SMM (due to the pending SMI),
the new CPU instead boots straight into the post-RSM (normal mode) "pen",
skipping its initial SMI handler.
The CPU halts nicely in the pen, but its SMBASE is never relocated, and
the SMRAM message exchange with the BSP falls apart -- the BSP gets stuck
in the following loop:
//
// Wait until the hot-added CPU is just about to execute RSM.
//
while (Context->AboutToLeaveSmm == 0) {
CpuPause ();
}
because the new CPU's initial SMI handler never sets the flag to nonzero.
Fix this by sending a directed SMI to the new CPU just before sending it
the INIT-SIPI-SIPI. The various scenarios are documented in the code --
the cases affected by the patch are documented under point (2).
Note that this is not considered a security patch, as for a malicious
guest OS, the issue is not exploitable -- the symptom is a hang on the
BSP, in the above-noted loop in SmbaseRelocate(). Instead, the patch fixes
behavior for a benign guest OS.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Fixes: 51a6fb4118
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2929
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200826222129.25798-3-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
The "virsh setvcpus" (plural) command may hot-plug several VCPUs in quick
succession -- it means a series of "device_add" QEMU monitor commands,
back-to-back.
If a "device_add" occurs *just before* ACPI raises the broadcast SMI,
then:
- OVMF processes the hot-added CPU well.
- However, QEMU's post-SMI ACPI loop -- which clears the pending events
for the hot-added CPUs that were collected before raising the SMI -- is
unaware of the stray CPU. Thus, the pending event is not cleared for it.
As a result of the stuck event, at the next hot-plug, OVMF tries to re-add
(relocate for the 2nd time) the already-known CPU. At that time, the AP is
already in the normal edk2 SMM busy-wait however, so it doesn't respond to
the exchange that the BSP intends to do in SmbaseRelocate(). Thus the VM
gets stuck in SMM.
(Because of the above symptom, this is not considered a security patch; it
doesn't seem exploitable by a malicious guest OS.)
In CpuHotplugMmi(), skip the supposedly hot-added CPU if it's already
known. The post-SMI ACPI loop will clear the pending event for it this
time.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Fixes: bc498ac4ca
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2929
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200826222129.25798-2-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
